In Verisk Analytics, Inc. v. ExactLogix, Inc., the Delaware Court of Chancery held in a post-trial opinion that a buyer’s termination of a commercial relationship with the target’s competitor constituted “willful conduct” that was the “primary cause” of the failure of an antitrust closing condition that prevented the deal from closing before the outside date. The court thus held that the buyer’s termination of the merger agreement was invalid and ordered specific performance, requiring the buyer to continue pursuing antitrust clearance and close the merger if approved. In reaching this conclusion, the court held that “willful conduct” required only voluntary and intentional action, not bad faith, and found that the buyer’s conduct triggered the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to require full compliance with a Second Request. The decision is notable for its remedy, its guidance in drafting conduct and causation standards in merger agreements, and its in-depth look inside an FTC merger investigation. The decision was authored by Vice Chancellor David and issued a mere four days after submission, reflecting Delaware’s ability to respond quickly to important commercial disputes.
The decision highlights that contractual conduct and causation standards could have significant consequences. The case also highlights that business decisions made during the pendency of a merger may be reported to the investigating agency and interpreted through the lens of the transaction’s competitive effects, and that omissions in communications with an agency can shape the course of an investigation.
Background
- Parties, vertical relationships and product integration. Verisk Analytics, Inc. provides software and related applications for insurance claims estimation. AccuLynx.com is a cloud-based roofing business management platform. Verisk offers AccuLynx competitors the opportunity to integrate with its products for claims Before Verisk and AccuLynx’s merger discussions, one of AccuLynx’s competitors, ServiceTitan, Inc., began negotiations with Verisk to develop a “deeper, more bespoke” “Enhanced Integration” than Verisk’s standard integration offering.
- The merger agreement. In July 2025, Verisk agreed to acquire AccuLynx for $2.35 billion. The agreement was subject to the expiration or termination of any waiting period under the HSR Act. The merger agreement provided that no party whose “willful conduct” is the “primary cause” of a failed closing condition may terminate the agreement. In addition, the parties agreed to a relatively short, four-to-five-month outside date because the merger appeared to present little antitrust risk: the parties did not compete, did not have any vertical relationships, and Verisk had integration agreements with only a small number of AccuLynx competitors.
- Termination of the Enhanced Integration discussions. Leading up to the AccuLynx acquisition, Verisk decided to offer only a standard integration to ServiceTitan, noting “[t]here may be reserved capability . . . for [AccuLynx] only.” Six days after the merger’s announcement, Verisk notified ServiceTitan of its decision to terminate the Enhanced Integration discussions and offered only a standard integration instead.
- The FTC’s vertical “market reset” theory of harm. In its initial investigation, the FTC entertained several horizontal and verticaltheories of During this time, unbeknownst to the merger parties, ServiceTitan informed the FTC of the Enhanced Integration discussions and their termination, including stating that “any integration that Verisk does with AccuLynx’s competitors would not be at the level or utility which would be achievable with the merger.” Based on this information, the FTC focused its investigation on a novel “market reset” vertical foreclosure theory: that post-merger, Verisk might develop a sophisticated pricing integration for AccuLynx that it would not offer to competitors.
- Verisk did not initially disclose the Enhanced Integration discussions. In its initial investigation, the FTC asked Verisk about its integration business, specifically whether any competitor had requested “an integration . . . that is more sophisticated or materially different than the integration that is currently available,” but Verisk did not disclose the terminated discussions with AVerisk businessperson later testified that he viewed the ServiceTitan standard integration as “a successful integration” and did not think of the terminated Enhanced Integration discussions when he spoke to the FTC during the initial review.
- Full compliance with Second Request required; termination of the merger agreement. In October 2025, the merger parties agreed with the FTC to do a “quick look” Second Request, where the FTC prioritizes certain information, hoping receipt of the narrower dataset would allow clearance without full compliance. However, on December 24 (two days before the outside date), the FTC made its final decision to require full compliance with the Second Request. Verisk delivered written notice purporting to terminate theMerger Agreement and then sought a declaratory judgment that its termination was valid. AccuLynx disputed the validity of the termination, seeking specific performance.
