Categories
Finance & Economics

Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble

A growing number of financial institutions, from BlackRock to the Bank of England, have reached the conclusion that markets are not accurately assessing climate change-related risks. European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde recently warned that central bankers “will have to ask themselves” if they are “taking excessive risk by simply trusting mechanisms that have not priced in the massive risk that is out there.”[1] According to one survey, 93 percent of institutional investors agree with her that climate risk “has yet to be priced in by all the key financial markets globally.”[2]

Yet while the consensus (and evidence) grows that assets are mispriced, there has been less attention paid to diagnosing why that might be; what are these faulty “mechanisms” that Lagarde says are not to be trusted?[3] In my new article, Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble, I seek to explain how this mispricing can exist, disputing arguments that climate risks are “already reflected in existing stock prices.”[4] I describe six drivers of mispricing.

First, shareholders and analysts currently lack the fine-grained asset level data they need in order to make climate-risk assessments. Where corporate operations are located, the origins and routes of their supply chains, the sources and quantities of inputs like water and energy – this is the type of information needed to assess climate risk exposure but not currently disclosed in financial reports. Often, the information that is voluntarily disclosed aggregates data at too high a level, is given at widely varying time-scales that make comparison difficult, and fails to differentiate well between exposure and liability.

Second, market actors continue to rely on risk assessment methods that are outdated in a climate-changed world.[5] They may employ strategies that expose them to model risk, such as relying on unrepresentative historical records to project future exposure. And traditional means of risk assessment may ignore latent risks: The entire capital stock of corporate America was built using engineering specifications designed to endure certain temperature and weather extremes that may be regularly exceeded under a climate-changed world. A facility that was built to withstand a “100-year flood” may now have a much higher likelihood of failure. Additionally, corporate managers may continue to rely on outdated methods of risk assessment that may suffer from a duration mismatch. Insurance premiums are reassessed annually and so could spike suddenly to reflect unaccounted-for climate risk; yet they are nevertheless relied upon as a proxy for the cost of risk for investments with expected returns over many years.

Third, corporate managers, with an eye toward maintaining a high share price, have little incentive to discover and disclose information that might reveal their company’s stock price is overvalued.[6] Equity-based compensation and firm-specific executive remuneration metrics may encourage managers to focus on the short-term and neglect to prepare their companies for longer term climate resilience.[7]

Fourth, many physical climate risks will occur within the relevant horizon for valuing securities but outside of conventional risk assessment horizons for investors that trade in the market. The investors with the longest investment horizons largely follow an indexing or quasi-indexing strategy – passively holding their funds instead of spending resources to research firm-specific fundamental values. While investors continue to shift their money into funds with an environmental, social, and governance (ESG) focus, perhaps suggesting an awareness of climate risks, there is insufficient scrutiny of index providers and their climate-related methodologies.[8]

Fifth, decades-long disinformation campaigns have intentionally confused public understanding of the cause and effects of climate change. Lessons from behavioral finance tell us that investors and corporate managers can be slow to integrate new information, can be irrationally myopic, and can overvalue short-term gains and undervalue longer-term losses – all of which, in the context of climate change, serves to maintain apathy regarding mitigation investment and long-term risk avoidance.[9]

Sixth and finally, shareholders concerned about climate risk have begun to press for voluntary disclosure from companies, but their efforts face opposition from corporate management both directly and through industry influence on government regulators. Under the Trump Administration, several agencies took actions to limit shareholder oversight of climate risks, including blocking requests for climate disclosure and preventing investors from integrating climate risks into their market decisions.[10]

The widespread under-assessment of climate risk may lead to two undesirable economy-wide harms: 1) systemic risk to the financial system and 2) the physical damages stemming from climate change itself as mispriced equity leads to misallocation of investment resources. If investors fail to demand risk assessment from companies, managers may be left unpunished by the market when they build homes and hotels in hurricane-prone regions too close to the shore or build bridges to withstand a “100-year-flood” based on a grossly unrepresentative historical record. This mis-investment imposes costs, not just on the company and the investor, but on the communities harmed by collapsing bridges and hotel evacuees.

Addressing climate-risk neglect will require an array of actions, from regulators and investors alike. Signals from the Biden Administration suggest a mandatory climate-risk disclosure regime may be forthcoming in the United States.[11] My article supports this agenda and provides some high-level guidance on how to design regulation to address the drivers of climate risk mispricing. Any mandatory climate risk disclosure regime has to meet climate science where it is. Regulators must pay particular attention to the spatial and temporal scales of requested disclosures and ensure they are both scientifically feasible and tailored to industry-specific needs.[12] In particular, an overemphasis on false precision provided by complicated models might obscure the usefulness of other methods of risk assessment and communication.[13] This fact should inform how the SEC decides to structure climate-risk disclosure compliance, including balancing the pros and cons of principles-based versus line-item disclosures. In crafting disclosure regulation, the SEC should seek out climate-related expertise through interagency working groups, advisory boards, and staff hiring.[14]

No amount of disclosure, however, can protect the market from climate change. The only path toward financial stability requires halting emissions. Direct regulation will be required to address not just mitigation deficits, but physical risks and adaptation deficits as well. Beyond the “market failure” of emissions externalities, there is a limit to what increased disclosure can facilitate in the face of systemic risks; climate risks remain unhedgeable even with increased information.

ENDNOTES

[1] Carolynn Look, Lagarde Says ECB Needs to Question Market Neutrality on Climate, Bloomberg (Oct. 14, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-14/lagarde-says-ecb-needs-to-question-market-neutrality-on-climate.

[2] Climate Change and Artificial Intelligence Seen as Risks to Investment Asset Allocation, Finds New Report by BNY Mellon Investment, Bloomberg, (Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2019-09-16/climate-change-and-artificial-intelligence-seen-as-risks-to-investment-asset-allocation-finds-new-report-by-bny-mellon-investm.

[3] With the noted exception of Jakob Thomä & Hughes Chenet, Transition Risks and Market Failure: A Theoretical Discourse on Why Financial Models and Economic Agents may Misprice Risk Related to the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy, 7 J. Sus. Fin. & Investment 82 (2017).

[4] Paul Brest, Ronald J. Gilson & Mark A. Wolfson, How Investors Can (and Can’t) Create Social Value, 44 J. Corp. L. 205, 227 (2019).

[5] Cf. Ronald Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Market Efficiency after the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of Information Costs, 100 Va . L. Rev. 313, 343-44 (2014) (discussing how valuation models employed by banks and ratings agencies failed because they relied on historical housing price data to model future risk and ignored warnings of high unaccounted-for correlations between assets).

[6] See, e.g., John Armour, Jeffrey Gordon & Geeyoung Min, Taking Compliance Seriously, 37 Yale J. Reg. 1, 26-31 (2020) (arguing that stock-based, including options-based, executive compensation models incentivize corporate managers to neglect risk management programs, to the detriment of the long-term value of the stock).

[7] Cf. Michael Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 Fin. Manag. 5, 7 (2005).

[8] See, e.g., Joe Rennison & Billy Nauman, Vanguard ‘Green’ Fund Invests in Oil and Gas-Related Stocks, Fin. Times (July 10, 2019); Adriana Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing, 36 Yale J. on Reg. 795, 848 (2019).

[9] See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stanford L. Rev. 8 (2003); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice 211 (4481) Science 453-458 (1981).

[10] See e.g., Fair Access to Financial Services, 85 Fed. Reg. 75,261 (Nov. 25, 2020) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 55).

[11] See e.g., Emily Glazer, Companies Brace Themselves for New ESG Regulations Under Biden, Wall St. J. (Jan. 18, 2021) https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-brace-themselves-for-new-esg-regulations-under-biden-11610719200?mod=searchresults_pos3&page=1.

[12] See e.g., Tanya Fielder et al., Business Risk and the Emergence of Climate Analytics, Nature Climate Change (2021). The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board creates voluntary industry-specific standards, with quantitative metrics for 77 different sectors. Standards Overview, Sustainability Accounting Standards Bd.

[13] See e.g., Fielder et al., supra note X.

[14] See Madison Condon, Sarah Ladin, Jack Lienke, Michael Panfil, & Alexander Song, Mandating Disclosure of Climate-Related Financial Risks, Institute for Policy Integrity and Environmental Defense Fund (2021).

This post comes to us from Professor Madison Condon at Boston University School of Law. It is based on her recent article, “Market Myopia’s Climate Bubble,” available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Commissioners Discuss SEC’s Enhanced Climate-Change Efforts

Over the past two weeks, we and the public have seen a steady flow of SEC “climate” statements and press releases.[1]  Our Divisions of Corporation Finance, Examinations, and Enforcement all have announced climate- or ESG-related initiatives.  What does this “enhanced focus” on climate-related matters mean?  The short answer is: it’s not yet clear.  Do these announcements represent a change from current Commission practices or a continuation of the status quo with a new public relations twist?  Time will tell.  In the meantime, it is important to contextualize the recent announcements by providing some historical and procedural background.

The Division of Corporation Finance, per a recent statement by the Acting Chair, will enhance its focus on climate-related disclosure in public company filings and embark on the task of updating the Commission’s guidance in this area.[2]  The staff of our Corporation Finance Division has been reviewing companies’ disclosures, assessing their compliance with disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws, and engaging with them on climate change and a variety of issues that fall under the ESG umbrella, for decades.  For example, the Commission approved the 2010 Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,[3] and Division staff regularly assesses whether climate-related disclosures comply with our rules.[4]  Indeed, even before the Commission issued its 2010 guidance, our disclosure regime encompassed climate-related issues.[5]  All of the Division’s work has been rooted in materiality, the touchstone we use in assessing issuer disclosure on all topics, including climate.

Given this history, we assume that the new initiative is simply a continuation of the work the staff has been doing for more than a decade and not a program to assess public filers’ disclosure against any new standards or expectations.  After all, the Commission has not voted on any new standards or expectations relating to climate-related disclosure.  The timing of this release—just before many public companies were due to file their annual reports—underscores its apparent function as a re-framing of the ongoing work, rather than the announcement of anything new.

The Acting Chair also announced that the staff would begin updating the Commission’s 2010 guidance.[6]  The staff can, and frequently does, recommend that the Commission update or revisit prior Commission action.  We welcome any recommendations the staff may have with respect to enhancing our interpretive guidance to meet investors’ needs for information material to their financial decision-making consistent with our Congressionally-mandated mission and authority.  The staff also can issue interpretive guidance or certain exemptive relief on its own that does not contradict Commission-level actions.  So the new announcement cannot foreshadow a plan for the staff to issue guidance that would elicit more specific line items or otherwise convert the Commission’s generally principles-based approach to a prescriptive one.  Such a change, of course, would require a new Commission vote.

The press release announcing our Division of Examinations’ 2021 examination priorities included an introduction about how this year’s priorities have an “enhanced focus” on climate and ESG-related risks.[7]  The Examination priorities themselves,[8] however, refer only briefly to climate and ESG-related risks and do not contain any discussion of a thematic climate focus.  Instead, as one would expect, the Examinations Division is prioritizing risk-based reviews of entities’ compliance with existing statutes and regulations.  These reviews touch on climate and ESG-related risks, which is not surprising given the increasing number of climate- and ESG-themed products and services, but their focus is appropriately much broader.[9]

The most recent announcement related to the Division of Enforcement also highlights climate and ESG issues, stating that the newly created “Climate and ESG Task Force will develop initiatives to proactively identify ESG-related misconduct.”[10]  What that means programmatically is unclear.  Our Division of Enforcement will continue to identify, investigate, and bring actions against those who violate our laws and rules.  Some of those violators might be public companies or advisers whose climate- or ESG-related statements are false or misleading, but such actions would not be based on any new standard; we have always pursued violations of our antifraud provisions.

If, instead, this announcement is designed to add heft to the announcements of the Divisions of Corporation Finance and Examinations that preceded it, the message is an odd one.  Wouldn’t it be more prudent for us to await the results of the Corporation Finance staff’s latest review of climate change-related disclosure and the Examinations staff’s climate- or ESG-related findings in this new exam cycle before allocating resources to an ESG-specific Enforcement initiative?  Better yet, shouldn’t we wait for our Corporation Finance staff to complete its assessment of our existing rules relating to ESG disclosures to find out if they are unclear or in need of updating before we announce an initiative aimed at bringing enforcement actions in this area?  But then maybe the Enforcement Division is merely continuing ongoing efforts with a little extra fanfare.  Either way, we must continue to review any alleged securities violations in light of the regulations and guidance in existence at the time of the conduct in question.

While these new climate-related announcements raise more questions than they answer, we look forward to working with SEC staff in the relevant divisions as they review disclosures, assess the adequacy of our guidance and rules, examine for compliance with our rules, and pursue securities law violations.  We encourage investors, issuers, and practitioners to join this effort by engaging with the staff and with us on these matters.  Without the benefit of the public’s experience, knowledge, and views, it would be premature for the Commission to make major changes to longstanding practices.

ENDNOTES

[1] See, e.g., Acting Chair Allison Herren Lee, “Statement on the Review of Climate-Related Disclosure” (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/lee-statement-review-climate-related-disclosure (hereinafter “Statement of Acting Chair Herren Lee”); “SEC Division of Examinations Announces 2021 Examination Priorities: Enhanced Focus on Climate-Related Risks” (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-39; (hereinafter “Press Release Announcing 2021 Examination Priorities”); “SEC Announces Enforcement Task Force Focused on Climate and ESG Issues” (Mar. 4, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2021-42?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery (hereinafter “Press Release Announcing Enforcement Task Force”).

[2] See Statement of Acting Chair Herren Lee, supra note 1.

[3] See “Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change,” Rel. No. 33-9106 (Feb 8. 2010), https://sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf (hereinafter, the “2010 Guidance”).

[4] In March 2019, then Corporation Finance Director Bill Hinman noted specific examples of how climate-related issues might trigger the need for material disclosures from filers, consistent with the Commission’s 2010 Guidance.  See “Applying a Principles Based Approach to Disclosing Complex, Uncertain, and Evolving Risks,” William Hinman, Director Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (March 19, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/hinman-applying-principles-based-approach-disclosure-031519See also GAO Report to Congressional Requesters, “Climate-Related Risks: SEC Has Taken Steps to Clarify Disclosure Requirements,” at 14-15, https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690197.pdf (detailing staff reports of climate-related disclosures to the Senate Committee on Appropriations in 2012 and 2014 and certain comment letters sent on climate-related disclosures between 2010-2017); GAO Report to the Honorable Mark Warner, U.S. Senate, “Public Companies: Disclosure of Environmental, Social, and Governance Factors and Options to Enhance Them,” at 36-37 https://www.gao.gov/assets/710/707949.pdf (explaining that since 2014, staff has conducted additional internal assessments on climate-related disclosures and assessments of disclosures on selected ESG topics).

[5] As Commissioner Casey said at the time the 2010 Guidance was adopted, “our disclosure regime related to environmental issues including climate change is highly developed and robust, and registrants are well aware of, and have decades of experience complying with, these disclosure requirements.”  See Commissioner Kathleen L. Casey,Statement at Open Meeting — Interpretive Release Regarding Disclosure of Climate Change Matters” (Jan. 27, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch012710klc-climate.htm.

[6] See Statement of Acting Chair Herren Lee, supra note 1.

[7] See Press Release Announcing 2021 Examination Priorities, supra note 1.

[8] SEC Division of Examinations 2021 Examination Priorities (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.sec.gov/files/2021-exam-priorities.pdf.

[9] Take the discussion of registered investment advisers’ compliance programs with respect to their sustainability offerings:  “The Division will review the consistency and adequacy of the disclosures RIAs and fund complexes provide to clients regarding these strategies, determine whether the firms’ processes and practices match their disclosures, review fund advertising for false or misleading statements, and review proxy voting policies and procedures and votes to assess whether they align with the strategies.”  Id. at 32.  The focus, however, is a variation of the same theme that has motivated examinations for many years:  advisers owe a fiduciary duty to their clients, which includes doing what you tell them you’re doing and informing them about conflicts of interest.

[10] Press Release Announcing Enforcement Task Force, supra note 1.  The announcement states that “[t]he initial focus will be to identify any material gaps or misstatements in issuers’ disclosure of climate risks under existing rules.”  It is unclear how that initial focus may evolve.

This statement was issued on March 4, 2021, by Hester M. Peirce and Elad L. Roisman, commissioners of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Categories
Litigation Securities Regulation

Gibson Dunn Offers 2020 Year-End Securities Litigation Update

Notwithstanding the ongoing spread of COVID-19 and unprecedented changes in daily life and the economy, the second half of 2020 marched on to the steady drumbeat of securities-related lawsuits we have observed in recent years, including securities class and stockholder derivative actions, insider trading lawsuits, and government enforcement actions. In this 2020 year-end edition of our semi-annual publication, we discuss developments in the securities laws that have occurred against this backdrop.

