Recent opinions by the Delaware Court of Chancery in the Cloudflare shareholder litigation show how challenging it can be to constrain judicial activism.
Cloudflare co-founders Matthew Prince and Michelle Zatlyn controlled just over 50.3% of the internet-infrastructure company’s voting power. They wanted to sell additional shares without losing voting control. To do this they proposed creating a new class (Class C) of nonvoting stock and a new class of preferred stock carrying nine votes per share, which would allow them to keep their majority voting control. A special committee of independent directors approved the transaction.
Stockholders sued in June 2026, claiming that the transaction unfairly benefited the founders. On Oct. 16, 2026., Vice Chancellor Laster issued a preliminary injunction blocking the recapitalization on the grounds that there was a chance that the special committee of directors, whom he acknowledged were disinterested, careful, and fully empowered, acted with subjective bad faith.
The 2025 amendments to Section 144 of Delaware’s corporation law were designed to validate transactions like this one. But even before the amendments were adopted, Vice Chancellor Laster indicated that they would not necessarily constrain him because there is “a lot of language that is left for courts to interpret” in future litigation. In Cloudflare, the language left for judicial interpretation is the term “good faith.”
Critically, the way that the court interpreted “good faith” allows it to retain plenary authority to invalidate even those transactions approved by fully informed independent directors. Under that approach, judges determine whether a board committee acted in good faith by peering into the heart and soul of directors and somehow determining whether they “subjectively believed” that their decision served the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Quoting In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., 1989 WL 7036, at *15 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989) (Allen, C.).
What Vice Chancellor Laster is demanding of himself and his colleagues on the Delaware Chancery Court is nothing less than what Professor Sybill Trelawney, a character in the Harry Potter series, expected of the students in her class on divination at the Hogwarts School of Witchcraft and Wizardry.[1] In Cloudflare, the required act of divination is for judges to peer back in time and determine whether directors “subjectively believed” that their decision served the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders. 118–19 & nn.313–16. Judges must probe the directors’ psyches to divine whether a challenged decision was the product of “any human emotion [that] may cause a director to [intentionally] place his own interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare of the corporation.” This is not the clarity and predictability that the Delaware legislature thought it was requiring of judges in the 2025 amendments.
The point is not that the Cloudflare decision was wrong, but that there is no way to tell. It is impossible to refute Vice Chancellor Laster’s speculation about what was going on in the hearts and minds of the directors. What the opinion does do, however, is to demonstrate that the legislature’s herculean effort to reduce the discretion of Delaware judges to interfere with the corporate governance of Delaware corporations fell short.
At one crucial juncture in the 145-page opinion, Vice Chancellor Laster managed to claim that, while he lacked the capacity to read the minds of directors, he could nevertheless determine a person’s “unobservable mental state” by looking at what the person did and the circumstances in which they did it, and by exercising “the very pedestrian capacity we all have for figuring out what another human being is thinking.” In re Cloudflare, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 2026-0772-JTL, slip op. at 118–19 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2026). Vice Chancellor Laster asserts that, just as it is possible to infer that a person is thirsty because she uses a water fountain, one can discern whether directors act in good faith by looking at their actions. Id.
The judge’s task in Cloudflare, however, was much more difficult than drawing conclusions about a person drinking from a water fountain, and his inquiry into mental state requires the interpretation of far more subtle and ambiguous signals. In fact, Vice Chancellor Laster acknowledged in a footnote that he could not find that plaintiffs were likely to prove bad faith, and that he would enjoin a transaction even if the plaintiffs had only a 30% chance of proving their version of the facts because all that was required to obtain an injunction was a showing that there was a “reasonable probability” that the defendant directors were acting in bad faith by acting with a controlled mindset. In re Cloudflare, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 2026-0772-JTL, 2026 WL 3333685 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2026), at 16-17, note 28.
The problem is that the facts will virtually always be ambiguous and permit competing inferences about the committee’s intent. In Cloudfare, for example, as Vice Chancellor Laster acknowledged, the plaintiffs’ theory that the directors were acting to further the company founders’ interests at the expense of the company and its stockholders “is not the only reasonably probable outcome. The Committee members may have believed that benefitting the Founders through the Recapitalization was in the best interests of the Company and all of its stockholders.”[2] Negotiating involves give and take, and the “give” can always be construed as capitulation.
The Cloudflare opinion accurately states that the guiding precedent for determining whether directors have acted in good faith is the decision in the derivative litigation against Disney,[3] which countenanced judges’ inquiries into directors’ good faith when deciding whether the business judgment presumption has been rebutted.[4] The court in Disney also found that intentionally pursuing a purpose other than advancing the best interests of the corporation constitutes bad faith.[5] But that court ultimately did not find that the Disney directors acted in bad faith.[6] Cloudflareis a departure from the historically cautious approach that Delaware courts have taken to evaluating good faith. The line of cases following Disney represents a two-decade effort to prevent mere failures in board processes to constitute acting in “bad faith,” Specifically, prior to Cloudflare, determining bad faith required finding a subjective intent to harm or a conscious disregard of a known duty. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 906 A.2d 27, 64–67 (Del. 2006); Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006); Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009) (directors must have “utterly failed” to attempt their duty). Bad faith, in short, is a state of mind of indifference or hostility to the corporation’s interests. It is not supposed to be a statement about how well a board committee negotiated a transaction.
Another troubling aspect of Cloudflare is how the opinion interprets the facts in a way that is hostile to the defendant directors. For example, the board’s special committee made a proposal that CEO Prince, did not like, and Prince “exploded and made threats.” This episode reasonably could be interpreted as the sort of bargaining consistent with putting the interests of the corporation ahead of the interests of the CEO, but the opinion does not reflect that possibility. Similarly, in his deposition, Prince said that special committee member Karim Lakhani told him that he and the other founders “wouldn’t get everything we want, but they would move in our – in our direction.”[7] Of course, those negotiating a deal often seek common ground, and usually move their initial positions towards that of their counter-parties in order to get a deal done. The fact that the founders did not get everything they wanted indicates that there was real bargaining and that the special committee was doing its job and engaged in real negotiations with the founders.
The greatest flaw in the Cloudflare opinion is that it provides no guardrails, no guidance for companies to use in planning transactions or for courts to use in limiting judges from finding a lack of good faith under almost any facts. This is unsurprising. Even before SB 21 was enacted, in addition to his comment about there being “a lot of language that is left for courts to interpret,” Vice Chancellor Laster reportedly predicted that the legislation would backfire, and that judges would be “forced to make it up as they go along.” After Cloudflare, it is clear that these observations were not just idle speculation; they were self-fulfilling prophecies.
ENDNOTES
[1] J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban 102 (1999); See also The Official Firenze, Encyclopedia’s Sybill Trelawney Fact File, https://harrypotter.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Sybill_Trelawney (accessed November 15, 2026).
[2] In re Cloudflare, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 2026-0772-JTL, slip op. at 34-35 (Del. Ch. Nov. 3, 2026).
[3] In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 64–67 (Del. 2006).
[4] In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 53 (Del. 2006)..
[5] In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006).
[6] In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67–68 (Del. 2006) (sustaining the Chancellor’s finding that the Disney directors acted in good faith when they approved Michael Ovitz’s employment agreement and elected him president).
[7] In re Cloudflare, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 2026-0772-JTL, slip op. at 136, footnote 102 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2026).
Jonathan R. Macey is the Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance and Securities Law at Yale Law School and a professor at Yale School of Management.
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