Analysis
As noted above, the merger agreement foreclosed termination if a terminating party’s “failure to fulfill its obligations or to comply with its covenants under the [merger agreement], or other willful conduct, has been the primary cause of, or primarily resulted in, the failure tosatisfy any condition to the obligations” of the parties under the merger agreement. AccuLynx argued that Verisk’s “willful conduct” (i.e.,its termination of Enhanced Integration negotiations with ServiceTitan) was the “primary cause” of the FTC’s decision to require the Second Request and prevented the deal from closing before the outside date. Therefore, AccuLynx argued that Verisk was not entitled to terminate the merger agreement. Following an expedited trial, the court agreed, with key aspects of its analysis as follows:
- The contract’s structure and diction led the court to conclude that “willful conduct” required only voluntary and intentional action, not bad faith. The court construed willful conduct as a lower threshold than the “knowing and willful breach” standard used elsewhere in the termination provision of the agreement. Drawing on the contract’s structure, the court held that by juxtaposing “knowing and willful breach” in one part of the termination provision with “willful conduct” in another, the merger agreement reflected the parties’ intent to “ratchet[] down the required mental state, prohibiting termination not only when a terminating party hasintentionally breached the Merger Agreement, but also when a party has engaged in any voluntary and intentional conduct that caused a condition to fail.” Verisk’s termination of the Enhanced Integration discussions was therefore sufficient to constitute “willful conduct.”
- Verisk’s termination of the Enhanced Integration discussions with ServiceTitan was the primary cause of the failed HSRcondition. The court also interpreted the merger agreement’s “primary cause” language as requiring a higher showing than language found elsewhere in the contract that tracked the prevention doctrine, which merely requires that a party’s conduct “contributed materially” to a failed condition. The court therefore applied a “but-for” causation analysis and found that but for Verisk’stermination, the FTC would not have developed its “market reset” theory and required full compliance with the Second Request.
- Verisk’s good faith efforts did not cure the causal link. Notably, the court found virtually no evidence that Verisk intended to breach the agreement. Verisk expended great effort and expense to obtain FTC clearance. The court acknowledged that AccuLynx was a genuinely attractive acquisition target for Verisk. Nevertheless, the anti-termination provision did not require bad faith orintentional misconduct, only that Verisk’s “willful conduct” was the “primary cause” of the failure of a closing condition, which the court found had been proven.
- Specific performance ordered despite no finding of bad faith. The court ordered specific performance of the merger agreement, requiring Verisk to use commercially reasonable efforts to obtain FTC clearance and close the merger if approved. The court rejectedVerisk’s argument that it would be inequitable to order specific performance absent bad faith, since the parties specifically agreed that aparty could not terminate if its own willful conduct caused a condition to fail. The court also noted that the parties had stipulated to the availability of specific performance for a breach of the agreement.
Practical Takeaways
- Contractual conduct and causation standards could have significant impact. The decision underscores that the parties’ choice between “willful conduct,” “willful breach” and “knowing and willful breach” standards could have real consequences. If parties intend for a uniform standard of conduct, they should be consistent in their use of these terms across the agreement, as using slightlydifferent terms in the same agreement may evince an intent to provide for different standards of conduct. Parties should also carefully negotiate the accompanying causation standard (“primary cause” vs. “material contribution” vs. “prevented”), as it determines how directly a party’s action must link to the particular condition to justify termination.
- Be aware of the impact of business decisions that could be viewed as influenced by a pending merger. Merger parties should assume that changes in dealings with competitors or customers may be reported to the investigating agency and interpreted through the lens of the merger’s competitive effects. Consult antitrust counsel before making such changes.
- Inaccurate responses may affect merger investigations. Although the court did not find that Verisk’s nondisclosure of the Enhanced Integration discussions was intentional, it said that Verisk’s “inaccurate responses . . . compounded” the concerns raised by the termination of the Enhanced Integration.
- Antitrust agency staff may raise novel theories of harm. Verisk and AccuLynx agreed that the market reset theory of harm wasnovel and likely would not have provided a basis to stop the The court also held that “[m]ore likely than not, but for the [email terminating the Enhanced Integration discussions], the FTC would not have been seriously concerned about a potential ‘market reset.’” However, an investigating agency may still raise certain novel theories, causing merger parties to expend time and resources arguing that the novel theories are incorrect or inapplicable.
- The decision highlights the FTC’s “quick look” review. The court’s description of the FTC’s investigation highlights the two-stage Second Request process used here. In a quick look review, the FTC asks parties to prioritize certain information so that the parties can avoid full compliance with the Second Request. In this case, the quick look review still involved eight weeks of review, from 16 custodians, with 400,000 responsive And at the end of the quick look review, the FTC may still order full compliance with the Second Request, as it did here.
- A government anffairs merger clearance strategy should work alongside a legal strategy. The decision indicates that Verisk and AccuLynx both hired government anffairs firms to advocate deal clearance. While a government affairs strategy may be part of an effective merger clearance strategy, it may not overcome other issues in the investigation.
This post is based on a Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP memorandum, “Delaware Court Orders Specific Performance of $2.35 Billion Merger After Buyer’s Willful Conduct Triggered FTC Second Request,” dated August 13, 2026, and available here.