The year-end update highlights what you most need to know in securities litigation developments and trends for the second half of 2020:

  • Federal securities filings decreased by approximately 22% when compared to 2019, even as the average settlement value rose and the median settlement value remained comparable.
  • The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, No. 20-222, and is set to review the Second Circuit’s inflation-maintenance theory and consider the use of price-impact evidence to rebut the presumption of reliance at the class certification stage.
  • With the Supreme Court set to provide additional guidance on “price impact” theories under Halliburton II, the Seventh Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s path by requiring trial courts to consider evidence of a lack of price impact even where that evidence overlaps with a merits issue, such as materiality, and assigning both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion to defendants.
  • The Delaware Supreme Court diminished Section 220’s threshold requirement that a stockholder have a “proper purpose” to inspect a corporation’s books and records, and may soon reduce or eliminate former stockholders’ standing to continue litigating “dual-natured” merger claims post-closing. We also discuss the fraud-on-the-board theory that survived a motion to dismiss in Mindbody.
  • We continue to monitor courts’ application of the disseminator theory of liability recognized by the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Lorenzo.
  • We again survey specific securities-related lawsuits arising in connection with or related to the coronavirus pandemic, including class actions, derivative actions, and government enforcement actions filed by both the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) and the Department of Justice.
  • We review developments regarding Omnicare’s falsity of opinions standard, as rulings by the Second Circuit and several district courts shed light on the boundaries of liability for false or misleading statements of opinion as well as omissions.
  • Finally, we consider notable ERISA litigation activity, including how the Supreme Court’s early 2020 decisions in Sulyma and Jander have been applied by lower courts, as well as a potential circuit split regarding an employer’s fiduciary duties while offering a single-stock fund.

Filing And Settlement Trends

According to data from a newly released NERA Economic Consulting (“NERA”) study, filings and settlements in 2020 reflected the volatility of a tumultuous year, though certain aspects remained consistent with existing trends. For example, a decrease in the number of merger-objection cases filed in 2020 (down to 106 from 162 in 2019) drove a decline in the number of new federal class actions filed in 2020 (down to 326 from 420 in 2019). As in 2019, the most frequently litigated industry sectors continue to be the “Health Technology and Services” and “Electronic Technology and Technology Services” sectors, each rising by 2%.

The median settlement value of federal securities cases in 2020—excluding merger-objection cases and cases settling for more than $1 billion or $0 to the class—was largely consistent with prior years (at $13 million, up from $12 million in 2019, and on par with $13 million in 2018). By contrast, average settlement values (excluding merger-objection and zero-dollar settlements) rose in 2020 (at $44 million, up from $29 million in 2019, though down from $73 million in 2018).

Filing Trends

Figure 1 below reflects filing rates for 2020 (all charts courtesy of NERA). 326 cases were filed last year, down considerably from the steady figures we have seen from 2017–2019. Note, however, that this figure does not include class action suits filed in state court or state court derivative suits, including those filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery.

Figure 1:

Mix Of Cases Filed In 2020

Filings By Industry Sector

As shown in Figure 2 below, the distribution of non-merger filings by industry was relatively consistent with 2019, even as the number of filings significantly decreased. The “Electronic Technology and Technology Services” and “Health Technology and Services” sectors continued to account for almost half of all filings, reaching 45% in 2020, with filings in both sectors rising by 2% over 2019. Notably, “Energy and Non-Energy Minerals” filings rose by 5% (at 6%, up from 1% in 2019), while “Commercial and Industrial Services” dropped by 4% (at 4%, down from 8% in 2019).

Figure 2:

Merger Cases

As shown in Figure 3 below, there were 106 merger-objection cases filed in federal court in 2020. This represents a 34.5% year-over-year decrease from 2019, and the lowest number of such filings since 2016, when the Delaware Court of Chancery put an effective end to the practice of disclosure-only settlements in In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 29 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016), which drove the increase in merger-objection filings between 2015 and 2017.

Figure 3:

Settlement Trends

As reflected in Figure 4 below, the average settlement value rebounded in 2020, reaching $44 million, after declining by more than 50% from $73 million in 2018 to $29 million in 2019, although that decrease can primarily be attributed to the inclusion of a settlement in 2018 that exceeded $1 billion, which skewed the average.

Figure 4:

Turning to the median settlement value, and excluding settlements over $1 billion, we see in Figure 5 that the steady pace of 2018 ($13 million) and 2019 ($12 million) continued in 2020 ($13 million).

Figure 5:

Finally, as shown in Figure 6, even though Median NERA-Defined Investor Losses rose steeply in 2020 to $805 million after a relatively consistent trend during the period 2014 through 2019, the Median Ratio of Settlement to Investor Losses fell for the second year in a row.

Figure 6:

What To Watch For In The Supreme Court

Supreme Court To Weigh In On Use Of Inflation Maintenance Theory

As we previewed in our 2020 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, No. 20-222, a case concerning the use of price-impact evidence to rebut the presumption of reliance at the class certification stage. ___ S. Ct. ___, 2020 WL 7296815 (Mem.) (Dec. 11, 2020). Recall that under Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014) (“Halliburton II”), the Supreme Court preserved the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption that enables courts to presume classwide reliance in Rule 10b-5 cases where plaintiffs satisfy certain prerequisites, but also opened the door to defendants rebutting that presumption at the class certification stage with evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not impact the issuer’s stock price. Since then, lower courts have split on the viability of the “inflation maintenance” theory in this context. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System offers the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve this split, squarely presenting the question of whether plaintiffs may use the inflation maintenance theory to demonstrate reliance by alleging that misstatements affected a stock price not by artificially inflating it, but by maintaining preexisting inflation.

By way of background, on April 7, 2020, a divided Second Circuit panel affirmed the trial court’s order certifying a class under the inflation maintenance theory premised on Goldman Sachs’s generic public statements. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 955 F.3d 254, 264–70 (2d Cir. 2020) (“Goldman Sachs II”). The plaintiffs did not make any showing that the challenged statements inflated the stock price, but rather premised their action on a drop in stock price following the announcement of a related regulatory action. Id. at 258–59, 262–63, 271, 273–74; see also id. at 275 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). In doing so, the Second Circuit rejected Goldman Sachs’s argument that the inflation maintenance theory may be applied only to “fraud-induced” inflation and should be narrowed to disallow its application to “general statements.” Id. at 265–70. The court also dismissed Goldman Sachs’s policy arguments that upholding inflation maintenance in these circumstances would “open the floodgates to unmeritorious litigation by allowing courts to certify classes that it believes should lose on the merits,” id. at 269, and that any time allegations of misconduct caused a stock to drop, “plaintiffs could just point to any general statement about the company’s business principles or risk controls and proclaim ‘price maintenance,’” id. (quoting Brief and Special Appendix for Defendants-Appellants at 52–53, Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 955 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2020) (No. 18-3667), ECF No. 62).

Following the Second Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in June 2020 in Goldman Sachs II, Order, Ark. Tchr. Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 18-3667 (2d Cir. June 15, 2020), ECF No. 277, it was expected that the Supreme Court would consider this important issue. On December 11, 2020, after reviewing amicus briefs from the Society for Corporate Governance, former SEC officials and law professors, and financial economists, the Supreme Court granted the defendants’ petition for a writ of certiorari.

The Supreme Court will consider (1) whether the defendant in a securities class action may rebut the presumption of classwide reliance recognized in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), by pointing to the generic nature of the alleged misstatements in showing that the statements had no impact on the price of the security, even though that evidence is also relevant to the substantive element of materiality, and (2) whether a defendant seeking to rebut the Basic presumption has only a burden of production or also the ultimate burden of persuasion. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at I, Goldman Sachs (No. 20-222).

If the Supreme Court rejects the Second Circuit’s inflation-maintenance theory, it would protect the foundational importance of price impact to the Basic presumption of reliance, and would enable securities class action defendants to defeat the Basic presumption using any price-impact evidence—direct as well as indirect—even if that evidence overlaps with a later merits inquiry. It would stop plaintiffs from establishing price impact by pointing only to a company’s generic, aspirational statements and a subsequent stock drop in response to some enforcement activity. It would also preclude plaintiffs from showing loss causation by merely alleging that investors purchased stock at inflated prices and later suffered losses. On the other hand, if the Court were to affirm the Second Circuit’s approach, we expect a proliferation of “inflation maintenance” class actions based on a company’s general statements.

Questions Over Constitutional Challenges To Power Or Appointment Of Administrative Adjudicators

Readers will recall the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2018), as discussed in our 2018 Mid-Year Securities Enforcement Update, that administrative law judges (“ALJs”) are “Officers” under the Appointments Clause and therefore must be appointed by either the President, the SEC, or a court of law. The Supreme Court’s holding in Lucia continues to generate constitutional questions over the appointment of administrative adjudicators, which could have implications for anyone considering bringing similar challenges against an ALJ of the SEC.

On March 1, 2021, the Supreme Court is set to hear argument in United States v. Arthrex, No. 19-1434 et al., which presents the question whether administrative adjudicators in the Patent and Trademark Office are “principal” or “inferior” Officers of the United States for purposes of the Appointments Clause. These consolidated cases present a question, not resolved by Lucia, as to how to categorize administrative adjudicators in light of their functions, supervision, and (possibly) removal protections. Gibson Dunn represents Smith & Nephew and ArthroCare Corp., the petitioners in No. 19-1452, in arguing (alongside the government) that administrative patent judges (“APJs”) are inferior Officers and were therefore permissibly appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. The Court’s resolution of the categorization issue in the context of APJs could have impacts for administrative adjudicators in other agencies.

On March 3, 2021, the Supreme Court is set to hear argument in Carr v. Saul and Davis v. Saul, a pair of consolidated cases involving whether parties need to present constitutional challenges to the appointment of administrative adjudicators at their administrative hearing in order to preserve the challenge for their later appeal. In both Carr and Davis, the petitioners filed for disability benefits under the Social Security Act, only for their claims to be denied by the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), the administrative tribunal, and the agency’s appeals board. Carr v. Comm’r, 961 F.3d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 2020); Davis v. Saul, 963 F.3d 790, 791 (8th Cir. 2020). Petitioners sought review in federal district court, and in light of Lucia, for the first time challenged the constitutionality of the appointment of the SSA ALJs. In Carr, the district court reversed the SSA decisions and remanded for new hearings before constitutionally appointed ALJs, while in Davis, the district court found that the petitioners had waived those challenges by not first bringing them during the administrative proceedings themselves. 961 F.3d at 1270; 963 F.3d at 792–93. On appeal, both the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals agreed that the challenges had been waived by not being brought directly before the SSA. 961 F.3d at 1276; 963 F.3d at 795. The Court’s decision in these consolidated cases should help clarify the applicability of preservation, waiver, and forfeiture principles to these type of structural challenges.

Delaware Development

Recent Trends In Section 220 Litigation

Since the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), stockholder plaintiffs have increasingly sought company books and records under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law to aid in drafting complaints that can withstand dismissal. See, e.g., Morrison v. Berry, 191 A.3d 268, 273, 275 (Del. 2018) (reversing dismissal under Corwin by relying on “crucial” documents obtained pursuant to Section 220). This uptick in Section 220 demands is not surprising, as Corwin established a formidable hurdle to plaintiffs hoping to overcome a motion to dismiss, as discussed in our 2017 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update. Further, Delaware courts have “repeatedly admonished plaintiffs to use the ‘tools at hand’ and to request company books and records under Section 220 to attempt to substantiate their allegations before filing derivative complaints.” California State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824, 839 (Del. 2018) (citation omitted).

Delaware Supreme Court Tosses “Proper Purpose” Requirement Except In “Rare” Circumstances

Section 220 permits a stockholder to inspect the company’s books and records for any “proper purpose” reasonably related to the stockholder’s “interest as a stockholder.” 8 Del. C. § 220(b). One well-recognized “proper purpose” that stockholders commonly assert is investigating alleged corporate mismanagement or wrongdoing, but a stockholder’s curiosity alone will not permit such an investigation. Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 121–22 (Del. 2006). Instead, the stockholder must demonstrate “a credible basis from which the court can infer that mismanagement, waste or wrongdoing may have occurred.” Lavin v. West Corp., 2017 WL 6728702, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 29, 2017) (quoting Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 118). Although the “credible basis” standard imposes “the lowest possible burden of proof” under Delaware law, see Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 123, Delaware case law has required stockholders to present some evidence to demonstrate that the alleged wrongdoing could be actionable, see United Techs. Corp. v. Treppel, 109 A.3d 553, 559 & n.31 (Del. 2014), and identify the course of action the stockholder plans to pursue if its demand succeeds, see Sec. First Corp. v. U.S. Die Casting & Dev. Co., 687 A.2d 563, 570 (Del. 1997).

Recently, however, the Delaware Supreme Court held in AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Lebanon County Employees’ Retirement Fund, “that a stockholder is not required to state the objectives of his investigation” to satisfy Section 220’s “proper purpose” requirement. 2020 WL 7266362, at *6 (Del. Dec. 10, 2020). The Court reasoned that so long as the stockholder states a credible basis to support an inference of mismanagement or wrongdoing, the stockholder need not “specify the ends to which it might use the books and records” should they confirm suspicions of mismanagement or wrongdoing. Id. at *7. The Court also held that, except in “rare” circumstances, a stockholder “need not demonstrate that the alleged mismanagement or wrongdoing is actionable” to obtain company books and records under Section 220. Id. at *13–14.

In light of the developing case law in the Section 220 context, companies should continue to “honor traditional corporate formalities” in acting and maintaining corporate communications and record-keeping regarding its actions. See KT4 Partners LLC v. Palantir Techs. Inc., 203 A.3d 738, 742, 758 (Del. 2019) (ordering directors to produce emails in response to a Section 220 request, where the company “did not honor traditional corporate formalities . . . and had acted through email in connection with the same alleged wrongdoing that [the stockholder] was seeking to investigate”).

Delaware Corporations Not Subject To California Inspection Statute

In another recent decision concerning the inspection rights of stockholders, the Delaware Court of Chancery held that Delaware law precluded a stockholder of a Delaware corporation headquartered in California from seeking books and records under California’s inspection statute, California Corporations Code Section 1601. JUUL Labs, Inc. v. Grove, 238 A.3d 904, 913–18 (Del. Ch. 2020). The court explained that Delaware law governs the internal affairs of Delaware corporations and “[s]tockholder inspection rights are a core matter of internal corporate affairs.” Id. at 915. The court highlighted that the internal affairs doctrine serves “an important public policy . . . to ensure the uniform treatment of directors, officers, and stockholders across jurisdictions,” which the court noted “can only be attained by having the rights and liabilities of those persons with respect to the corporation governed by a single law.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the court held that the stockholder could not seek inspection under Section 1601. Id. at 918. This decision should help Delaware-incorporated companies limit the burden associated with responding to conflicting, burdensome, and invasive books and records demands under the laws of states other than Delaware.

Delaware Supreme Court May Eliminate Standing To Litigate “Dual-Natured” Merger Claims Post-Closing

Despite declining the opportunity to reject precedent that permits stockholders to litigate “dual-natured” merger claims post-closing, the Court of Chancery recently invited the Delaware Supreme Court to do so by certifying its decision in In re TerraForm Power, Inc. Stockholders Litigation, 2020 WL 6375859 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2020), for interlocutory appeal. In TerraForm Power, Inc., plaintiff stockholders asserted breach of fiduciary duty claims against several directors, the CEO, and the majority stockholder of TerraForm Power, Inc., alleging that the controlling stockholder caused TerraForm “to issue [the controlling stockholder] stock for inadequate value, diluting both the financial and voting interest of the minority stockholders.” 2020 WL 6375859, at *1, *2. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of standing, arguing that such dilution claims are “quintessential derivative claims that belong to the corporation” and could not be asserted by plaintiffs, who had ceased to be stockholders at the time of the motion due to a merger. Id. at *1. But Vice Chancellor Glasscock found that the facts alleged in TerraForm Power, Inc. were “indistinguishable” from those at issue in Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 (Del. 2006). TerraForm Power, Inc., 2020 WL 6375859, at *11. In Gentile, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, where a controlling stockholder dilutes the “economic value and voting power” of a minority stockholder’s shares by “caus[ing] the corporation” to issue itself shares for inadequate compensation, the minority stockholder is not deprived of standing to prosecute such claims after the merger closes because they are in the nature of both direct and derivative claims. Gentile, 906 A.2d at 100. Accordingly, Vice Chancellor Glasscock explained that he was bound by Delaware Supreme Court precedent and, as such, Gentile “mandate[d] that the direct claims pled survive” the motion to dismiss. TerraForm Power, Inc., 2020 WL 6375859, at *16.

