Suppose a company’s capital structure will eventually cause its controller to lose control as she sells shares or the company issues new ones. Should a recapitalization preserving her control be treated as self-dealing? The Delaware Supreme Court has accepted an expedited appeal in the Cloudflare case, yet the parties debate the meaning of good faith under Section 144 rather than whether preserving control should trigger controller self-dealing review.
My claim has two parts. First, courts cannot review the fairness of a recapitalization that preserves control, because the value of continued founder control cannot be priced. Second, Delaware doctrine does not require them to try. Under Sinclair and Williams, a recapitalization that preserves control without taking existing rights from the minority is not self-dealing.
Start with the first part. In a 2020 Columbia Law Review article cited by the Delaware Chancery Court, Assaf Hamdani and I explained that reallocations of control rights present a problem courts cannot price. Continued founder control may protect an idiosyncratic vision that creates value while increasing agency costs. No objective valuation can resolve that tradeoff, and market-price changes cannot serve as a measure of damages. Courts should enforce the charter’s allocation of authority to change control rights and apply the business judgment rule when the charter is silent.
Delaware doctrine respects this limit. In Sinclair Oil v. Levien (1971), the Delaware Supreme Court described as self-dealing a controller obtaining something from the corporation to the exclusion and detriment of minority shareholders. That test asks what the minority lost. Taking existing minority voting rights differs from preventing minority shareholders from acquiring greater relative voting power in the future. The latter may disappoint an expectation, but a founder’s future loss of voting power through issuances or sales does not necessarily create a minority right to receive that power. Whether such a right exists should depend on the charter, including its amendment rules.
As dual-class companies mature, new issuances and founder sales dilute the founders’ high-vote shares. Adding nonvoting shares in a triple-class structure permits founders to retain control with declining economic ownership. The nonvoting shares are distributed pro rata but benefit founders in a way others cannot replicate. The pro rata distribution has an equal legal effect on all shareholders but an unequal practical effect on the controller. The question is whether this gain extracts a nonratable benefit from public shareholders, who retain their votes but lose the possibility of greater influence later.
Delaware’s Original Doctrine
Delaware’s earlier decisions did not treat control preservation as self-dealing. In Société Holding Ray D’Albion v. Saunders Leasing (1981), Chancery declined to enjoin a single-to-dual-class recapitalization that would preserve a family’s control while it sold shares. In Williams v. Geier (1996), the Delaware Supreme Court applied business judgment review to tenure voting that strengthened a family’s voting position, finding no disproportionate benefit on its face. In eBay v. Newmark (2010), Chancery likewise applied the business judgment rule to Craigslist’s adoption of a staggered board, which deprived eBay of its practical ability to elect a director through cumulative voting. The court explained that eBay had no contractual entitlement to continued board representation, and that disadvantage was not, by itself, self-dealing.
Delaware’s deference was accompanied by national stock-exchange regulation. In 1994, the major U.S. stock exchanges adopted a common voting-rights policy restricting midstream departures from one-share-one-vote. These rules apply to listed companies regardless of incorporation in Delaware, Nevada, or Texas. Exchange-level investor protection therefore does not place Delaware at a competitive disadvantage. The preservation of control was left to the charter and the exchanges, not to fiduciary review.
The Doctrinal Drift
Google changed the landscape. In 2012, it proposed nonvoting Class C shares alongside its high- and low-vote stock for compensation, acquisitions, and founders’ sales without diluting founder control. As interpreted, the exchange policy restricted single-to-dual-class but not dual-to-triple-class recapitalizations. Public shareholders sued in Delaware, and the case settled before trial. At the settlement hearing, then-Chancellor Leo Strine acknowledged that Williams supported defendants but suggested public shareholders might expect voting power to migrate from founders through dilution. His suggestion recast a possible future shift in control as an interest potentially protected through fiduciary review.
Facebook abandoned a similar reclassification amid litigation in 2017 and later paid $68.7 million in plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and expenses. In IRA Trust v. Crane (2017), NRG Yield added two classes of low-vote shares to protect its controller from future voting dilution. Chancery deemed control preservation a nonratable benefit triggering entire fairness. Although it dismissed the complaint under MFW safeguards, that threshold classification departed from earlier doctrine and was never reviewed by the Delaware Supreme Court.
