Can Regulators Prevent Corporate Scandals? What 200 Years of History Tell Us

Are regulatory interventions in financial markets delayed reactions to market failures, or can regulators pre-empt corporate misbehavior? Given the high economic and social costs associated with corporate scandals, and the substantial resources countries dedicate to preventing such misconduct, the answer to this question is of utmost importance.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that regulatory activity has a strong reactive component. History offers several prominent examples: The British Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844 followed widespread business failures and bankruptcies, the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are often seen as a reaction to the Great Depression … Read more

No Country Left Behind: History Complicates Efforts to Harmonize Global Regulation

The European Union (EU) enacted a series of regulations in the early 2000s to improve the financial markets of member states. While the new regulations were formally the same across the EU, member countries must individually implement, supervise, and enforce them. Our paper, recently published in the Review of Financial Studies and available here, uses this situation to estimate the causal effect of securities regulation on market liquidity and also to examine how prior conditions, implementation, and enforcement affect the results of new regulation.

In our study, we examined the liquidity effects of two EU directives on securities regulation. … Read more