In light of the criticism surrounding Gentile, however, Vice Chancellor Glasscock certified an interlocutory appeal of his decision to the Delaware Supreme Court to address whether Gentile remains good law. In re TerraForm Power, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2020 WL 6889189 (Del. Ch. Nov. 24, 2020). We will monitor the progress of this appeal and report on any developments in future editions of our Securities Litigation Update.

Revlon Claim Alleging “Fraud On The Board” Survives Motion To Dismiss

Recent Delaware decisions have potentially important implications for corporate directors’ disclosure obligations. In In re Mindbody, Inc., Stockholders Litigation, 2020 WL 5870084 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020), plaintiff stockholders alleged that three corporate insiders of Mindbody, Inc. manipulated the company’s sale to Vista Equity Partners for personal financial gain by withholding material information from the Board and tilting the sale process in Vista’s favor. Id. at *1, *20–25. Plaintiff alleged that the company’s founder—who acted as the company’s lead negotiator—“suffered from material conflicts in the sale process that he failed to disclose to the Board,” and that flaws related to a special committee’s mandate and effectiveness suggested that “the Board was the passive victim of a rogue fiduciary.” Id. at *24–25. The Court of Chancery rejected defendants’ attempt to dismiss this “fraud-on-the-board” theory, holding at the motion to dismiss stage where the facts are assumed to be true, that plaintiffs adequately pleaded the paradigmatic Revlon claim involving “a conflicted fiduciary who is insufficiently checked by the board and who tilts the sale process toward his own personal interests in ways inconsistent with maximizing stockholder value.” Id. at *13, *25.

Mindbody is a helpful reminder that “[a] plaintiff can state a Revlon claim by pleading that one conflicted fiduciary failed to provide material information to the board,” Mindbody, Inc., 2020 WL 5870084, at *14, and in such a case “the irrebuttable presumption of the business judgment rule” under Corwin may not apply since “it is not uncommon that a court finds the same information to be material to both directors and stockholders,” id. at *26 (internal quotations omitted).

Development Of Disseminator Liability Theory Upheld In Lorenzo Continues

As we discussed in our 2019 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, the Supreme Court held in Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019), that those who disseminate false or misleading information to the investing public with the intent to defraud can be liable under Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Exchange Act Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c), even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements for the purposes of enforcement under Rule 10b-5(b). Notably, Francis V. Lorenzo himself settled with the SEC on October 8, 2020, finally bringing an end to the litigation that commenced seven years ago. While the question of liability had been determined and affirmed by the Supreme Court in 2019, the SEC’s 2020 Order suspended Lorenzo from “association with any broker or dealer” and from “participating in any offering of a penny stock” for a period of twelve months but did not require Lorenzo to pay a monetary penalty. See Francis V. Lorenzo, Securities Act Release No. 10872, Exchange Act Release No. 90110, 2020 WL 5993037, at *3 (Oct. 8, 2020).

In the wake of Lorenzo’s settlement with the SEC, courts continue to grapple with whether and how to apply Lorenzo, which raised the possibility that secondary actors—such as financial advisors and lawyers—could face liability under Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c) simply for disseminating the alleged misstatement of another upon a showing that the secondary actors knew the statement contained false or misleading information.

For example, a bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Georgia emphasized the wide range of conduct captured by Rule 10b-5 in the wake of Lorenzo and denied summary judgment in an adversary proceeding on that basis. In re King, 2020 WL 6075956, at *18 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 14, 2020). Although the bankruptcy court was interpreting Minnesota state securities law, the court analogized it to federal law to conclude that the debtor, King, could be held liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for the representations and omissions cited by investors. Id. Recognizing that a different individual purportedly made many of the allegedly misleading statements, the court reasoned that King nonetheless “could be liable for participating in a scheme to defraud . . . using [the other individual’s] misleading statements” as a disseminator, citing In re Cognizant Technology Solutions Corp. Securities Litigation, 2020 WL 3026564, at *16–19 (D.N.J. June 5, 2020), which we addressed in our 2020 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update. In re King, 2020 WL 6075956, at *18. Together, the cases confirm that courts are willing to impose liability when individuals “substantially participate or are inextricably involved in the fraud.” Id.

In other instances, however, Lorenzo is merely a belt to the suspenders supplied by more traditional theories of liability. For example, in In the Matter of Laurie Bebo & John Buono, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) considered the liability of a CEO that allegedly misrepresented the state of an assisted living company’s financial affairs in order to conceal that the company was in breach of its lease agreement. Initial Decision Release No. 1401, 2020 WL 4784633, at *1 (ALJ Aug. 13, 2020). According to the SEC, the company then failed to disclose the company’s noncompliance with the lease in periodic reports filed with the SEC in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. Although the ALJ ultimately found that the CEO “made” the relevant statements because she signed and “had responsibility for the content of the [Company’s] periodic reports,” the ALJ also reasoned that whether the CEO specifically made the statements was immaterial for scheme liability under Lorenzo. Id. at *76–77.

In future Securities Litigation Updates, we will continue to monitor closely how the Lorenzo disseminator liability theory is applied and how it is used to buttress other theories of liability.

Survey Of Coronavirus-Related Securities Litigation

When COVID-19 first arrived in the United States, resulting in massive economic dislocation and a stock market drop in March 2020, many predicted a wave of securities litigation would soon follow. The first wave of COVID-19-related securities lawsuits was more of a ripple, however, targeting select industries, such as travel and healthcare, that were most directly impacted by the pandemic. We surveyed these cases in our 2020 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update.

Despite the steady recovery of the financial markets, the number of COVID-19-related securities litigations has increased. Plaintiffs have continued to sue companies in the travel and healthcare industries and have also widened their net to companies in other industries, including cybersecurity and real estate companies. This second, larger wave of cases has challenged a range of misstatements, including those concerning safety and risk disclosures.

Although it is still too soon to tell how courts will treat COVID-19 in these cases more broadly, we continue to monitor developments in these and other coronavirus-related securities litigation cases. Additional resources regarding company disclosure considerations related to the impact of COVID-19 can be found in the Gibson Dunn Coronavirus (COVID-19) Resource Center.

Securities Class Actions

False Claims Concerning Commitment To Safety

In the Second Circuit, statements concerning a company’s commitment to safety are often considered inactionable because they are “too general to cause a reasonable investor to rely upon them.” In re Vale S.A. Sec. Litig., 2017 WL 1102666, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2017); see also Foley v. Transocean Ltd., 861 F. Supp. 2d 197, 204 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[W]e note that the statements [regarding commitment to safety and training] would likely be considered expressions of ‘puffery’ that cannot form the basis of a securities fraud claim.”). Such statements may be found actionable, however, when the company operates in a dangerous industry and “it is to be expected that investors will be greatly concerned about [its] safety and training efforts.” Bricklayers & Masons Local Union No. 5 Ohio Pension Fund v. Transocean Ltd., 866 F. Supp. 2d 223, 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

City of Riviera Beach Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., No. 20-cv-24111 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 7, 2020): This putative class action against a cruise line company alleges that defendants “failed to disclose material adverse facts about the company’s decrease in bookings outside China, and its inadequate policies and procedures to prevent the spread of COVID-19 on its ships.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3–4. Instead, Royal Caribbean allegedly gave false assurances to “the investing public that its safety protocols were ‘aggressive’ and would ‘ultimately contain the virus.’” Id. at 3. Within days of Royal Caribbean’s suspension of global operations on March 14, 2020, analysts downgraded the company’s stock and lowered their price targets. Id. at 5–6.

Hartel v. GEO Grp., Inc., No. 20-cv-81063 (S.D. Fla. July 7, 2020): A plaintiff stockholder filed a securities class action against GEO Group, a private corrections facilities operator, alleging that the company misled investors about the effectiveness of its COVID-19 response. Dkt. No. 1 at 1–2, 9. The complaint alleges that the company subjected its residents and employees “to significant health risks as the COVID-19 pandemic progressed,” which left the company “vulnerable to significant financial and/or reputational harm.” Dkt. No. 33 at 12. The company’s stock price declined after news of a serious outbreak in one of its facilities was released. Id. at 10.

Failure To Disclose Specific Risks

“Forward-looking statements are protected under the ‘bespeaks caution’ doctrine where they are accompanied by meaningful cautionary language.” In re Am. Int’l Grp., Inc. 2008 Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 511, 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). “However, generic risk disclosures are inadequate to shield defendants from liability for failing to disclose known specific risks.” Id.; see also Freudenberg v. E*Trade Fin. Corp., 712 F. Supp. 2d 171, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (observing generally, in adjudicating a motion to dismiss, that defendants “cannot be immunized for knowingly false statements even if they include some warnings”).

Arbitrage Fund v. Forescout Techs. Inc., No. 20-cv-03819 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2020): Plaintiffs allege computer and network security company Forescout misled investors when, on February 6, 2020, the company announced a merger with Advent International Corp. without disclosing “the significant and disproportionate impact COVID-19 was having on [Forescout’s] business.” Dkt. No. 1 at 6, 10. Forescout previously disclosed general risks relating to COVID-19 but allegedly omitted that Advent was considering withdrawing from the merger agreement due to COVID-19. Id. at 22. On May 15, 2020, Advent announced it was terminating the merger plans. Id. at 16-17. Forescout’s stock fell nearly 24% in the following days. Id. at 24. This case was later consolidated with Sayce v. Forescout Technologies Inc., No. 20-cv-00076 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2020). Dkt. No. 55 at 7.

Berg v. Velocity Fin., Inc., No. 20-cv-06780 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2020): A stockholder of Velocity, a real estate finance company, alleges that at the time of the company’s January 16, 2020 initial public offering, the defendants concealed “the potential impact of the novel coronavirus on Velocity’s business and operations.” Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The “Risk Factors” that Velocity reported were themselves purportedly materially misleading because they “presented as hypothetical[] risks that had already materially harmed the Company.” Dkt. No. 40 at 25. On April 8, 2020, Velocity announced it suspended all loan originations and by May 18, its share price had declined over 80% below the IPO price. Id. at 26–27, 29. As Gibson Dunn recently discussed, on January 25, 2021, the Court granted Velocity’s motion to dismiss, grounding the coronavirus-related portion of its decision on the fact that Velocity could not have anticipated the extent of the pandemic in early January 2020.

Alleged Insider Trading And “Pump and Dump” Schemes Connected To The Government’s Vaccination Efforts

“Under the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ of insider trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 are violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997). Relatedly, in a “pump and dump” scheme, an individual promotes company stock to artificially increase the market price and then sells his shares at the inflated price. Emergent Capital Inv. Mgmt., LLC v. Stonepath Grp, Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2003). In these cases, a plaintiff can adequately allege loss causation by showing that defendants had “the ability to manipulate stock prices of their ventures and that [] affiliated entities sold substantial quantities of [the stock in the relevant period].” Id. at 197 (internal quotations omitted).

Tang v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 20-cv-10462 (D.N.J. Aug. 13, 2020): In this putative class action, a stockholder contends the company violated Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the ’34 Act by allegedly failing to disclose that its officers were granted stock options immediately prior to the company’s public announcement that it had received a loan to produce drugs for the treatment of COVID-19. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. The price of the company’s stock increased after this announcement, and it then dropped as news of the stock options began to circulate. Id. at 4–5.

Hovhannisyan v. Vaxart, Inc., No. 20-cv-06175 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2020): A stockholder in Vaxart, a small clinical-stage biotechnology company, filed a putative class action lawsuit against the company, certain current and former senior executives and directors, and its majority stockholder. Dkt. No. 1 at 1. The complaint alleges that the defendants “engaged in a naked ‘pump and dump’ scheme” by making “a series of misleading statements to investors [suggesting the company] was a major player in the U.S. government’s effort to develop a vaccine.” Id. The stock price plummeted once The New York Times reported that the company misled investors about the nature of its vaccination efforts so that its insiders could reap massive gains. Id. at 2–3.

Stockholder Derivative Actions

In a derivative suit, a stockholder seeks to assert a claim belonging to the corporation. “Whenever directors communicate publicly or directly with shareholders about the corporation’s affairs, with or without a request for shareholder action, directors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith and loyalty.”  Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998).  “[A] director must make a good faith effort to oversee the company’s operations. Failing to make that good faith effort breaches the duty of loyalty and can expose a director to liability.” Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805, 820 (Del. 2019) (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996)).

Disclosure Liability

Fettig v. Kim, No. 20-cv-03316 (E.D. Pa. July 7, 2020): Certain directors and officers of Inovio Pharmaceuticals allegedly breached their fiduciary duties by claiming in February and March 2020 “that Inovio had developed a COVID-19 vaccine in a matter of about three hours,” Dkt. No. 1 at 7 (internal quotations omitted), and “may be in a position to begin human clinical trials in the United States in April 2020,” id. at 10. In response to these announcements, Citron Research posted on Twitter that Inovio’s claims were false and urged the SEC to investigate. Id. at 3. Although Inovio denied Citron’s allegations, it stated that the vaccine was not actually a “vaccine,” but an “early stage prototype,” causing the company’s stock price to plummet. Id.

Wong v. Eberly, No. 20-cv-04269 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2020): Plaintiff alleges that directors and officers of Chembio Diagnostics, Inc. made misleading statements about Chembio’s rapid COVID-19 antibody tests, including that they “were 100% accurate after 11 days following the onset of symptoms.” Dkt. No. 1 at 1, 5. On June 16, 2020, the FDA wrote Chembio a letter saying the test was far less effective than the company had represented and revoked its Emergency Use Authorization, effectively barring distribution. Id. at 6–7. After the announcement, the stock price plummeted by over 60%. Id. at 7.

Oversight Liability

Zarins v. Schessel, No. 654833/2020 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Sept. 30, 2020): A stockholder in SCWorx Corp., a health care technology company, brought a derivative action against certain company directors, claiming that those directors breached their duties to the company “by making or causing the Company to make false statements that artificially inflated the price of SCWorx securities.” Dkt. No. 1 at 3. Specifically, the complaint alleges that the director defendants caused “SCWorx to announce that it had received a committed purchase order of two million COVID-19 rapid testing kits.” Id. at 11. The company’s stock dropped after an investment research firm referred to the purported deal as “completely bogus” and backed by purported fraudsters and convicted felons. Id. at 14–15.

Insider Trading

As discussed above, insider trading involves a corporate insider trading the company’s securities based on material, nonpublic information. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651. “[A] corporate insider must abstain from trading in the shares of his corporation unless he has first disclosed all material inside information known to him.” Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980). “[I]f disclosure is impracticable or prohibited by business considerations or by law, the duty is to abstain from trading.” SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 285 (2d Cir. 2012). A similar state-law claim in Delaware is known as a Brophy claim, which permits a corporation to recover from its fiduciaries for harm caused by insider trading. Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 70 A.2d 5 (Del. Ch. 1949).

City of Hallandale Beach Police Officers’ and Firefighters’ Personnel Ret. Tr. v. Garcia, No. 2020-0887 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 2020): On October 13, 2020, plaintiffs filed suit against the controlling stockholder of a company and other individuals alleging that defendants purchased shares of the company at a price that was too low in light of a decline in the company’s stock price at the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Dkt. No. 1 at 2. Plaintiff brought a Brophy claim as well as derivative claims for breach of fiduciary duty, waste, and unjust enrichment. Id. at 42–45.

Jaquith v. Latour, No. 2020-0904 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2020): The plaintiff in this derivative action against the directors and controlling stockholder of Vaxart, a biotechnology company, alleges that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by approving warrant amendments allowing the controlling stockholder to trade on material, nonpublic information relating to Vaxart’s participation in Operation Warp Speed (“OWS”). Dkt. No. 7 at 2–3. Three weeks after the amendments, Vaxart announced that it was selected to be part of OWS.  Id. at 5. Shortly after Vaxart’s stock price skyrocketed, the controlling stockholder exercised its warrants and sold its shares for nearly $200 million in profit. Id. at 6.

SEC Cases

SEC v. Schena, No. 20-cv-06717 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2020): The SEC charged Mark Schena, the President of Arrayit Corporation, a healthcare technology company, for “making false and misleading statements about the status of Arrayit’s delinquent financial reports.” Dkt. No. 1 at 1. At the time, the defendant had allegedly failed to provide Arrayit’s independent auditor with the documents necessary to complete audits of the company’s financial statements. Id. at 4. Schena was also charged with making false and misleading statements that the company had a COVID-19 test and that it was pending emergency FDA approval. Id. at 8. The SEC contends that Arrayit had not applied for emergency approval when these statements were made. Id.

