Public-company information has great social value. However, it is widely thought that left to their own devices, firms will under-disclose information about their condition and prospects. This thinking is embodied in the mandatory-disclosure regime that sits at the foundation of modern securities law. But government-compelled disclosure in this area—including piecemeal additions to the disclosure regime based on the latest Washington fad—leaves much to be desired.
In our recent article, Making a Market for Corporate Disclosure, we argue that the under-disclosure concern could be addressed in a far broader way by constructing a well-regulated market for tiered access to corporate … Read more
Mandatory disclosure sits at the foundation of modern securities regulation. Public companies must produce and share a wide variety of information about their condition and prospects, and they must do so on their own dime.
There can be little doubt that corporate information has great social value. Much has been written on the connection between more informative securities prices, on the one hand, and improved capital allocation and corporate governance, on the other. Nevertheless, it is equally as clear that having the government dictate the amount, format, and timing of corporate disclosure will leave society with less than the optimal … Read more
Corporate information that moves stock-market prices has long sat at the center of modern securities regulation in the United States. The Great Depression-era securities laws at the foundation of the field require much mandatory disclosure of this type of information. They also include a strict anti-fraud regime to ensure the credibility of those disclosures of that information. And for a half century now, that regime has been interpreted to prohibit insiders from trading on the same information. All of these laws have been motivated by both concerns for fairness and economic efficiency.
Today, a new body of securities law is … Read more