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Fried Frank discusses Expansion of Aiding and Abetting Liability for “Gatekeepers” — Stewart v. Wilmington Trust

In Stewart v. Wilmington Trust (March 26, 2015), the Delaware Chancery Court characterized the outside auditor and the administrative management company for certain captive insurance companies as having a “gatekeeping role” for the companies. On that basis, the court refused to dismiss claims against them for aiding and abetting the alleged breaches of fiduciary duties of the companies’ directors. The decision expands the Chancery Court’s recent focus on the gatekeeper concept, underscoring the potential for aiding and abetting liability for advisors.

Focus on advisors who have a “gatekeeper” role. An advisor to a board may have aiding and abetting liability if the advisor “knowingly participated” in a directors’ breach of fiduciary duties—even if the director herself is exculpated under the company’s charter against liability for breach of the duty of care. Recent Chancery Court decisions have focused on aiding and abetting liability of advisors who the court views as having a gatekeeper role with respect to a corporation’s sale or other process. As articulated in Wilmington Trust, the court’s view is that, while “gatekeepers” are engaged by companies to provide services and are not fiduciaries with the same duties as directors have, they “are different from other third parties with whom the corporation may conduct business,” in that they “occupy a position of trust and materially participate in the traditional insiders’ discharge of their fiduciary duties.” This view reflects a heightened risk of aiding and abetting liability for directors’ breaches. Importantly, however, in the two cases in which the court has found (or, at the pleading stage, has inferred) the requisite “knowing participation” by an advisor, the court viewed the advisor’s conduct as egregious, involving an unusual degree of negligence and conflict of interest.

Recent cases.

Wilmington Trust. In Wilmington Trust:

The court noted that the management company and the auditor were present when the audited financial statements for 2008 were approved by the board with little or no discussion. Most importantly, the management company and the auditor, in connection with the 2008 financial statements, presented certain items that had been identified in the 2007 “significant matters letter” as being “less of a problem than they really were”, and then “allowed the directors to ignore the letter and the suggestions in it”. Adopting the phraseology used in Rural Metro, the court stated: “This knowing lack of follow-up directly created the ‘unreasonable process’ and ‘informational gaps’ that are alleged to have led to the Board’s breaches of fiduciary duties.”

The court distinguished the situation involving another auditor that had been engaged only for the 2008 financial statements. This firm may well have been negligent in its work, according to the court; but it had “not been around long enough” to have engaged in the dereliction of its responsibilities that the court ascribed to the management company and the auditor—namely, the “knowing failure to follow up on the original warnings they provided to the Board in connection with the first audit, despite experiencing very similar irregularities the next year.”

The in pari delicto doctrine and exceptions. In Wilmington Trust, the court held that the doctrine of in pari delicto barred breach of contract and negligence claims against the management company and the auditor, and also would have barred aiding and abetting claims against any person other than an insider fiduciary of the companies. To avoid aiding and abetting claims being barred against non-fiduciary third parties who are gatekeepers, the court created a new exception to the doctrine. Applying this new exception for gatekeepers, the court refused to dismiss the aiding and abetting claims against the auditor and the management company.

In pari delicto is an affirmative defense that, unless an exception applies, bars courts from adjudicating the claims between parties that both suffered their losses substantially as a result of their illegal conduct. The doctrine requires that the courts not waste resources in adjudicating these claims and “leave [the wrongdoers] where their own acts have placed them.” Since the actions of corporate directors and officers, acting within the scope of their authority, are imputed to the corporation itself, when corporate officers or directors engage in illegal conduct, the corporation itself is generally considered a wrongdoer, and is barred from stating a claim against a third party that participated in the scheme of wrongdoing. In this case, the plaintiff’s own complaint alleged that the director (J) and the corporation itself bore “substantially equal responsibility”—J for the alleged fraud and the corporation for the other directors’ failure to detect and prevent the fraud. Thus, in this case, the corporation (and, accordingly, the plaintiff) would be barred from stating a claim against the management company and the auditor for having participated in the wrongdoing (i.e., aiding and abetting), unless an exception to the in pari delicto doctrine were applicable.

The “adverse interest exception” to the doctrine eliminates the bar against claims, in the corporate context, when the officer or director acts solely for his or her own benefit and not the corporation’s benefit (as when an officer or director steals money from the corporation, for example). This exception did not apply in Wilmington Trust because J’s fraud in part benefited the companies. The “fiduciary duty exception” to the doctrine eliminates the bar against claims in a suit by a corporation against its own fiduciaries for breaches of their fiduciary duties. The rationale for the exception is that parties (like receivers or stockholder derivative plaintiffs) must be able to act on the corporation’s behalf to hold faithless directors and officers accountable. This exception did not apply in Wilmington Trust because the management company and the auditor were not corporate fiduciaries but outside third parties engaged to perform services.

The court concluded that the fiduciary duty exception “should extend to cover well-pled aiding and abetting claims against defendants like auditors”—because of their gatekeeper role.

Practical implications.

The new exception to the in pari delicto doctrine—and, more generally, the courts expanded view of advisors as “gatekeepers”—increases the potential for aiding and abetting liability for advisors. The following should be kept in mind, however:

The preceding post comes to us from Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.  It is excerpted from their recent publication “Fried Frank M&A Quarterly April 2015”, which was  published on April 23, 2015 and is available here.

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