The Cheesecake Factory, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 90565 (Dec. 4, 2020): As Gibson Dunn recently discussed, this enforcement action came after the company submitted a Form 8-K withdrawing prior financial guidance due to the economic impact of the pandemic. Order at 2. The company had allegedly made misstatements and omissions regarding its ability to operate sustainably in the shift to a business model centered on take-out and delivery. Id. at 3. The Cheesecake Factory settled on a neither-admit-nor-deny basis, and agreed to a $125,000 penalty. Id. at 1, 4.

Criminal Securities Fraud

United States v. Berman, No. 20-cr-278 (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2020): On December 15, 2020, the CEO of Decision Diagnostics Corp. was indicted by a federal grand jury in connection with an alleged scheme to defraud investors by making false and misleading statements about the development of a new COVID-19 test, which led to millions of dollars in investor losses. Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 15. According to the indictment, the defendant falsely claimed that Decision Diagnostics had developed a 15-second, COVID-19 finger-prick rapid test that was on the verge of FDA approval. Id. at 6–7. At the time, however, the test was allegedly more of a concept than an actual product, and the company lacked the resources to conduct the clinical testing required by the FDA. Id. at 9.

*          *          *

Although a fair number of COVID-19 suits have been filed, the book is far from closed on these lawsuits or the continued impact COVID-19 will have on the stock market and broader economy. It is still unclear whether optimistic stock market projections regarding the success of vaccinations will bear out, and when companies in the hardest hit industries will be able to return to business as usual. Regardless of the course COVID-19 takes in 2021, we expect plaintiffs to continue filing coronavirus-related securities lawsuits.

Falsity Of Opinions – Omnicare Update

As we discussed in our prior securities litigation updates, lower courts continue to analyze the boundaries of liability for false or misleading statements of opinion set forth in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175 (2015). The Omnicare Court identified two situations in which a speaker can be held liable for a statement of opinion. Id. at 184–86. First, although “a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an ‘untrue statement of material fact,’ regardless [of] whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong,” liability can be found when a speaker does not “actually hold[] the stated belief,” or when the opinion statement contains demonstrably untrue “embedded statements of fact.” Id. Second, even where speakers might sincerely believe their stated opinions, they can be found liable if they omit a fact “about the issuer’s inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion” that “conflict[s] with what a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself.” Id. at 189. We expect to see even broader application of Omnicare principles in the coming months as COVID-related securities cases begin reaching judicial decisions.

In July, the Second Circuit shed some light on what qualifies as a plausibly pled omission theory of liability in Abramson v. NewLink Genetics Corp., 965 F.3d 165 (2d Cir. 2020), reh’g en banc denied. The lower court found no liability could attach as a matter of law to the first of the defendants’ statements at issue—that “‘all the major studies’ show survival rates of at most 20 months” for certain cancer patients—because plaintiffs did not “aver that the speaker did not hold the belief.” Id. at 174–76, rev’g Nguyen v. NewLink Genetics Corp., 2019 WL 591556 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2019). Noting that Omnicare lessened the importance of a precise distinction between statements of fact and opinion, particularly where the statement was allegedly misleading by omission, the Second Circuit panel, made up of Judges Kearse, Walker, and Livingston, rejected this analysis. Id. at 176. Instead, the panel found that the degree of fact or certainty implied in the defendant’s conclusory statement rendered it misleading because the existence of “major studies” to the contrary should have given the defendant reason to speak in more qualified terms. Id. at 176–77. Applying the same omission theory framework, the panel also reversed the trial court’s dismissal as to the second statement at issue—a mix of opinion and fact: “it is our belief that in our study today we don’t have any reason to believe that median survival for these patients will be more than low 20s,” and that the company’s study “‘is designed’ for the possibility that the control group survival rate is ‘in the low 20s.’” Id. at 178. As before, the panel concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged the statement was misleading by omission due to its categorical nature. Id. As to both statements, the court found the driving factor was whether a fact finder could conclude a reasonable investor, taking these conclusory statements at face value, could be misled to believe no credible study to the contrary existed. Thus, the decision guides issuers to use more qualified terms in their statements rather than conveying absolute certainty to investors, especially if there is reason to believe facts exist cutting the other way.

Otherwise, Omnicare remained a significant pleading barrier in the latter half of 2020, particularly where the opinions concerned general statements about financial performance. In Shreiber v. Synacor, Inc., for example, issued just a few months after Abramson, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of class action claims alleging that Synacor’s “upbeat statements about . . . expected future revenues” from a key contract to create a web portal were misleading because they failed to disclose certain material risks in achieving those projections—namely that the counterparty “controlled monetization” of the portal. 2020 WL 6165909, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Oct. 22, 2020). The plaintiffs in Schreiber admitted that the opinions were “honestly held” and supplied no untrue supporting facts, leaving only the question of whether the defendants “omit[ted] information whose omission makes the statement misleading to a reasonable investor.” Id. at *2. The court found no such omission, noting that the defendants disclosed the terms of the relevant contract and effectively cautioned that revenue would only be achievable after the program was fully deployed, so the omissions “fairly align[ed]” with Synacor’s stated expectations to achieve $100 million in revenue after deploying the portal and migrating customers. Id. (quoting Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 189).

Several cases in the Southern District of New York reaffirmed that appropriate cautionary language is significant in protecting issuers from Omnicare liability. For example, in In re Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV Securities Litigation, 2020 WL 5819558 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2020), the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ optimistic opinions about expected dividends had omitted material information on factors that could restrict dividend payments. Id. at *6. But because the defendants’ SEC filings had cautioned that they “may be unable to pay dividends” depending on numerous factors, the court ruled that the “alleged misstatements [were] nonactionable statements of opinion.” Id. at *5–*6; cf. In re Ferroglobe PLC Sec. Litig., 2020 WL 6585715, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 2020) (statements made during a presentation were not misleading where slides “immediately preced[ing] and follow[ing]” the statements had “acknowledged” the issues claimed to have been omitted). Likewise, in Burr v. Equity Bancshares, Inc., 2020 WL 6063558 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2020), the court dismissed claims related to statements about loan loss allowances. Crucially, defendants’ SEC filings had described various factors that affected their allowance determinations. Id. at *6. And defendants expressly noted that their determinations were “ultimately a matter of ‘management’s judgment.’” Id. Given these warnings, as well as the “customs and practices of the relevant industry,” the court determined that a reasonable investor would not have been misled. Id. (quoting Omnicare, 575 U.S. at 189).

Recent district court opinions also illustrate that Omnicare can apply to limit claims even in the absence of classic opinion qualifiers. For example, in West Palm Beach Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Conagra Brands, Inc., 2020 WL 6118605 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2020), the district court treated the defendants’ alleged predictions about the “success and effects” of a proposed merger as opinions—to be analyzed under Omnicare—despite the absence of “qualifiers such as ‘I think’ or ‘I believe.’” Id. at *16. The court reasoned that “future predictions” are distinguishable from statements of fact in light of the inherent uncertainty entailed in making predictions. Id. Similarly, in Costanzo v. DXC Technology Co., 2020 WL 4284838 (N.D. Cal. July 27, 2020), a California district court assumed that Omnicare applied to the claims at issue, even though “[t]he challenged statements” lacked “any clear indication” that they were opinions. Id. at *12. Thus, while it remains true that issuers are well advised to properly qualify opinion statements with phrases like “I think” or “I believe,” a failure to do so does not preclude Omnicare treatment when other factors show that the disputed statement was an opinion.

Halliburton II Market Efficiency And “Price Impact” Cases

As discussed above, the most significant development related to litigating price impact during the second half of 2020 was the Supreme Court’s grant of Goldman Sachs’s petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court’s eventual decision in that case will mark the Court’s first guidance on the proper application of its 2014 holding in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014) (“Halliburton II”). In Halliburton II, the Court affirmed that courts may presume that stockholders classwide relied on alleged misrepresentations—provided the misrepresentations were public and material, the stock traded in an efficient market, and the plaintiffs traded after the alleged misrepresentation but before any correction. See id. at 277–78; Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 & n.27 (1988). In Halliburton II, however, the Court also held a defendant can undermine the presumption—and defeat class certification—by showing that the alleged misrepresentation in fact had no impact on the stock price. See Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at 283.

As we have previously noted, lower courts have had to reconcile the Supreme Court’s explicit ruling in Halliburton II that direct and indirect evidence of price impact must be considered at the class certification stage, see id., with the Supreme Court’s previous decisions holding that plaintiffs need not prove loss causation, see Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804, 813 (2011) (“Halliburton I”), or materiality, see Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 470 (2013) (“Amgen”), until the merits stage. Lower courts have also struggled with the issue of what standard of proof defendants must meet to rebut the presumption and what evidence is required to successfully do so.

Before the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in the Goldman Sachs case, the Seventh Circuit issued In re Allstate Corp. Securities Litigation, 966 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2020), an opinion that both acknowledged the need for and provided guidance on reconciling the three key Supreme Court decisions regarding the presumption of reliance noted above. The Seventh Circuit followed the Second Circuit’s lead in requiring trial courts to consider evidence of a lack of price impact even where that evidence overlaps with a merits issue, such as materiality. Allstate, 966 F.3d at 600–01, 608–09. It also followed the Second Circuit on assigning both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion to defendants. Id. at 610–11 (citing Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79, 96–104 (2d Cir. 2017)). The Seventh Circuit vacated the trial court’s ruling certifying a class and held that the district court’s refusal to engage with defendant’s evidence of a lack of price impact was error. Id. at 609. Thus, the court remanded for further consideration of defendant’s evidence, id., including evidence regarding any price increase when the challenged statements were made and whether the stock price drops when the alleged fraud is revealed, see id. at 613.

Despite the emerging consensus among circuit courts that price impact evidence must be considered at the class certification stage even where it overlaps with merits issues, several district court decisions in the second half of 2020 declined to consider arguments regarding whether alleged corrective disclosures actually corrected the challenged statements. See, e.g., Plymouth Cty. Ret. Sys. v. Patterson Cos., 2020 WL 5757695, at *13 (D. Minn. Sept. 28, 2020) (declining to consider defendants’ arguments that changes in stock price on alleged corrective disclosure dates were not attributable to the challenged statements, because loss causation is a merits issue); In re CenturyLink Sales Practices & Sec. Litig., 2020 WL 5517483, at *13 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2020) (same). Both Plymouth County Retirement System and In re CenturyLink cited the Second Circuit’s 2020 decision in Goldman Sachs II, now under review by the Supreme Court, for the proposition that “[d]efendants must show ‘that the entire price decline on the corrective-disclosure dates was due to something other than its alleged misstatements,’” see, e.g., Plymouth Cty., 2020 WL 5757695, at *13 (quoting Ark. Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 955 F.3d 254, 270 (2d Cir. 2020)), but refused to consider whether the corrective disclosures actually contradicted the challenged statements, see, e.g., id. (citing Amgen, 568 U.S. at 475).

We will continue to monitor developments in the Goldman Sachs matter and cases considering Halliburton II.

ERISA Litigation

Where employer stock is offered as an investment option in employee retirement plans, securities litigation is often accompanied by claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). 2020 saw noteworthy ERISA litigation activity, including the Supreme Court’s Sulyma decision clarifying the statute of limitations for fiduciary breach claims. Lower courts have also been active in the wake of the Court’s January decision in Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592 (2020), in addition to analyzing the requirements for fiduciary breach claims, the requirement of administrative exhaustion as a defense to fiduciary claims, and the enforceability of arbitration agreements.

Sulyma And Subsequent Lower Court Developments

As we discussed in our 2020 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, in February the Supreme Court unanimously held in Intel Corporation Investment Policy Committee v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768 (2020), that for purposes of ERISA’s limitations period in fiduciary breach cases, a fiduciary’s disclosure of plan information alone does not create “actual knowledge” subjecting such claims to the statute’s shorter three-year period, 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), absent proof that a beneficiary actually read such disclosures. The Court left open questions, however, concerning how to prove “actual knowledge” based on circumstantial evidence or “willful blindness.” See Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. at 779.

Only a small number of lower courts have applied this decision so far. In Guenther v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 972 F.3d 1043 (9th Cir. 2020), the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a complaint as time-barred by the three-year limitations period triggered by actual knowledge as addressed in Sulyma. The court found that the plaintiff had actual knowledge based both on his testimony that he received and read relevant plan disclosures, and on “[c]ircumstantial evidence” such as actions that reflected his understanding of their contents. Id. at 1055. By contrast, a few district courts have declined to dismiss complaints as time-barred under the standard articulated in Sulyma. In Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc., No. 18-cv-1566, 2020 WL 6939810 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 21, 2020), the court held that a plaintiff’s admission of past “generic concerns” about the fees that ultimately gave rise to her claim was “not evidence that she had actual knowledge of the underlying fiduciary conduct at issue”: “[s]he might have thought she was paying too much for the services she received, but her personal beliefs in no way demonstrate knowledge of the details, specifically that the fees charged were allegedly above the market price . . . , and particularly that fees might have even been inflated due to the alleged kickback scheme.” Id. at *28. Another court similarly declined to dismiss on timeliness grounds in Bouvy v. Analog Devices, Inc., No. 19-cv-881, 2020 WL 3448385 (S.D. Cal. June 24, 2020). Defendants argued that the plaintiff had knowledge from receipt of plan disclosures, but “fail[ed] to provide evidence indicating Plaintiff had actual knowledge or was willfully blind.” Id. at *5. In sum, the precise contours of “actual knowledge” and “willful blindness” after Sulyma will continue to be worked out in lower court litigation.

Additionally, at least one court has read Sulyma to shed light on another question, not directly presented in that case: “whether a Plan may set its own limitations period for statutory ERISA claims” that supersedes the statutory period. Falberg v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., No. 19-cv-9910, 2020 WL 7695711, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2020). In Falberg, the district court held that the answer is “no” for a case that would otherwise be controlled by the three-year period in 29 U.S.C. § 1113(2), in part because of the Supreme Court’s statement in Sulyma that “[29 U.S.C.] § 1132(a)(2) claims ‘must be filed within one of three time periods’ pursuant to § 1113.’” Id. at *3 (quoting Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. at 774) (emphasis added by trial court). The court accordingly denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and declined to issue a certificate of appealability on this issue. See id. at *4.

ESOP Fiduciary Claims After Jander

Regular readers will recall the discussion in our 2019 Year-End Securities Litigation Update and 2020 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update of the circuitous path taken by the case of Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander, 140 S. Ct. 592 (2020) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court ultimately punted on the question whether the “more harm than good” pleading standard from Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 430 (2014), can be satisfied by generalized allegations that the harm resulting from the inevitable disclosure of an alleged fraud generally increases over time. Rather than deciding that question, the Court remanded the case in January to allow the Second Circuit to address two unresolved issues raised by the parties: (1) whether ERISA ever imposes a duty on a fiduciary for an employee stock option plan (ESOP) to act on inside information; and (2) whether ERISA requires disclosures that are not otherwise required by the securities laws. Jander, 140 S. Ct. at 595. Justice Kagan (joined by Justice Ginsburg) and Justice Gorsuch filed dueling concurrences addressing those questions and disputing whether they were properly presented.

On remand, the Second Circuit in June 2020 reinstated the judgment entered pursuant to its original opinion—an uncommon win for plaintiffs in this area. Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 962 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). The court agreed with Justice Kagan’s suggestion that the additional arguments raised by defendants and the government in supplemental briefing “either were previously considered by this Court or were not properly raised,” and therefore were forfeited. Id. at 86.

Since then, the Second Circuit’s decision has become even more of an “outlier,” as “the overwhelming majority of circuit courts to consider an imprudence claim based on inside information post-Dudenhoeffer [have] rejected the argument that public disclosure of negative information is a plausible alternative.” Burke v. Boeing Co., No. 19-cv-2203, 2020 WL 6681338, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2020). In a pair of cases decided in July, the Eighth Circuit rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning on this question in Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., 967 F.3d 767, 774 (8th Cir. 2020), and instead followed the reasoning of “nearly every other circuit court to confront this type of argument” by concluding that “this chain of reasoning is uncertain and a reasonably prudent fiduciary . . . could still believe disclosure was the more dangerous of the two routes.” Dormani v. Target Corp., 970 F.3d 910, 915 (8th Cir. 2020). The plaintiffs in one of these cases, Allen v. Wells Fargo & Co., have filed a petition for certiorari asking the Supreme Court to weigh in on this deepening circuit split, which last year’s remand in Jander left unresolved.

