Sky Blog
The recently introduced Delaware Senate bill that would amend the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL) provision dealing with conflict of interest transactions (SB 21) has blown up the financial news, corporate law blogosphere, and corporate law social media.[1]
Most …
Yesterday, Delaware State Senator Bryan Townsend introduced a sweeping set of amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law. If adopted, these measures would mark the most significant single-year revision of Delaware’s corporate code since at least 1967, reshaping everything from …
Recently, corporations and fiduciaries have faced enhanced litigation risk arising from entire fairness claims challenging related-party transactions and other transactions implicating unique interests of corporate fiduciaries. This risk is most pertinent for controlled public corporations, although it has also affected …
Last week, in Maffei v. Palkon, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the decision to change the corporate domicile of a Delaware corporation with a controlling stockholder to Nevada is subject to the business judgment rule, making stockholder challenges …
Delaware’s regime governing controlling shareholders relies on the courts’ ability to police conflicted transactions under the stringent “entire fairness” standard of review. In theory, judicial review under this standard allows judges to distinguish between fair transactions and those that are …
In the important 2014 case of Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court held that freeze-out mergers, in which a controlling stockholder takes a company private, are subject to Delaware’s heightened “entire fairness” standard of …
In NRG Yield v. Crane (Dec. 12, 2017), the Court of Chancery dismissed fiduciary duty claims against directors who approved a corporate recapitalization that was proposed by a controller and would perpetuate its control. The reclassification provided for the issuance …
It has long been a policy of corporate law1 that the informed business decisions of independent and disinterested directors are protected by the presumption of the business judgment rule.2 Courts are reluctant to second-guess decisions that are made …