Do Self-Reporting Schemes Deter Corporate Crime?

Many law enforcement agencies reduce punishments for corporations that report their own offenses. My research shows that these self-reporting schemes may help deter crime within a certain range of leniency. But the level of leniency has a U-shaped relationship with the level of deterrence: As the severity of punishment decreases, the probability that a crime will occur first decreases and then increases.

Direct and Indirect Punishments of Executives

The United States, the United Kingdom and other countries have strengthened corporate self-reporting programs to help them detect non-antitrust offenses such as securities fraud and foreign bribery as well as antitrust violations. … Read more

How External Whistleblower Rewards Affect Internal Reporting

Does paying employees for blowing the whistle on corporate crime to regulators discourage internal reporting and undermine corporate governance? The answer is not as simple as it might seem. My research shows that, as the amount of reward increases, the probability of internal reporting rises at first but then falls.

The question has been discussed in countries that have introduced or contemplated the introduction of legislation to reward whistleblowers but has not yet been fully analyzed. One of the overlooked obstacles is that the standard of proof for external whistleblowing cases is higher than for cases of internal reporting, and … Read more