Exhaustion Defenses Against Fiduciary Claims

Decisions in 2020 indicate that the circuits remain split on whether plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before filing claims invoking ERISA-imposed fiduciary duties. Almost all circuits have held that plaintiffs must generally exhaust administrative remedies “before filing suit” for benefits due pursuant to a plan “under [ERISA] § 502(a)(1)(B), [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)].” LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., Inc., 552 U.S. 248, 258–59 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). But only two courts of appeals—the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits—have extended that requirement to claims alleging a breach of fiduciary duties imposed by ERISA itself, in addition to claims for benefits due under the terms of a plan. See Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 536 F.3d 1217, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 2008); Lindemann v. Mobil Oil Corp., 79 F.3d 647, 649 (7th Cir. 1996). District courts in those circuits therefore continue to dismiss cases for failure to exhaust that would proceed unhindered in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Fleming v. Rollins, Inc., No. 19-cv-05732, 2020 WL 7693147, at *5 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 23, 2020).

This circuit split has now persisted for over thirty years. See Mason v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 474 U.S. 1087, 1087 (1986) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (urging that “the Court should grant certiorari in this case in order to resolve the uncertainty over the existence of an exhaustion requirement in cases of this kind”). Until the Supreme Court weighs in, this division is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

Single Stock Fund Fiduciary Claims

In the past year, a circuit split has developed on the question of whether an employer can satisfy its fiduciary duties while offering a single-stock fund. ERISA requires the fiduciary of a pension plan to act prudently in managing the plan’s assets and to diversify the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B), (C). Recent litigation has challenged whether single-stock funds are per se imprudent because they are not diversified, or whether single-stock funds may be offered so long as a diversified portfolio can be attained at the plan level.

In May of last year, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a putative fiduciary breach class action in Schweitzer v. Investment Committee of Philips 66 Savings Plan, 960 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 2020). The court first addressed the statutory definition of a qualifying employer security, which is exempt from the otherwise applicable fiduciary duties of diversification. Id. at 105; see 29 U.S.C. § 1107(d)(1) (defining an employer security as one “issued by an employer of employees covered by the plan, or by an affiliate of such employer”). The court rejected the defendants’ argument that the single-stock funds at issue (investing in ConocoPhillips stock) were qualifying employer securities because an intervening spinoff had changed the employer into a new entity (Phillips 66) for statutory purposes. 960 F.3d at 195. Nevertheless, the court held that the defendants satisfied their fiduciary duties to diversify and act prudently because they provided plan participants with an array of other investment options that “enable[d] participants to create diversified portfolios.” Id. at 196–98. The court rejected plaintiffs’ claim that “a single-stock fund is imprudent per se.” Id. at 198.

A few months after Schweitzer, the Fourth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and reversed the district court’s dismissal of a putative class action claiming that the defendant company breached its fiduciary duty with a single-stock fund. Stegemann v. Gannett Co., 970 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 2020). Rejecting the argument that “diversification must be judged at the plan level rather than at the fund level,” the Fourth Circuit held that “each available fund on a menu must be prudently diversified.” Id. at 476–77 (emphasis added). The dissent argued that “the majority merge[d] the duties of diversification and prudence,” and, in effect, made it impossible for an employer to “ever prudently offer a single-stock, non-employer fund.” Id. at 484, 488 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). No other court has adopted the Fourth Circuit’s standard. Defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and, on January 4, 2021, the Supreme Court called for a response from the plaintiff, indicating that the Court might be interested in hearing the case.

Arbitrability Of ERISA §502(a)(2) Claims

Whether ERISA plan participants can be required to arbitrate fiduciary duty-related disputes has continued to be litigated in the past year. Because ERISA § 502(a)(2) “claims belong to a plan—not an individual,” the “relevant question is whether the Plan agreed to arbitrate the § 502(a)(2) claims,” not the individual employee. Dorman v. Charles Schwab Corp., 780 F. App’x 510, 513 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing Munro v. Univ. of S. Cal., 896 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2018)) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in Dorman, the Ninth Circuit held that because “the Plan did consent in the Plan document to arbitrate all ERISA claims,” the mandatory arbitration agreement was enforceable. Id. at 514; see also Dorman v. Charles Schwab Corp., 934 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2019) (published opinion issued the same day holding that ERISA claims may be arbitrable, and overruling Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1984)).

If the plan does not expressly agree to arbitration in the plan document, however, then an arbitration agreement may be unlikely to be enforced for a § 502(a)(2) claim, regardless of whether the individual employee signed an arbitration agreement related to his or her own employment. For example, in Ramos v. Natures Image, Inc., No. 19-cv-7094, 2020 WL 2404902 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2020), the district court partially denied a motion to compel arbitration on an ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duty, even though the individual employee plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements. The key distinction for the Ramos court was whether the plan is a party to the arbitration agreement. Id. at *7. And because the employee’s arbitration agreement in Ramos concerned only the employment relationship and did not bind the plan to arbitration, the court held that the agreement did “not cover claims for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA”. Id.; but see Woellecke v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-CV-12430, 2020 WL 6557981, at *3–4 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 9, 2020) (holding that because “the parties agreed to arbitrate [both] the merits of any arbitrable disputes” and any arbitrability disputes, “the matter must be resolved by the arbitrator . . . to decide whether disputes are subject to their agreement”). For this reason, the court also rejected the argument that, when the plan was not bound by the arbitration agreement, there was a distinction between a plaintiff bringing a class action on behalf of the plan and a plaintiff bringing an individual action. Ramos, 2020 WL 2404902 at *7.

Finally, even if the plan expressly agrees in the plan document to arbitrate § 502(a)(2) ERISA claims, the arbitration agreement still may not be enforced, as other courts have called Dorman into question more directly. In Smith v. Greatbanc Trust Co., the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois rejected Dorman’s holding, even though the plan agreed to arbitrate. 2020 WL 4926560, at *3–4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2020). The court reasoned that failure to notify the former employee, who remained a participant in the plan, about changes to the plan was inconsistent with ERISA’s notice requirements, and that, to the extent the arbitration agreement served as a “waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies,” the agreement was unenforceable. Id. at *4 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. 228, 235–36 (2013)). The case is now pending appeal, but if the Seventh Circuit affirms the district court in Smith, it could create a split with the Ninth Circuit.

This post comes to us from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. It is based on the firm’s recent memorandum, “2020 Year-End Securities Litigation Update,” dated February 16, 2021, and available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Shareholder Monitoring and Discretionary Disclosure

Regulation Fair Disclosure (“Reg FD”) is commonly believed to prohibit managers from disclosing information about their firm to select shareholders. But managers are in fact allowed to do so in several circumstances. Specifically, Reg FD exempts communications to shareholders who will not trade on the information and to companies’ customers, suppliers, and strategic partners. In a new article, we exploit an understudied setting where large shareholders and firms enter into bilateral contracts that entitle the shareholders to receive specific information privately from management. We find that, after the execution of such contracts, firm performance improves and the amount of public disclosure drops.

From a theoretical perspective, our findings are consistent with delegated monitoring theories of disclosure that predict that, when public disclosure is costly, monitoring by a large stakeholder leads management to supply more private information to that stakeholder and less public information to other similarly aligned investors who free-ride off the monitor (Admati et al., 1994; Diamond, 1984). We also take steps to ensure that our results are not driven by the firm’s poor performance or any expropriation by the shareholder.

Shareholder contracts specifying private information rights are released publicly through SEC filings and, despite their visible presence, are largely ignored in the literature (Schoenfeld, 2020). We analyze 3,456 of these contracts using 13D filings from 1996 to 2018. We observe that the two main types of shareholders in this setting are corporate shareholders, who invest in firms to facilitate specific business projects, and activist shareholders, who profit from investing in, fixing, and divesting from firms. From a theoretical perspective, both types of investors have the appealing institutional feature that they are not short-term traders. Rather, these shareholders use their private information to monitor and guide management. Of the 3,456 shareholder contracts in our sample, 1,110 or about 32 percent specify information rights for shareholders.

Our first analysis provides descriptive evidence on what information shareholders can acquire from firms in this setting. We find that shareholders can gain access to a variety of information from a  target firm, including financial forecasts beyond what firms often release publicly, appraisals of a firm’s assets and liabilities, production schedules, access to physical premises, trade secrets, and accounting ledgers and the right to ask questions of the firm’s employees, directors, and auditors. Consistent with Reg FD, information rights are often accompanied by covenants that prohibit shareholders from trading on any information obtained from these sources, further supporting our argument that these information rights serve primarily as a way for shareholders to monitor firms.

Consider, for example, the following excerpt from the shareholder contract executed in 2016 between investor Apollo Global Management and Miller Energy Resources:

The Company [Miller Energy] shall furnish to the Shareholder [Apollo] the following information…[1] a report setting forth, for each calendar month during the then current Fiscal Year to date, the volume of production and sales attributable to production…[2] within 30 days after the end of each month, a report setting forth, for each calendar month during the fiscal year to date, the volume of production and sales attributable to production on a well by well basis…[3] on the tenth Business Day of each calendar month, a six-month forecast of cash flows of the Company its Subsidiaries on a monthly basis…[4] on or before the end of each Fiscal Year, an updated appraisal of all hard assets of the Company and its Subsidiaries…[5] during normal business hours and upon reasonable notice, reasonable access at all reasonable times to its officers, employees, auditors, properties, offices, plants and other facilities and to all books and records.

In our second analysis, we find that information rights in shareholder contracts are more common for corporate investments and in settings where access to information is important for shareholders given the potential for agency problems. Specifically, the prevalence of information rights is significantly positively associated with geographic distance between a firm and a shareholder, which is a widely used proxy for information asymmetries between management and investors. Information rights are also significantly positively associated with contract complexity, which is a construct used by prior studies as a proxy for the extent of relationship-specific investments, a setting where agency problems can be more severe. We also find that information rights in shareholder contracts are positively associated with the total dollar value of a shareholder’s investment, a setting where shareholders are likely to monitor management more.

Our first concrete evidence that the large shareholders in our sample monitor the firm instead of expropriate from other investors is based on our finding that the market reacts favorably to the filing of shareholder contracts with information rights. The mean (-5, +5 day) market-adjusted return to shareholder contracts with information rights, centered on their filing dates, is +1.2 percentage points and statistically significant. These positive announcement returns are supported by our evidence on overall improved operational performance at the target firms. On average, from the year before to two years after the execution of a shareholder contract with information rights, EBITDA/assets and EBITDA/sales significantly increase in a difference-in-differences (D-in-D) manner by 2.82 and 3.49 percentage points at the targets, respectively. Both of these changes are relative to performance-matched control firms. Consistent with the setting assumed in models of delegated monitoring, these findings further suggest that large shareholders use information rights not to expropriate from other investors, but to monitor the firm in a manner that benefits all shareholders.

Having established that our setting represents a delegated monitor who acquires private information, we next test whether management reduces public disclosure. We find that, on average, from the year before to the year after the execution of a shareholder contract with information rights, target firms’ annual management guidance and 8-K filing frequencies significantly decrease by about 1.5 to 2.0 disclosures per year relative to control firms. Both of these changes are relative to disclosure-matched control firms. These findings on improved performance and reduced disclosure support the predictions of delegated monitoring theories and are inconsistent with theories that predict that information rights would result in reduced disclosure due to investors expecting poor performance from the firm.

Our study makes several contributions to the literature. In many economics models of disclosure, investors do not enter directly into contracts  for release of information to meet their needs but rather build price-based mechanisms into compensation contracts to induce managers to make disclosures that maximize the stock price (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). However, prior studies argue that some sophisticated shareholders have expertise in monitoring managers and, as part of their monitoring process, likely have special information needs beyond what is provided by mandated disclosures such as the annual report (e.g., Admati et al., 1994). In such situations, shareholders may use their ownership-control rights to contract with a firm to meet these needs. This study provides some of the first evidence on this mechanism that shareholders use to fulfill their monitoring role.

Our study also highlights circumstances in which Reg FD allows managers to provide shareholders with selective access to information, which is a feature of Reg FD that has received limited research attention. Our finding that information rights can facilitate beneficial monitoring is contrast with Reg FD’s main premise that selective disclosure harms investors.

REFERENCES

Admati, A. R., Pfleiderer, P., Zechner, J., 1994. Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy 102, 1097-1130.

Diamond, D. W., 1984. Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of Eco- nomic Studies 51, 393-414.

Schoenfeld, J., 2020. Contracts between firms and shareholders. Journal of Accounting Research 58, 383-427.

Verrecchia, R., 1983. Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5, 179-194.

This post comes to us from professors Venky Nagar at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business and Jordan Schoenfeld at Dartmouth College’s Tuck School of Business. It is based on their recent article, “Shareholder Monitoring and Discretionary Disclosure,” available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

King & Spalding Discusses Takeaways from GameStop

The recent meteoric rise (and subsequent fall) of GameStop, AMC Theaters and a host of other “meme stocks” has prompted hedge funds, investment bankers, regulators and public company executives to critically re-examine their preparedness for extraordinary market volatility.

The meme stock phenomenon is unique in numerous respects that have been well documented.  What has drawn less attention, however, is the fact that the phenomenon highlights how other “mid-cap” companies could become the next meme stock – or be subject to highly volatile stock price movements that may not be identical to what transpired at GameStop and AMC, but are dramatic nonetheless.

This client alert examines key considerations for board members and C-suite executives seeking to prepare proactively or react swiftly to increased volatility in their company’s publicly-traded securities.

GameStop and Its Predecessors

GameStop recently found itself in the middle of a perfect storm for stock price volatility. Record numbers of new investors in the past year poured into the market, attracted by an industry-wide move to zero-commission trading and pandemic-induced idle time.  In January 2021, droves of new and existing investors, forming a highly-organized and like-minded online community, propelled GameStop’s stock price upwards over 1,700% in a matter of days, despite little change in the company’s underlying business.[1] Before GameStop, Hertz saw its stock pop almost 500% after it filed for bankruptcy.[2]  Similarly, Eastman Kodak increased 1,500% on news that it would start producing pharmaceutical ingredients.[3]  Predictably, these companies’ stock prices came back down to earth after the initial euphoria wore off.

The tech-savvy and vocal retail investor community often targets companies with significant short positions held by hedge funds.  For example, before the run-up in its stock, the short position in GameStop exceeded its float by 140%.[4]  It is the digital reincarnation of Occupy Wall Street[5] – meme populism for those who came of age in the internet generation.  However, what makes this new wave of investors unpredictable – and company boards and C-suite executives anxious – is their willingness to swing in and out of multiple stocks based solely on contagious, speculative enthusiasm, equally proud of their huge gains and heavy losses and willing to publicly disclaim any reliance on traditional fundamentals.

Key Considerations

How affected companies have responded to this new-found and often short-lived virality has greatly varied. Here are some of the key questions that directors and C-suite executives should carefully consider if they find themselves subject to the meme stock phenomenon or volatile market swings.

When Is Public Disclosure Necessary or Advisable?

When the story is being written about your company, your instinct may be to put out a message of your own, to garner some control over the news cycle.  But often the best course of action is to maintain a “no comment” posture to the extent practicable.

GameStop CEO, George Sherman, first spoke on January 28, 2021, 15 days[6] after the GameStop run began, touting the company’s commitment to inclusion, diversity and respect, but avoiding mentioning trading activity altogether.[7]  In other instances, regulators in the United States and abroad may affirmatively ask the company to comment when trading is volatile or an exchange halts activity altogether.  BlackBerry, for instance, released a statement on January 25, 2021 in response to a request from Canadian regulators, noting that BlackBerry was “not aware of any material, undisclosed corporate developments” and had experienced “no material change in its business or affairs that . . . would account for the recent increase in the market price or trading volume of its common shares.”[8]

Companies should also pay careful attention to messaging during the run up and subsequent retrace, as volatility often results in litigation – and companies should expect the plaintiffs’ bar to closely scrutinize all these statements to determine whether the targeted company “incited” the stock price run.  In the event that a company’s downturn results in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the King & Spalding team has analyzed how potential litigation claims relating to volatile trading would be treated in such a proceeding.[9]

What Could Happen at the Next Annual Meeting?