Cloudflare Litigation
Cloudflare’s founders faced loss of majority voting control through sales and new issuances. The proposed dual-to-triple-class recapitalization would preserve that control without giving the founders additional voting or cash-flow rights: Each 10-vote Class B share would become a one-vote Class A share and a preferred share carrying nine votes and no economic interest. New nonvoting Class C shares would be distributed pro rata, one per Class A share. The recapitalization would also replace the charter’s ownership-based sunset with a 40% capital-at-risk requirement measured on the founders’ Class A shares only. Assuming entire fairness applied absent amended Section 144’s safe harbor, Cloudflare appointed an independent special committee.
Chancery preliminarily enjoined the recapitalization in October 2026, finding a reasonable probability that the committee had not acted in good faith. It certified two questions: whether the Disney standard of good faith should remain, and whether good faith is judged collectively or director by director. On November 6, the Supreme Court accepted expedited review without limiting the parties to Chancery’s questions.
The Real Question on Appeal
The Supreme Court could treat whether Cloudflare’s recapitalization is self-dealing as a question of first impression. Alternatively, it could extend Williams’s reasoning to recapitalizations that preserve existing control. Yet in Match Group (2024), the Supreme Court distinguished Williams. The tenure-voting recapitalization strengthened the controller’s position in practice but conferred no disproportionate benefit on its face, while Match involved a reorganization that also transferred non-pro-rata cash-flow rights. Match did not decide that preserving existing control, standing alone, is self-dealing. Cloudflare’s plan, by contrast, does not involve transfer of cash-flow rights.
A recapitalization that preserves control can be structured, like the one in Williams, to apply to every stockholder alike. In the words of Williams, as quoted in Match, “[t]he Recapitalization applied to every stockholder, whether a stockholder was a minority stockholder or part of the majority bloc.” The nonvoting distribution at Cloudflare is likewise pro rata, while the founders’ separate exchange merely divides their existing 10 votes between two instruments. In Maffei v. Palkon (2025), the Supreme Court observed, citing Williams, that an improvement in a controller’s position does not necessarily establish a nonratable benefit. Williams as read in Match thus supports the conclusion that preserving control against future dilution, without taking existing voting or cash-flow rights from minority stockholders, is not self-dealing.
Nor does Senate Bill 21 foreclose that conclusion. Section 144(e)(3) covers acts and transactions between a corporation and its controller as well as transactions conferring a financial or other benefit not shared with stockholders generally. But that definition sets the reach of the safe harbor. It does not say when fairness review applies. The first part of the definition should not be read literally either. A pro rata dividend is also an act between a corporation and its controller, and Sinclair held that it is not self-dealing. The founders’ exchange, which does not change aggregate rights, is of the same kind. The meaning of a benefit not shared with stockholders generally should likewise be informed by Sinclair, not expanded to treat every preservation of an existing voting position as an extraction from minority shareholders. Expanding self-dealing to that practical benefit would compel the very fairness valuation that Delaware’s older cases avoided.
Cloudflare’s original charter contained an ownership-based sunset, and the recapitalization replaces it. But the charter did not make the sunset immutable. If minority shareholders did not bargain for a separate class vote or other restriction on amendments affecting their negotiated rights, the controller’s votes may supply the shareholder approval needed to change them. Absent such terms, courts should not grant a vested minority right to gain control through future dilution. To be sure, Chancellor Strine’s suggestion has some force. But expectations follow the legal rule rather than precede it. After Williams, there was no reasonable expectation that, as a default, minority shareholders would be protected against controllers preserving control. Crane did not change that. Cloudflare went public in 2019, less than two years after Crane, but one pleading-stage Chancery ruling does not set the default rule. Those who want a protection can bargain for it, and they can discount the price they pay when the charter provides no such protection. A fiduciary rule should not supply a term for which they never bargained.
The defendants’ concession below that the recapitalization is self-dealing may make the threshold issue difficult to decide. But a concession on a question of law need not bind the Supreme Court. In any event, the Supreme Court should not leave the impression that Crane has already settled the question. Before deciding the meaning of good faith, Delaware needs to decide whether a recapitalization that preserves existing control against future dilution is self-dealing at all.
Zohar Goshen is the Jerome L. Green Professor of Transactional Law at Columbia Law School.
