On September 29, 2021, the SEC issued a proposed rulemaking to enhance the information mutual funds, exchange-traded funds and other registered management investment companies (“funds”) report annually about their proxy votes. The proposal also would require so-called “institutional investment managers” subject to section 13(f) of the Exchange Act (“managers”), which includes a broad range of investors in U.S. publicly traded equities, including some who are not “managers” in the conventional sense, to report annually regarding their voting of proxies related to executive compensation “say-on-pay” matters. The proposed rulemaking—the first to be issued under the leadership of SEC Chairman Gary Gensler—touches … Read more
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted the conflict minerals disclosure (CMD) rule, which requires issuers to perform due diligence on “conflict minerals” – natural resources known to fuel conflicts in underdeveloped nations – that are used in the “functionality or production” of their products. The issuers must disclose whether their products contain tantalum, tin, tungsten, or gold (3TG) from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) or any of nine neighboring African nations (together, the covered countries). The CMD rule is designed to further the humanitarian goal of ending the extreme violence perpetrated by armed … Read more
On June 3, 2021 President Joseph Biden issued a “Memorandum on Establishing the Fight Against Corruption as a Core United States National Security Interest,” (hereinafter “Anti-Corruption Memorandum” or “Memorandum”). In issuing the Memorandum, President Biden placed fighting corruption at the “core” of his foreign policy, and explained that he wanted his administration to “lead efforts to promote good governance; bring transparency to the United States and global financial systems; prevent and combat corruption at home and abroad; and make it increasingly difficult for corrupt actors to shield their activities.” The Memorandum set a deadline for obtaining recommendations from … Read more
When the COVID-19 pandemic shuttered major economies in March 2020, it also wreaked havoc on financial markets. In the first few weeks of March, investment-grade corporate bonds lost roughly a fifth of their value, on par with the declines in equity and high-yield debt. (Haddad et al., 2020; Falato, Goldstein & Hortaçsu (forthcoming)). Contrary to the usual flight to quality, in mid-March, U.S. Treasury yields began rising and only stabilized after the Federal Reserve initiated a massive purchase program. (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2020). The distress in the Treasury market accentuated distress in other markets and liquidity challenges for firms. Nonbanks that service … Read more
The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in 2010 in the wake of the Great Recession, introduced mandatory stress-testing for the largest U.S. banks. Dodd-Frank Act Stress Testing (DFAST) was intended to ensure that banks have sufficient capitalization to absorb the losses they may experience in an economic downturn and, more importantly, continue providing credit to the economy. The stress-testing exercise, which is conducted by the Federal Reserve, uses hypothetical macroeconomic scenarios to predict a bank’s portfolio return under stress and its implied equity values. Thus, the exercise indicates whether a bank, given its current equity position and portfolio allocation, could withstand a … Read more
The Dodd-Frank Act recently celebrated its 10th anniversary, with commentators, policymakers, and scholars joining the celebration by discussing the achievements of the sweeping post-crisis financial reform. Yet Dodd-Frank left critical unfinished business that, if not addressed, could erode the structural foundations of the post-crisis markets: the regulation of clearinghouses.
In a new article, I identify the flaws in the the current regulatory framework for clearinghouses. These flaws polarize rather than align the incentives of clearinghouses’ major stakeholders: the owners – companies such as the Chicago Mercantile Exchange Group, Intercontinental Exchange, and the London Stock Exchange Group – and the … Read more
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 allows the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to bring enforcement actions and impose civil penalties in administrative proceedings as alternatives to federal district courts. Some argue that this gives the SEC a “home-court” advantage. For example, the SEC serves as both prosecutor and, through the administrative judges it appoints, adjudicator in an administrative proceeding, and no jury trials are allowed. The SEC argues, though, that administrative proceedings can process cases more efficiently than federal courts. Yet the opacity of administrative proceedings and the SEC’s discretion over the choice of venue have prompted criticism and challenges … Read more
The Office of Financial Research (“OFR”) was created by the Dodd-Frank Act to help address the gaps in data availability and analysis that had hampered governmental authorities in their response to the financial crisis of 2008. It was hoped that the OFR would serve as an “early warning system” that would detect emerging systemic risks through data collection and analysis, but the OFR never really had the opportunity to live up to its promise. During the Obama administration, it suffered from an unsupportive Treasury Department and pushback from other federal financial regulatory agencies; under the Trump administration, the staff and … Read more
My article, Enforcement Against the Biggest Banks, takes a census of the hundreds of enforcement actions by American regulators against the world’s largest banks between the passage of Dodd-Frank in July 2010 and December 31, 2016, near the end of the Obama administration. The effort allows us to characterize the nature of contemporary American bank enforcement.