Companies that have been the target of meme stock volatility should anticipate potential disruptions at their annual meeting, as established institutional investors are replaced or supplemented by new, “meme stock” investors.  Management should be prepared to deal with these disruptions and formulate a plan prior to the meeting that addresses various contingencies.  The Company’s public relations team should consider closely tracking online messaging in advance of the meeting to seek insight into planned activities.  Moreover, if sufficient coordinated buying activity exists such that some subset of these new investors could reasonably be considered a “group” within the meaning of the Exchange Act’s Section 13(d) definition, the Company’s public relations team may need to likewise closely track public filings disclosing ownership thresholds.

Should the Company Consider a Capital Raise?

Flying high on the wings of an elevated valuation, one’s mind may naturally consider the question “how can my company capitalize on these tailwinds (however short)?”  “At-the-market” financing, which allows a company to sell new shares directly into the public markets at the going rate, has become increasingly common.  Take AMC Theaters, for example, which raised over $300 million in the midst of its run up, allowing both hedge funds looking to cover their short position and enthusiastic retail investors to purchase shares in the open market, while simultaneously raising funds to better a company bruised and battered by COVID-19.[10]  Additionally, AMC used convertible bond financing, which allowed the company to repay debt with stock instead of cash, to clear $600 million of debt off its balance sheet.[11]  One could also envision a future meme stock experiencing issues or opportunities with pending or planned M&A activity, especially where a mix of stock and cash consideration is contemplated.

While company management may wish to strike while the iron is hot, they should be wary of regulatory issues with these capital transactions.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has heightened its scrutiny of all transactions involving meme stocks.[12]  In 2020, the SEC raised concerns with Hertz’s pre-bankruptcy equity offering, including the adequacy of Hertz’s disclosures and the likelihood that investors would exit any proceeding with no return.[13]  Hertz ultimately discontinued its equity offering amid reported scrutiny from the SEC.

Going forward, the SEC is urging companies seeking to raise capital amid extreme price volatility to disclose risk factors specific to a GameStop-style stock surge and decline.[14] Acting SEC chair Allison Herren Lee emphasized the SEC’s growing focus on companies looking to make these types of raises noting, “we are going to make sure as we – you know, as we look to what they’re doing, whether or not they are trying to raise money in the middle of this. And if so, can they adequately disclose the risks associated with that? And are insiders in these companies trading?”[15]

Moreover, even if regulators ultimately allow capital raises at these increased valuations, company management should expect that shareholder litigation will ensue if and when losses are realized.

Can and Should Insiders Trade Company Stock?

In January 2021, GameStop’s CEO, George Sherman, became a billionaire on paper.[16]  However, there are structural and practical limitations that could prevent insiders from realizing such gains.  Publicly-traded companies often have restrictions on the sale of stock by certain key executive officers or require board approval before trades may be executed.  The SEC and the various stock exchanges also have disclosure requirements if insider trades are executed.  Moreover, there are real reputational risks associated with any insider selling down, let alone where insiders are taking significant profit from a short-term swing.

Additionally, executives should carefully revisit 10b5-1 plans that may have been adopted well before the stock price run.  While these plans may have been put in place on a “clear day”, the optics and reputational risk of ongoing insider activity, even pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 plan, need to be considered as such trading activity may continue to harm the company and the executive long after the stock begins to stabilize.

Finally, company management should be mindful of public perception of indirect transactions employed by insiders to profit off the volatility. For example, George Karfunkel, a Kodak board member, donated $116 million worth of Kodak shares to a charity during its period of volatility, which had the benefit of being both a boon to the charity and generating a massive tax deduction for Mr. Karfunkel.[17] Mr. Karfunkel has since apparently reduced the gift significantly, but a probe by a special committee of Kodak’s board found that the gift “was not advisable from a corporate governance perspective” due to a possible conflict with company policy designed to avoid the appearance of insider trading.[18]

How Will Equity Incentive Compensation Plans Be Affected?

Public companies often incentivize their employees with performance-based bonus or equity awards, which may include both individual performance metrics and company-wide targets.  Such plans often also include options to purchase company stock at a specific strike price.  When a company experiences a rapid run up in its stock price, such run up may have significant implications for both achievement of performance metrics (depending on the annual goals set by the plan) and for an employee’s cost-benefit analysis in determining whether to exercise its option to purchase company stock.  If the company’s stock price subsequently falls dramatically, options may vacillate rapidly between in-the-money and out-of-the money.  Company management may wish to reconsider the terms of their equity incentive compensation plans, using compensation committee discretion often granted under the plan’s themselves.  However, such adjustments midstream have varied implications – including additional disclosure requirements, potential requirements to obtain stakeholder approvals and benefits and tax considerations.  Company management should work closely with benefits and tax counsel to evaluate the effect of a run up and subsequent fall on these compensation plans, evaluating whether action or inaction is the best course given the specific context.

Additional Regulatory Considerations

There will be regulatory investigations, including market manipulation, insider trading, and potentially scalping and touting, in nearly all of these meme stock scenarios.  Public company management should consider its existing compliance structures, cybersecurity protections, and insider trading policies well in advance of being a meme stock subject.  A robust set of compliance systems may be the difference between the public company merely being a source of information to regulators or law enforcement, or being a target of regulators and law enforcement.

ENDNOTES

[1] Matt Phillips and Taylor Lorenz, “‘Dumb Money’ Is on GameStop, and It’s Beating Wall Street at Its Own Game,” New York Times, Jan. 27, 2021 (available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/business/gamestop-wall-street-bets.html).

[2] Gregory Zuckerman and Mischa Frankl-Duval, “Individuals Roll the Dice on Stocks as Veterans Fret,” The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2020 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/individuals-roll-the-dice-on-stocks-as-veterans-fret-11591732784?mod=article_inline).

[3] Eric Platt and Kadhim Shubber, “Kodak shares rise almost 1,500% on Covid drug loan deal,” Financial Times, July 30, 2020 (available at https://www.ft.com/content/4f36c65c-64e6-4b14-871d-df7fb95c435e).

[4] Katherine Greifeld and Lu Wang, “GameStop Short Interest Plunges in Sign Traders Are Covering,” Bloomberg, Feb. 1, 2021 (available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-01/gamestop-short-interest-plummets-in-a-sign-traders-are-covering).

[5] Heather Gautney, “What is Occupy Wall Street? The history of leaderless movements,” Washington Post, Oct. 10, 2011 (available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-leadership/what-is-occupy-wall-street-the-history-of-leaderless-movements/2011/10/10/gIQAwkFjaL_story.html).

[6] Catherine Thorbecke, “GameStop timeline: A closer look at the saga that upended Wall Street,” ABC News, Feb. 5, 2021 (available at https://abcnews.go.com/Business/gamestop-timeline-closer-saga-upended-wall-street/story?id=75617315).

[7] Press Release, “GameStop Earns Top Marks in Human Rights Campaign’s 2021 Corporate Equality Index,” GameStop, Jan. 28, 2021 (available at https://news.gamestop.com/news-releases/news-release-details/gamestop-earns-top-marks-human-rights-campaigns-2021-corporate).

[8] Press Release, “BlackBerry Comments on Trading Activity at Request of the Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC),” BlackBerry, Jan. 25, 2021 (available at https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/company/newsroom/press-releases/2021/blackberry-comments-on-trading-activity-at-request-of-the-industry-regulatory-organization-of-canada).

[9] YOLO Investing and Treatment of Equity-Related Litigation Claims in Bankruptcy, available on King & Spalding’s Private Credit & Special Situations Investing Hub and here (finding that such lawsuits are subordinated in a bankruptcy proceeding to the same level as the holder’s equity pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 510(b)).

[10] Ben Mahaney, “AMC Explodes 301% After $305M Share Sale; Street Says Hold,” Yahoo! Finance, Jan. 28, 2021 (available at https://finance.yahoo.com/news/amc-explodes-301-305m-share-075559466.html).

[11] Alexander Gladstone and R.T. Watson, “Cinema Chain AMC Inks Financing Deal to Help It Survive Pandemic,” The Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2020 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/cinema-chain-amc-inks-financing-deal-to-help-it-survive-pandemic-11594418559).

[12] Public Statement, “Joint Statement Regarding Ongoing Market Volatility,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Jan. 27, 2021 (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/joint-statement-ongoing-market-volatility-2021-01-27).

[13] Becky Yerak, “Hertz Sold $29 Million in Stock Before SEC Stepped In,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 2020 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/hertz-sold-29-million-in-stock-before-sec-stepped-in-11597100128?mod=article_inline).

[14] “Sample Letter to Companies Regarding Securities Offerings During Times of Extreme Price Volatility,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Feb. 8, 2021 (available at https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/sample-letter-securities-offerings-during-extreme-price-volatility#_edn1).

[15] Matt Levine, “Is Everything Securities Fraud?” Bloomberg, Feb. 3, 2021 (available at https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-03/goldman-sachs-goes-to-supreme-court-hedge-funds-won-on-gamestop-kkpoe6ws).

[16] Lance Lambert, “GameStop CEO’s shares are worth nearly $1 billion—and, boy, does he probably want to sell,” Fortune, Jan. 29, 2021 (available at https://fortune.com/2021/01/29/gamestop-stock-ceo-george-sherman-gme-shares-net-worth-billion/).

[17] Theo Francis, Mark Maremont, and Geoffrey Rogow, “Kodak Insider Makes Well-Timed Stock Gift of $116 Million to Religious Charity He Started,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 11, 2020 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodak-insider-makes-well-timed-stock-gift-of-116-million-to-religious-charity-he-started-11597154826).

[18] Mark Maremont, “Kodak Director Makes Retroactive Cut to Huge Charity Stock Gift,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 13, 2021 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodak-director-makes-retroactive-cut-to-huge-charity-stock-gift-11610571219).

This post comes to us from King & Spalding LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “From the Chat Room to the Board Room – Knowing Your Meme Stock,” dated February 12, 2021, and available here.

Categories
International Developments Securities Regulation

The Duty to Disclose Inside Information: The Subtle Relationships Within the European Market Abuse Regulation

In our recent paper we discuss the European regime governing the disclosure of inside information. In particular, we try to find an answer to the question of which duties of the disclosure regime have been violated in two situations: where i) inside information is selectively disclosed to third parties and ii) the confidential nature of the inside information is no longer ensured if the disclosure of that information has been delayed. The requirements of the public disclosure of inside information are set out in Article 17 of the Market Abuse Regulation (MAR).[1] The issuer’s primary duty to disclose inside information follows from Article 17(1) MAR. Separate disclosure duties have been included in Article 17(8) and Article 17(7) MAR for, respectively, the two situations referred to above. Commentators have raised doubts over the necessity and function of Article 17(8) MAR. Similar doubts could be raised over Article 17(7) MAR. In our paper we defend the independent status of these legal provisions by focusing on their function of serving legal certainty.

Legal Framework and Rationale for the Duty to Disclose Inside Information

According to Article 7(1) MAR, inside information is of a precise nature, has not been made public, relates directly or indirectly to one or more issuers or to one or more financial instruments, and would, if it were made public, be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instruments. Article 17(1) MAR contains the primary duty to disclose inside information, which, in short, stipulates that the issuer in question must disclose inside information that directly concerns that issuer as soon as possible. Hence, Paragraph 1 contains a continuous duty for issuers to disclose inside information. The main purpose of Paragraph 1 is to prevent insider dealing by putting investors on an equal footing and, hence, to reduce the risk of insider dealing. A subsidiary objective of the duty to disclose inside information is that all relevant information is made available to the investing public as soon as possible, which increases market transparency and, ultimately, improves the efficiency of the price formation process.[2]

Selective Disclosure of Inside Information

Article 17(8) MAR stipulates that an issuer must make complete and effective public disclosure of any inside information shared with any third party by that issuer in the course of its business or by a person acting on behalf or for the account of that issuer in the normal course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties (“selective disclosure”), unless this third party owes a duty of confidentiality. Selective disclosures include, for example, the sharing of information with (major) shareholders during a shareholder meeting and the sharing of information with investment analysts. Article 17(8) MAR is the European counterpart to Section 243.100 of Regulation FD (“Reg FD”). In the U.S., information regarding the issuer was frequently first shared with investment analysts before it was made publicly available.[3] Partly based on the fact that a continuous duty to disclose inside information is absent under U.S. federal law, it has been argued that copying Section Reg FD into the European legal framework has the undesirable effect of (unjustly) granting issuers a second chance to disclose inside information. From this point of view, it has even been advocated that Article 17(8) MAR should be deleted entirely.[4]

Although Article 17(8) MAR is derived from a legal system with its own distinct disclosure regime, we believe that this provision also has its independent status in the European legal system. Imagine, for example, that an issuer’s chairman accidentally (partly) discloses inside information during a presentation given at the annual shareholder meeting and that the attendees owe no duty of confidentiality. It’s a slip of the tongue. If the issuer has not opted to delay the disclosure of the inside information, an infringement of Article 17(1) MAR occurs. After all, the issuer did not comply, or at least not in the appropriate manner, with its primary duty to disclose the inside information. However, in our example, the issuer must still make complete disclosure of the inside information pursuant to Article 17(8) MAR, because the chairman selectively disclosed (part of the) inside information in the normal course of his employment, profession or duties. Whether the duty to disclose the inside information can still be based on Article 17(1) MAR depends on the circumstances following the selective disclosure. Indeed, if the inside information is disclosed during a presentation, it could be that that information has lost all or part of its non-public nature. If that is the case, that information no longer (fully) qualifies as inside information in the sense of Article 7(1) MAR, and the duty to disclose can no longer be based on the primary duty of Article 17(1) MAR. The previous example illustrates the independent value of Article 17(8) MAR, because it clearly states that, in the case of selective disclosure of inside information, the issuer must at all times disclose the information in question in full – and not only to the extent that it is still non-public. This also means that, after the selective disclosure of inside information, the issuer does not have to (re)assess whether the inside information has (completely) retained its non-public nature.

Extending the previous example, consider that the issuer lawfully delayed the disclosure of the inside information. In this case, the selective disclosure of (a part of) that information during a presentation will not by itself infringe Article 17(1) MAR. After all, the primary duty was lawfully suspended by invoking the exception of Article 17(4) MAR.[5] However, following the selective disclosure, the issuer must yet again make complete disclosure of the inside information pursuant to Article 17(8) MAR. Indeed, whether the obligation to (fully) disclose the inside information can also be based on Article 17(1) MAR depends on whether the inside information has (fully) retained its non-public nature.[6] This example also shows the independent value of Article 17(8) MAR.

What If the Confidential Nature of Inside Information Is No Longer Ensured?

As long as the inside information remains confidential, the issuer may lawfully delay its disclosure under Article 17(4) MAR, provided, of course, that the two other requirements of this provision are met. If, however, the inside information is no longer confidential, Article 17(7) MAR stipulates that the issuer shall disclose it as soon as possible. At first glance, the disclosure duty of Article 17(7) MAR may seem superfluous. After all, if the inside information is no longer confidential, the issuer can no longer lawfully delay its disclosure, and the primary disclosure duty of Article 17(1) MAR comes into play.

In practice, inside information may lose its confidential nature to the extent that it also loses – at least in part – its non-public nature, as a result of which it no longer (fully) qualifies as inside information within the meaning of Article 7(1) MAR. From our perspective, Article 17(7) MAR states beyond any doubt that, if the inside information is no longer confidential, no matter whether it has partly or fully become public, the issuer must completely disclose that information – and not only to the extent that the information remains non-public.[7] This once again means that, if the information is no longer confidential, the issuer does not need to (re)assess whether the information has (completely) retained its non-public nature.

In our paper, we also discuss whether inside information is no longer confidential when it is selectively disclosed. We argue that the selective disclosure typically means the information is no longer confidential, but not in all cases. Though the events constituting the loss of the confidential nature and the loss of the non-public nature of that information, respectively, can overlap in practice, we contend that the loss of the information’s confidentiality and non-public status should be distinguished legally from one another. Furthermore, in the context of Article 17(7) MAR, we argue that – without a plausible alternative explanation – volume or price developments may be sufficient to show that the inside information is no longer confidential. Nonetheless, we once again explain why the aforementioned distinction must be made between the loss of the information’s confidentiality and non-public status.

ENDNOTES

[1] Regulation (EU) No 596/2014, OJ 2014 L 173/1.

[2] See in this respect, amongst others, J Payne, ‘Disclosure of Inside Information’ in V Tountopoulos & R Veil (eds), Transparency of Stock Corporations in Europe. Rationales, Limitations and Perspectives (2019) 89-107.

[3] For the sake of completeness, we note that insider dealing – under certain circumstances –is prohibited under U.S. federal law. However, insider dealing, as opposed to the selective disclosure of inside information, does not constitute the main focus of our paper, and, hence, we have excluded the regulation of insider dealing under U.S. federal law from our analysis.

