In the world of corporate governance, large institutional investors wield power. But for many, that power comes from using their “voice” to call for changes within the firm because voting with their feet by selling their stake is not realistic. How can these investors amplify their voices? In a recent study, we explore a novel strategy employed by one of the world’s largest investors: announcing ahead of annual meetings how it intends to vote on management and shareholder proposals.

Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) manages Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global, valued at over $1.85 trillion (as of May 2025). Historically, large investors like NBIM disclosed how they voted at shareholder meetings only afterward. However, starting in 2021, NBIM began publicly releasing its voting decisions five days before the annual shareholder meetings of its portfolio companies.

We investigate whether this early-release strategy acts as a signal that amplifies NBIM’s voice in voting outcomes. That is, when this large institutional investor expresses its opposition to management before the meeting, do other investors follow its lead? Our findings suggest they do.

Voting on proposals, such as electing directors, approving executive pay, or supporting environmental and social initiatives is how shareholders typically influence companies. While investors can try to coordinate with each other to force change, regulators (for example, the SEC in the U.S.) often scrutinize these efforts. If investors explicitly coordinate, they may be classified as a “group” (often called a “wolf pack”), which triggers strict disclosure requirements and legal hurdles. Announcing how it intends to vote allows NBIM to signal its views to like-minded investors.

Many smaller institutional investors lack the resources to research each proposal at every company they own. As a result, they often rely on proxy advisers  like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) and Glass Lewis that sell voting recommendations. While influential, these advisers are sometimes criticized for using “one-size-fits-all” approaches. This creates a gap in the market for a credible, high-quality signal from a fellow investor rather than a third-party adviser. We posit that NBIM fills this gap. Because it is known for its extensive resources and long-term investment focus, its early voting disclosures may guide other investors.

To measure NBIM’s influence, we analyze over 174,000 proposals at more than 2,200 U.S. firms between 2013 and 2024 and compare voting outcomes in the years before NBIM started early disclosure (pre-2021) with those after. We find that, when NBIM announces in advance that it will vote against a management proposal, voting support for the proposal drops significantly compared with when NBIM votes against without the early announcement. This effect is distinct from the influence of proxy advisers like . Our findings suggest that this act of transparency allows investors to collectively push for changes in corporate behavior without the regulatory burdens of formal coordination.

Digging deeper, we find that the amplification effect was most powerful in director elections. We also find that NBIM’s early dissent increased the likelihood that a proposal would fail to reach 80% support – a critical threshold that often forces boards to address shareholder concerns to avoid reputational damage. Interestingly, we find that NBIM acts as a tie-breaker. The impact of its early disclosure strengthens when the two major proxy advisers provide different recommendations.

Some “no” votes are predictable, so we would not expect their early release to have the same influence as others. For example, NBIM has a policy of voting against combining the roles of CEO and board chair. Because the “no” vote is a predictable, other investors don’t learn new information from it, and we find less amplification in these cases. However, other issues are more complex and require company-specific analyses. We find that the influence of early disclosure is the strongest in these cases. For example, when NBIM voted against directors on issues like CEO pay or  directors’ time commitments, the influence strengthened. Other investors can piggyback on the analyses done by NBIM and vote similarly on these more complex issues.

NBIM also conducts thousands of meetings with companies annually – we refer to these as “engagement” – and we found a link between its voting positions and engagement. NBIM is significantly more likely to meet with a company when it votes against management or supports a shareholder proposal. And we find that NBIM’s voting position has even more influence on other shareholders when NBIM has engaged with the company prior to the vote. This suggests that other investors view the engagement as a sign that NBIM’s position is based on high-quality information obtained during those meetings. Other investors appear to take it as a warning if, after meeting with management, NBIM stilldecided to vote no.

Our study highlights a shifting dynamic in corporate governance. It demonstrates that transparency can advance change. By simply releasing its decisions five days early, NBIM allows other investors to consider its analyses and gains  support for its positions. The takeaway is that shareholders’ voice is growing louder and more organized. Through the strategic use of transparency and direct engagement, big investors like NBIM can create a ripple effect, turning their individual votes into louder voices that companies cannot ignore.

Mary Ellen Carter is a professor at Boston College’s Carroll School of Management, Andrea Pawliczek is an assistant professor at the University of Colorado’s Leeds School of Business, A. Irem Tuna is a professor at London Business School, and Jon Underwood is a visiting assistant professor at the University of Iowa’s Tippie College of Business. This post is based on their recent paper, “Amplifying Influence: The Impact of Early Release of Voting Positions and Engagement,” available here.