Enforcement against big banks can be “cumulative” – increasingly, multiple agencies penalize banks for the same misconduct. One regulator might view the misconduct as, say, a violation of public disclosure duties, but another regulator might see it as a problem with the safety … Read more
While much attention has been paid to President Trump’s deregulatory efforts and intentions, presidential involvement in the work of the administrative agencies is not new. Past presidents including Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama have acted up to – and at – the limits of presidential power in efforts to ratchet-up, or ratchet-down, regulation.
My recently published article, Presidential Pendulums in Finance, examines the past decade of presidential involvement in financial regulation in particular. As the paper explains, presidential involvement in financial regulation over the past 10 years stands to quicken the rate at which regulatory cycles … Read more
One of the many significant reforms enacted in The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 was the creation of a whistleblower bounty program within the SEC. The program increased monetary rewards for whistleblowing and provided protections from retaliation with the goal of encouraging more whistleblowers to report their information to the SEC. While there is a growing literature investigating the effects of many facets of Dodd-Frank, an unanswered question is whether the whistleblower program affected illegal insider trading – an activity that is traditionally hard for the SEC to detect and prosecute. In my recent paper, … Read more
Bank bailouts during periodic financial crises aim to stop financial panic and restore the stability of the financial system. Even if they are undesirable, future bank bailouts are unavoidable due to political and political economy reasons, whether or not they are regulated or economically efficient. In a new book, I build on existing literature to examine the different bank bailout and resolution techniques and tools through carefully selected case studies from the U.S., the E.U., the U.K., Spain, and Hungary. The pros and cons of the different legal and regulatory options are identified in order to reconstruct a regulatory framework … Read more
On September 23, 2020, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission approved changes to its highly successful Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower program in a 3-2 vote . The program has resulted in over $2.5 billion in penalties against public companies, $750 million returned to investors, and $500 million paid in rewards. Paying corporate whistleblowers mandatory monetary rewards of between 10-30 percent of all penalties obtained from commission enforcement proceedings triggered by their allegations has been a highly controversial law from the start. These controversies all played out during the commission’s prolonged whistleblower rulemaking proceeding.
The whistleblower advocacy community strongly opposed the major … Read more
The 2008 financial crisis triggered a surge of interest in regulating consumer financial markets. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to safeguard consumer interests. Since 2011, the CFPB has accepted complaints about the financial products and services provided by the depository institutions under its jurisdiction. Since 2013, the CFPB has released a complaint database to the public. The data include individual complaints, their submission dates, complainants’ 5-digit ZIP Codes, types of products and issues (without narratives), and the names and responses of the banks involved.
The purpose of … Read more
Modern finance is fast moving, extremely complex, and contributes to pervasive unknowns. Yet the processes governing how finance is regulated are typically slow, highly deliberative, and often reflect deeply ingrained and incredibly optimistic assumptions about our ability to understand the financial system and the potential impact of regulatory intervention. In our new paper, “Why Financial Regulation Keeps Falling Short,” we identify the key drivers of this fundamental mismatch between finance and financial regulation, demonstrate how this mismatch contributes to undesirable policy outcomes, and lay the conceptual foundations for understanding how the processes governing the creation of financial regulations … Read more
The Financial Stability Oversight Council’s (FSOC) recently revised guidelines (the 2019 Guidelines) on how it will identify and address financial stability risks are a major shift from the guidelines it issued in the immediate aftermath of the Financial Crisis (the 2012 Guidelines). The 2019 Guidelines draw upon lessons learned from FSOC’s ultimately fruitless attempts to designate nonbank financial companies as systematically important. Instead, building on one of the original purposes of the Dodd-Frank Act, which was then emphasized in one of the Treasury Reports, the 2019 Guidelines focus on identifying and regulating systemically important … Read more
On December 4, 2019, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (the “Council”) voted unanimously to finalize amendments to its interpretive guidance (the “Final Guidance”) on designating nonbank financial companies as “systemically important financial institutions” (“SIFIs”). The Final Guidance, which will replace the Council’s interpretive guidance on SIFI designations issued in April 2012 (the “Prior Guidance”), implements an “activities-based” approach to identifying and addressing potential risks to financial stability, and is intended to enhance the “analytical rigor and transparency” of the Council’s process for designating SIFIs.
The Final Guidance, which adopts the … Read more
If there was one thing most people could agree on after the 2008 financial crisis, it was that “too-big-to-fail” banks were to blame for the market crash. This shared understanding was accompanied by a corollary: Small banks were not the problem. These so-called community banks were perceived to be innocent bystanders, overrun by market turmoil caused by much larger financial institutions.
Community banks have long been sympathetic figures in financial regulatory circles. Generally speaking, the term refers to banks with less than $10 billion in assets that focus on traditional financial products. Reasoning that such firms pose little risk, policymakers … Read more