[4] GTJ Hoff, ‘Openbaarmaking van voorwetenschap volgens het nieuwe regime van de Verordening marktmisbruik’ (2016) Tijdschrift voor Financieel Recht 507, 522.

[5] Indeed, if the inside information has been disclosed during a presentation, this raises the question whether the third condition of the exception to the primary duty, namely that the confidentiality of the information concerned must be ensured, is still met (see Article 17(4)(c) MAR). We refer to § 5.2 of our Paper for the answer to this question.

[6] For the sake of completeness, we emphasize that the obligation to (fully) disclose the inside information can only be based on Article 17(1) MAR (or Article 17(7) MAR) if the confidential nature of the inside information is no longer ensured. Again, we refer to § 5.2 of our Paper.

[7] C Mosca, ‘Article 10: Unlawful Disclosure of Inside Information’ in M. Ventoruzzo & S. Mock (eds), Market Abuse Regulation: Commentary and Annotated Guide (2017) 279-280.

This post comes to us from Mathijs Giltjes, a PhD candidate at Erasmus School of Law, and Arnoud Pijls, an assistant professor at the school. It is based on their recent article, “The Subtle Relationship between Paragraphs 1, 4, 7 and 8 of Article 17 of the Market Abuse Regulation,” available here.

Categories
Corporate Governance Securities Regulation

Addressing ESG in 2021: Who Is in Charge?

Over the course of 2020, market forces drove corporations and institutional investors to make expansive commitments to their purpose and social responsibility. This fueled companies in many regions to publish lengthy reports under the ESG moniker (Environmental, Social and Governance). The volume of individual company disclosures will almost certainly increase dramatically in 2021. Will the quality of disclosures improve? How should these disclosures be integrated into the presentation of fundamental business performance?

In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission has been noticeably absent from the intensifying public debates on the E and the S of ESG. It already addresses much of the G.

A compound question: Should and will the newly appointed SEC chair step up in 2021 on disclosure rules for issuers to drive greater transparency, integrity, and consistency on ESG? Would this be the most effective way to manage the many market players, each pursuing its own strategic and financial motives as well as scrambling to be the ultimate arbiters of ESG?

The cry for corporations to address broad stakeholder interests is a global one. Aspects of this debate are more evolved today in Western Europe than here in the United States. An increasingly global question is which environmental and social disclosures warrant a tighter framework and third party assurance? We speculate that guidelines due this year from the European Commission and commentary from the IFRS will influence some thinking on this front.

Critiques addressing ESG often imply there is a firmly established set of “best practices.” Not so. Today in the U.S., there are relatively precise rules for disclosures on governance structure and processes (the “G” of ESG). Most of this information is in increasingly lengthy shareholder proxies prepared for annual meetings and filed with the SEC. It is the norm to see supplemental information in this document responsive to outsiders’ comments, including proxy advisory firms and the largest institutional investor stewardship groups. Executive management teams and boards regularly review and defend these disclosures.

In contrast, disclosure requirements addressing environmental and social topics are decidedly undeveloped by federal authorities. Save for inclusion in company risk factors, E&S commentary is often consciously excluded from public companies’ annual reports on Form 10-K or other SEC filings. One motivation for lodging most E&S commentary outside of the SEC filings has been legal counsel’s notion that this reduces potential liability. Also at play here are evolving challenges to the definition of materiality – broadening from the SEC economically rooted definition of meaningful to a rational investor to currently much more subjective information.

Indeed, like their large European peers, nearly all of the S&P 500 Index member companies are publishing customized annual social responsibility or “sustainability” reports, as well as posting periodic website content and making bold forecasts on sustainability and human capital on company earnings calls. A number of third parties (including institutional investors, proxy advisers, ESG rating agencies, NGOs, and academics) are requesting various data sets and subsequently are distributing different E&S rating factors.

Independent auditing firms are not playing their traditional role here (albeit they are trying to figure out how), nor has an alternative method for achieving independent assurance of companies’ self-reporting been developed.

We continue to have an alphabet soup of non-governmental associations and product vendors engaged. The player list begins with NGO organizations such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), and Task Force of Climate Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).

For-profit vendors such as MSCI, Sustainalytics (Morningstar), S&P, and ISS-ESG are all vying for the pole position as scorekeeper. This latter group is sprinting to set the rules of the disclosure game for various parties, with clear intent to establish the uniqueness and ubiquity of their independent fee-based commercial product offerings. The ranking processes are not fully transparent. Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch – the large independent for-profit credit agencies – are also incorporating ESG commentary in their ratings. Not to be excluded, academic centers are developing analytic frameworks. Company information is effectively traveling through third-party filters and returning to investors in a scored form rather than being directly communicated through and integrated in investor documents.

Institutional asset management companies globally seem to be in the driver’s seat, pushing the ESG agenda forward. This group has adopted a mix of corporate social responsibility, sustainable investing, and impact investing themes. This probably constitutes the broadest repositioning for fund flows we have seen across the money management sector since the financial crisis of 2008.

This is driving shifts in the philosophy and processes of management firms, a pragmatic reaction to changing investor priorities as well as positioning for competitive advantage with new product development. Another catalyst is at play as well: Money managers themselves are being scored and ranked by the rating agencies on their implementation of ESG principles.

One need look no further than the newly released 2021 governance and proxy guidelines issued by the nation’s largest institutional equity investors — BlackRock, State Street, and Vanguard – a combination of increasingly assertive guidance, warnings, and promotional statements. These three firms are in effect playing regulators of ESG in our capital markets and demonstrating their willingness to take action at annual meetings or through special shareholder votes.

Are the standards regarding this E&S disclosure best set independently from the SEC? Under former Chairman Clayton in August 2020, the SEC mandated new disclosures on human capital management, effective with year-end 2020 filings. Importantly, these disclosure requirements are explicitly stated as principles based with sensitivity to materiality, not prescriptive or rules based. The SEC is asking companies for discussion of measures or objectives that address the attraction, development, and retention of personnel.  We expect to see a wide range of qualitative and quantitative responses in 2021 that will need to be significantly fine-tuned. Case in point, human capital data has not been traditionally processed through internal accounting and finance department systems.

E&S is difficult to tightly define, and cross-currents influencing the definition will intensify. The burden in 2021 will continue to fall on the marketplace, as we struggle toward “generally accepted ESG reporting principles.”

We do need more standardization here and expect the Biden Administration will propel the SEC to take action beyond the human capital request, likely next addressing climate disclosures and overriding the debate of jurisdictional authority. The SEC is ill-equipped to address the broad objectives incorporated in ESG. That said, there is ample rationale for seeking a referee.

Samuel G. Liss is the managing principal of Whitegate Partners LLC, an advisory firm to the financial and business services sectors. He also serves as an adjunct professor at NYU Stern School of Business and at Columbia Law School, teaching courses on corporate governance.

Categories
Securities Regulation

How Material Are Disclosures in Annual Reports?

The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (collectively, “regulators”) have expressed concern over “disclosure overload,” or the concern that the sheer volume of disclosure in annual reports makes it difficult for investors to identify and incorporate relevant information into their decisions (White 2013). While academic research finds that annual reports have become longer and less readable (e.g., Dyer et al. 2017), regulators attribute disclosure overload in part to high levels of immaterial disclosure that make it difficult for investors to recognize the material, or relevant, information in these reports.

Interestingly, firms are not required to disclose immaterial information (that is, information that would fail to change the mind of a current or prospective stakeholder). The FASB and the SEC make it clear that their disclosure requirements apply only to the extent the information is material – leading one to question why firms choose to provide immaterial disclosure in their annual reports. In a new paper, I seek to provide insight on this issue by examining the relative materiality levels of firms’ quantitative annual report disclosures.

Determining whether an item is material, and therefore should be disclosed in the annual report, is an often ambiguous process. Part of this ambiguity stems from the fact that firm managers must assess not whether they personally consider an item material, but whether an item could be considered material by current or potential investors. Managers must assess whether a piece of information has the potential to influence investors’ decisions. Furthermore, accounting standards and financial reporting regulation typically don’t provide bright-line guidance for assessing an item’s materiality because materiality has both quantitative and qualitative components. In particular, while we generally expect smaller dollar amount items to be less material and therefore less influential in investors’ decisions, it may very well be that some small dollar amount items have important implications for firm value (and by extension for investors’ decisions). Further complicating these assessments is the risk that an item that appears immaterial in today’s business conditions (and therefore would not need to be disclosed) may be considered material in the future if conditions change.

As a researcher, I cannot definitively determine whether each disclosure in each firm’s annual report is material or not. However, to provide some insight into regulators’ concerns, I examine the relative materiality of firms’ quantitative annual report disclosures: What is the magnitude of the dollar amounts disclosed, relative to the firm’s total assets? I first calculate the ratio of each dollar amount disclosed in a firm’s Form 10-K annual report relative to the firm’s total assets. I include dollar amounts from both the text and the tables in the report. For example, if a firm has total assets of $10 million, and discloses capital expenditures of $800,000, the ratio is 0.08. I then calculate the median value of these ratios for each firm’s annual report. Higher values of this measure indicate higher materiality disclosures. If a firm’s materiality measure is 0.02, then the median value of its quantitative disclosures is 2 percent of total assets. While this measure does not tell us whether the firm is disclosing immaterial information, it provides insight into whether the firm is disclosing generally larger or smaller dollar amounts, relative to its size (i.e., total assets). On average, I expect relatively smaller dollar amounts are less material (i.e., less likely to influence an investor’s decisions) than relatively larger dollar amounts.

I create this measure for all Form 10-Ks filed with the SEC for fiscal years ending during 1997–2017. My final sample has 36,655 annual reports. I find the median materiality of firms’ annual report disclosures has decreased 34 percent over the sample period — that is, firms are disclosing relatively smaller dollar amounts in their annual reports over time. In 1997, the median dollar amount disclosed in the average Form 10-K was almost 2 percent of total assets; in 2017, this amount was down to 1.3 percent of assets.

To provide insight beyond these descriptive results, I also estimate formal regressions to better understand why firms disclose relatively more or less material dollar amounts. Several interesting results emerge. First, I find firms disclose significantly smaller dollar amounts (i.e., provide lower materiality disclosure) when macroeconomic uncertainty is higher, likely in response to higher investor demand for information. Second, I examine the association with a firm’s ex-ante litigation risk. Firms can be sued for failing to disclose information that a manager may have deemed immaterial ex-ante but was considered material by investors ex-post. Accordingly, I find that firms with higher litigation risk tend to disclose lower materiality information (i.e., smaller dollar amounts) in their annual reports. Finally, I also find that more innately risk-averse managers choose to provide lower materiality disclosure, presumably because these managers are less tolerant of the potential risks of nondisclosure (e.g., litigation; reputational damage). Together, these results suggest that managers choose to disclose smaller dollar amount items to protect themselves and their firms from the risk of failing to disclose an item they incorrectly deemed immaterial. Furthermore, it is important to note that these results are incremental to the effects of annual report disclosure length and firms’ operating complexity on their disclosure practices (e.g., firms with derivatives; pensions; multiple geographic segments; recent acquisitions; etc.).

I also conduct preliminary analyses to examine whether annual reports with lower materiality disclosures are more difficult for investors to process. While I find some evidence that such reports are associated with higher measures of investor uncertainty, the results are mixed. Importantly, however, I do not find any evidence to suggest that annual reports with lower materiality disclosure (i.e., annual reports that disclose smaller dollar amounts) provide investors with more useful information. These preliminary results lend some credence to regulators’ concerns about annual report disclosure overload but require additional consideration by future research.

These results may be informative to regulators and standard setters as they create more effective financial reporting. If regulators want firms to disclose less immaterial information, my results suggest they consider (1) reducing one-size-fits-all disclosure regulations and (2) providing more legal (i.e., safe harbor) protection for managers that opt not to disclose information because they believe the information to be immaterial at the time of the disclosure.

REFERENCES

Dyer, T., M. Lang, and L. Stice-Lawrence. 2017. The evolution of 10-K textual disclosure: Evidence from Latent Dirichlet Allocation. Journal of Accounting and Economics 64: 221–245.

White, M.J. 2013. The Path Forward on Disclosure. National Harbor, MD.

This post comes to us from Professor Jenna D’Adduzio at the University of British Columbia’s Sauder School of Business. It is based on her recent paper, “The Materiality of Quantitative Disclosure in Annual Reports,” available here.

Categories
International Developments

Cleary Gottlieb Discusses New EU ESG Disclosure Obligations for Financial Services Firms

Over a year ago, on December 29, 2019, Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 on sustainability-related disclosures for the financial services sector (the “Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation”, or “SFDR”) entered into force. Just a few months remain before key provisions begin to apply and asset/fund managers and other financial services firms should not delay in preparing for new disclosure requirements.

The SFDR requires European financial firms to consider how sustainability risks are incorporated into their investment decision-making processes, and the extent to which their financial sector remuneration practices are consistent with sustainability concerns.  In short, manufacturers of financial products and financial advisers need to consider and adapt how they operate their business before they can make the disclosures required under the SFDR.

The initiative falls under Action 7 of the European Union’s 2018 Action Plan on sustainable finance, aiming to clarify institutional investors’ and asset managers’ duties in relation to sustainability considerations.

This alert memorandum provides an overview of the SFDR (including as to status, scope and conceptual and technical framework), explores the upcoming regulatory implications of this initiative for European financial sector firms, and provides a comparative analysis of similar regulatory developments in other jurisdictions.[1]

I.         In a nutshell

The SFDR stems from the premise that disclosures to end-investors on the integration of sustainability risks, adverse sustainability impacts, sustainable investment objectives, and the promotion of environmental or social characteristics in investment decision‐making and advisory processes are insufficiently developed – in part, because they are not yet subject to harmonised requirements.

On that basis, the SFDR introduces a set of new ESG transparency and disclosure requirements for certain financial services firms – including, in particular, asset managers and fund managers, with respect to:

–     website disclosures;

–     pre-contractual disclosures (such as fund prospectuses); and

–     periodic reporting to investors.

In addition, the SFDR defines the concept of a “sustainable investment”, which requires that investee companies engage in activities that contribute to an environmental or social objective, provided that (a) the investment does not significantly harm (“DNSH”) any such objectives, and that (b) the investee follows good governance practices. Such disclosures are to be prepared with reference to the criteria for determining whether an economic activity can be considered “environmentally sustainable,” as set forth in the Taxonomy Regulation.[2]

Many important aspects of the SFDR will apply to all asset or fund managers, even those that do not have an express ESG-related objective (although some will only apply to financial products with a specific ESG focus).

The extensive disclosure requirements are expected to drive firms to review how sustainability risks are incorporated into their investment decision-making processes and, potentially, make internal strategic changes as to how they operate their business, both for purposes of achieving compliance with the SFDR and (re-)positioning themselves on the financial market.  This will in turn require significant engagement with investee companies (as well as with investors or other intermediaries who may themselves be subject to the requirements) and ongoing due diligence and portfolio monitoring.

II.        Status

The SFDR entered into force on December 29, 2019.  Most of the Regulation’s substantive framework requirements and general principles will, however, apply starting on March 10, 2021. Others (relating mostly to periodic reporting obligations) will apply as from January 1, 2022.

As for the more detailed (so-called, “Level 2”) technical standards (currently being developed by the three European Supervisory Authorities, i.e., ESMA, the EBA and EIOPA), the Commission confirmed in October 2020 that these will no longer become applicable from March 2021 but rather, instead, “at a later date” (likely not until 2022).

III.      Scope

The entities that fall within the scope of application of the SFDR are, broadly speaking:

  • Financial market participants who manufacture or provide to the market certain financial products” (i.e., portfolio managers, fund managers, pensions providers); and
  • Financial advisers (i.e., providers of investment or insurance advice).

Of the above – financial market participants include:

The financial products administered by financial market participants are:

Financial advisers include:

The territorial scope of the SFDR is somewhat unclear – in particular, the extent to which non-EU AIFMs will be subject to the requirements at the entity level (as opposed to merely the product level).

The UK Financial Markets Law Committee is looking to raise this issue with the EU.

