The conventional story around the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is that it was the final blow in bringing down the Glass-Steagall Act wall that separated commercial and investment banking in 1999, increasing risky business activities by commercial banks and inadvertently precipitating the 2007 financial crisis. But the conventional story is only one-half complete. What it omits is the effect of change in commercial bank regulation on investment banks. After all, it was the failure of Lehman Brothers—an investment bank, not a commercial bank—that sparked the meltdown.
My recent article, Size Matters: Commercial Banks and the Capital Markets, fills in the rest … Read more
The Wall Street Journal recently reported that federal prosecutors are pursuing criminal cases against bank executives for allegedly selling flawed mortgage securities. The crux of the cases? That the bankers ignored warnings they were packaging too many shaky mortgages into investment securities and failed to disclose the risks to others. The result, they claim, was fraud.
In a recent paper, The Nonprime Mortgage Crisis and Positive Feedback Lending, we collected evidence that the risk of a nonprime housing bubble (not the certainty, but a meaningful risk) should have been obvious to the originators, securitizers, rating agencies, money managers, and … Read more
The following post comes to us from Charles K. Whitehead, Professor of Law at Cornell Law School, and is based on his recent paper, “Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition,” which is co-authored by Simone M. Sepe, Associate Professor of Law and Finance, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law. The full paper is available here.
The financial markets have transformed in the last four decades. Greater competition among banks and non-banks across traditional business lines has benefited consumers. But at what expense?
In Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition, my co-author, Simone Sepe, … Read more
The accepted wisdom is that a lawyer who represents herself—by acting as both a lawyer and a director—has a fool for a client. In our working paper, Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations, my co-authors, Lubomir Litov and Simone Sepe, and I explain why the accepted wisdom is outdated. The benefits of lawyer-directors in today’s world significantly outweigh the costs. Beyond monitoring, they help manage litigation and regulation, as well as structure compensation to align CEO and shareholder interests. On average, a lawyer-director increases firm value by 9.5 percent, and when the lawyer is also a company executive, … Read more