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How Changes in the Likelihood of Shareholder Litigation Affect M&A Decisions
Evidence shows shareholders’ wealth is protected from self-serving managers, who are often motivated to divert corporate resources, by both internal and external corporate governance mechanisms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, due to high monitoring …