IV.      Key provisions

Disclosures to be made under the SFDR include:

  • at the entity level : (financial market participants and financial advisers: website disclosures)       
    • a requirement to provide information on their policies on the integration of sustainability risks in their investment decision‐making process or advice;
    • a requirement to include in their remuneration policies, and disclose, information on how those policies are consistent with the integration of sustainability risks;
    • a comply or explain requirement with respect to consideration and due diligence of principal adverse impacts on sustainability (“PAIs”) of investment decisions and investment advice;
  • at the product level :
    • a requirement to explain how ESG risks are likely to impact investment returns; (financial market participants and financial advisers: pre-contractual disclosures)
    • a comply or explain requirement with respect to PAIs; (for financial market participants and financial advisers: pre-contractual disclosures)
    • a requirement to disclose the ESG performance of, all throughout the life of the product,:
      • any products which promote environmental or social characteristics (k.a. “Article 8”, or “light-green”); and
      • any sustainable investments
        (e., products which have sustainability as their outright investment objective – a.k.a. “Article 9”, or “dark-green”); (for financial market participants: pre-contractual disclosures, websites and periodic reports).

V.        Technical implementing provisions

In April 2020, the three European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) launched a joint consultation (ended on September 1, 2020) on the draft regulatory technical standards (“RTSs”) to be issued by the Commission under the SFDR.

The SFDR’s RTSs include, in particular:

i.      a set of indicators and mandatory reporting templates applicable to the disclosure of PAIs and the firm’s policies for identifying, prioritising and addressing PAIs (as well as the mandatory contents of the alternative “statement of no consideration”);

ii.     details on the content and presentation of product-level disclosures through pre-contractual, website and periodic reporting statements (also with regards to “Article 8” and “Article 9” products); and

iii.   requirements for disclosing the way in which products comply with the DNSH principle.

The Annex to this alert memorandum presents the structure and template that will apply to the disclosure of PAIs (mentioned under (i), above), pursuant to the current draft RTSs.

As commented by several participants to the consultation, obtaining data for many of the 32 mandatory PAI indicators currently listed under the RTSs will likely be a challenge for firms, notwithstanding any leeway afforded by materiality and proportionality criteria.  Under the current draft RTSs, for any mandatory PAI indicators for which data is not readily available, firms shall use best efforts to (a) obtain the information from investee companies and (b) assess the adverse impacts (including a description of assumptions used, additional research carried out, cooperation with third parties and use of external experts).

Under Article 4 of the SFDR, firms that do not consider the adverse impacts of their investment decisions on sustainability factors must provide the reasons for not doing so, including when and whether they intend to do so in the future.  Under the current draft RTSs, such information must be published in a separate section on the firms’ websites entitled “No consideration of sustainability adverse impacts.”  This means that firms that are in the process of obtaining data and making the assessments will be required to include this “no consideration” statement until the analysis is complete.

For item (ii) above, disclosure templates applicable to the pre-contractual and periodic reporting to be made in relation to “Article 8” and “Article 9” product level disclosures are under development by the ESAs.

For item (iii), the ESAs shall submit a separate set of RTSs by December 30, 2020.  As said, it is expected that such standards will address the DNSH principle from both an SFDR and a Taxonomy Regulation standpoint.

VI.      Parallel developments outside the EU

United Kingdom

Given that the operative provisions of the SFDR affecting firms will not start to apply until March 2021 (that is, after termination of the UK withdrawal’s “transition period” on December 31, 2020), they were not subject to the UK’s default “on-shoring” mechanism. Neither HM Treasury nor the FCA has announced plans to adopt the SFDR in UK legislation post-Brexit and we do not anticipate that the UK will adopt SFDR wholesale. Nonetheless, sustainable finance is a clear priority for the UK authorities and, as indicated below, climate-related disclosure requirements (at a minimum) are expected to be introduced for both financial sector and non-financial sector entities in the UK.[3]

On November 9, 2020, the UK Joint Government-Regulator TCFD Taskforce (comprising, inter alia, HM Treasury, the FCA and the PRA) announced that the recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) will be implemented across the UK economy, publishing an interim report[4] and a roadmap towards mandatory climate-related disclosures for seven categories of organisation – listed commercial companies, UK-registered large private companies, banks and building societies, insurance companies, asset managers, life insurers and FCA-regulated pension schemes, and occupational pension schemes – by 2025.[5]  In particular, the roadmap envisages that the UK will introduce new disclosure requirements for FCA-authorised asset managers[6] based on the TCFD recommendations, which will apply from 2022 for the largest managers (which may be defined as those with assets under management in excess of £50 billion) and life insurers and pension providers (with a possible policy asset value threshold of £25 billion) and from 2023 for other asset managers, life insurers and pension providers. The FCA has announced plans to consult on potential client-focussed disclosure requirements, aligned to the TCFD recommendations, for UK-authorised asset managers, life insurers and FCA-regulated pension schemes in early 2021.

It is worth noting that, in line with the report and roadmap, the FCA, through its policy statement of December 21, 2020 (PS20/17),[7] adopted a new Listing Rule[8] applicable to premium listed commercial companies in the UK from January 1, 2021, which will require such companies to include TCFD-recommended disclosure statements in their annual financial report, or else a statement explaining their reasons for non-disclosure, the steps they plan to take to ensure future compliance and relevant timeframes to achieve disclosure. The FCA plans to consult in the first half of 2021 on extending the rule to a wider scope of listed issuers.

The FCA has also provided guidance on how companies can determine whether their disclosures are consistent with TCFD recommendations by evaluating whether their disclosures provide sufficient detail to enable users to assess a company’s exposure and approach to addressing climate-related issues.

The FCA has also observed that issuers may already be required to make disclosures on climate-related and other ESG matters under other regulations, including the Market Abuse Regulation and the Prospectus Regulation. As a result, PS20/17 also includes a finalised technical note titled “Disclosures in relation to ESG matters, including climate change” which aims to clarify such existing requirements.

United States

The United States does not have a federal framework for consideration of sustainability in disclosure, risk analysis or remuneration.  While legal authority to regulate financial advisors and financial products exists through several government departments and agencies, there has not yet been coordinated consideration of a financial regulatory initiative related to sustainable finance.  A September 2020 report by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission on managing climate risk in the U.S. financial system outlined the existing authority and made recommendations to financial regulators, which may be considered in the future.  Furthermore, in October 2020, the New York Department of Financial Services issued guidance to banking and insurance institutions under its jurisdiction, requiring these institutions to (i) integrate climate change financial risks into their governance frameworks, risk management processes, and business strategies, (ii) appoint a board member, committee of the board or senior management team to be accountable for assessment and management of financial risks from climate change, (iii) develop an approach to climate-related financial risk disclosure, and (iv) conduct a risk assessment of direct and indirect impacts from climate change.  The guidance is generally principles-based, but may serve as a template for future federal guidance.  The incoming Biden Administration is expected to focus on sustainability, but it is not yet clear what regulatory or legislative initiatives may follow.

The umbrella framework of the U.S. federal securities laws disclosure regime, which creates liability for offerings with material misstatements or omissions in disclosure and imposes a due diligence obligation on financial institutions underwriting securities offerings, applies and pushes issuers to have clear disclosure of sustainable goals and metrics used to measure progress.  Given the general principles-based approach of the U.S. securities laws, however, it is unlikely that even if new prescriptive requirements around disclosure are adopted and there is convergence around mandated reporting frameworks, there will be any short-term development toward a systemic definition and regulation of sustainable activities similar to the SFDR.

MENA

In the MENA region, the increased focus on ESG reporting has largely centred around the importance of strengthening sustainability disclosures by issuers, rather than the disclosure/transparency duties of financial advisors and other financial services providers.  By way of example, a number of stock exchanges have recently introduced voluntary ESG reporting guidance for listed companies, including the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) in July 2019, Dubai Financial Market (DFM) in November 2019 and Bahrain Bourse in June 2020.

UAE

However, the first and third of the three voluntary “Guiding Principles on Sustainable Finance” (published in January 2020 by the leading regulatory authorities in the UAE, including the Central Bank of the UAE, the Abu Dhabi Global Market’s FSRA and the Dubai International Financial Centre’s DFSA) are expressly applicable to “intermediaries” (such as banks and exchanges) and “investors” (such as asset managers and sovereign wealth funds), rather than  solely issuers.  The first of these principles – the integration of ESG factors into governance, strategy and risk management – encourages intermediaries and investors to integrate ESG considerations into their investment processes and product development.

The third principle – the promotion of appropriate ESG-related reporting and disclosures – focuses on the disclosure/transparency duties of intermediaries and investors by encouraging periodic reporting that allows stakeholders to understand the reporter’s general exposure to ESG-related issues and progress in managing and adapting to such issues.

Asia

Hong Kong

As part of its strategy framework on developing green finance, the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) conducted a survey on integrating ESG and climate risks in asset management from March to September 2019.  The results of the survey, published in December 2019, suggested that while most asset managers considered ESG factors (including risks arising from climate change) in their investment and risk management processes, they did not adopt a consistent approach to disclosing this information and integrating climate-related risks into their investment decisions.  As such, in October 2020, the SFC issued a consultation paper introducing proposed requirements on governance, investment management, risk management and disclosures for asset management firms with a focus on climate-related risks and considerations.  The proposals will be subject to public consultation until January 2021.

China

While ESG has become a focus of the Chinese government, and we expect relevant rules to be promulgated and implemented in the near future, currently there are no mandatory requirements in China for financial advisors and other financial services providers to disclose sustainable finance information.

Conclusion

The EU is again leading the way globally in regulation of sustainable finance disclosures by financial sector participants, as for regulation of ESG criteria and definitions through the Taxonomy Regulation and, generally, through other aspects of its 2018 Action Plan on sustainable finance.  While other regions and individual countries may follow suit in their own time, financial advisory firms, fund managers, asset managers and others with a global footprint will need to follow the EU rules in any event, especially given the current uncertainty regarding the broad geographical scope of the SFDR.

Firms should waste no time in 2021 getting ready for these new disclosure obligations. Even though the detailed Level 2 technical standards have been delayed, the SFDR is already in force today, the framework requirements and general principles will apply from March and periodic reporting must commence from January 1, 2022. For fund managers and others whose disclosures will depend on input from third parties such as portfolio companies and LPs, the time to start the necessary conversations to obtain this input is now.

ENDNOTES

[1] The authors are grateful to Jiamo Hu and Aadishi Agarwal for their assistance in the preparation of this memorandum.

[2] For a dedicated analysis of the EU’s Sustainable Finance Taxonomy Regulation (EU) 2020/852, see our alert memo: https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/a-framework-taxonomy-for-sustainable-finance.

[3] UK firms seeking to market relevant products into the EEA may also be subject to the EU SFDR (or subject, in any event, from a degree of “peer pressure” (or investor pressure) to meet SFDR standards).

[4] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/933782/FINAL_TCFD_REPORT.pdf

[5] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/933783/FINAL_TCFD_ROADMAP.pdf

[6] Investment firms who provide portfolio management services, alternative investment fund managers and UCITS management companies.

[7] https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/policy/ps20-17.pdf

[8] In LR 9.8 with consequential amendments to LR 15.4 and LR 16.4.

This post comes to us from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “2021 Brings Significant New ESG Disclosure Obligations for Financial Services Firms,” dated January 5, 2021, and available here

Categories
Securities Regulation

Regulatory Costs of Being Public: Evidence from Bunching Estimation

Disclosure and internal governance regulations are, along with accounting rules, distinguishing features of the public firm.  Deregulation agendas such as those of the Trump administration typically assume that many regulations on public firms have imposed high compliance costs.  Such arguments are at the center of the debate surrounding the decline in the number of public firms, changes in firm-size distribution and the growth of private equity markets.

Researchers and policy makers have extensively studied the costs and the impact of disclosure and internal governance rules (e.g., SEC, 2011; Coates and Srinivasan, 2014). However, as Leuz and Wysocki (2016) write in their survey of the literature (p. 529): “evidence on the causal effects of disclosure and financial reporting regulation is often difficult to obtain and still relatively rare.” One of the key challenges is that public firms can manipulate their size to avoid these regulations. As a result, analyses have been  limited to a small set of regulatory changes where manipulation is absent. Another challenge is that many methods are not well-suited for quantification of regulatory costs, as noted Leuz and Wysocki also note.

In a new paper, we attempt to advance the literature in two respects. First, rather than facing manipulation as an identification impediment, we follow the bunching estimation literature (e.g., Saez, 2010; Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Alvero and Xiao, 2020) and use firms’ choices to bunch their public floats around the regulatory threshold as an identification strategy. The central insight of this approach is that more bunching by public firms to avoid financial regulation implies higher regulatory costs.  This approach allows us to analyze multiple regulatory changes over 20 years, which provides a more comprehensive understanding of the regulatory costs borne by public firms. Second, we propose an approach to translate the observed bunching to a monetary value of regulatory costs, which are critical inputs into quantitative cost-benefit analyses by regulators and policymakers.

We begin by documenting four regulatory changes around disclosure and internal governance rules since 1992.  Each change features a regulatory trigger around a public float (i.e., value of trading equity) threshold.  The first regulatory threshold stemmed from the introduction of the “Small business issuers” and scaled disclosures in 1992.  Firms below a $25 million float had less stringent disclosure requirements on financial data, executive compensation, and beneficial ownership. These scaled disclosures were later expanded to firms below a $75 million float in 2008. Next, the “Non-accelerated filer” was introduced in 2002.  Firms with a float below $75 million had 10 (15) more days to file their quarterly (annual) reports to the SEC.  With the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley in 2002, there emerged another break in the regulatory requirements around $75 million in float with an exemption to SOX 404.  This section of the law requires firms to hire an outside auditor to attest to their internal controls.  Finally, the passage of the JOBS Act in 2012 created the “Emerging growth company” (EGC) category for newly public firms with a public float less than $700 million.  See Table 1 for a summary of these regulations.

Table 1: Summary of Regulatory Thresholds

Panel A: Key Public Float Thresholds

Panel B: Public Float Intervals and Associated Regulatory Benefits

Next, we document that firms significantly bunch their public floats below each of the three regulatory thresholds (Figure 1) in years the regulations are in place, while we find no significant bunching in years without regulations.  On its own, such bunching provides compelling visual evidence that regulations triggered by these thresholds impose significant compliance costs on firms, and that these costs seem to outweigh the regulations’ potential benefits such as lower costs of capital.

Figure 1: CDF and Histogram for Public Float Around Regulatory Thresholds

We employ a fuzzy bunching estimator (Alvero and Xiao, 2020) to measure the excess mass at the thresholds and use this to estimate the associated regulatory costs.   We use a simple model in which firms trade off the cost of capital structure distortion and regulatory costs to translate the observed excess bunching mass into an estimate of regulatory costs. The extent of bunching identifies the magnitude of regulatory costs: If regulation imposes zero costs, we will not observe bunching; if regulation imposes high costs, we will observe bunching, as a significant number of firms will move below the threshold to avoid regulation.

We apply our estimation model to a set of firms with public floats around the three regulatory thresholds: $25 million, $75 million, and $700 million. Comparing the density distributions of public float before and after the introduction of a regulation shows the extent to which firms bunch their float below a threshold to capture the associated regulatory benefits. Based on these density distributions of public float, our bunching model provides an estimate of the marginal firm that is indifferent between bunching and not bunching, an estimate of annual regulatory costs, and the present value of these costs scaled by total firm value. The estimated costs are summarized as follows:

  • For the $25 million float threshold that triggers scaled disclosure, the marginal bunching firm faces an annual cost of enhanced disclosure of $26,000. This is 7.8 percent of its EBITDA and, on a present value basis, 0.62 percent of its firm value.
  • For the $75 million float threshold that triggers SOX 404, the marginal bunching firm faces an annual cost of SOX 404 compliance of $122,000, which is 1.3 percent of its EBITDA and 6.3 percent of its net income, and, on a present value basis, 0.73 percent of its firm value.
  • For the $700 million float threshold that triggers EGC status, we estimate that the marginal bunching firm faces an annual cost of $743,000 from losing EGC benefits, which is 2.4 percent of its EBITDA, 7.4 percent of its net income, and, based on present value, 0.8 percent of its firm value.

Overall, the estimates reveal economically and statistically significant regulatory costs. See Figure 2 for a heatmap of these costs estimated for all firms.

A comparison of our estimated net regulatory costs with those in earlier literature and surveys shows that they are 10 percent to 70 percent smaller. There are two reasons for this difference.  First, our bunching approach estimates the net cost of regulations and thus incorporates the potential benefits of regulation available to firms. Second, survey based measures can be biased upward due to firms’ incentives to inflate self-reported regulatory costs to seek regulatory relief (e.g. Coates and Srinivasan, 2014; Parker, 2018; Alvero et al., 2019).

Figure 2: Estimated Regulatory Costs Scaled by Public Float

(a) Firms with public age<=5

(b) Firms with public age>5

These figures show, by public float and year, the estimated total regulatory costs scaled by firms’ public float. Panel A shows it for firms that went public less than five years ago. Panel B shows it for firms that went public more than five years ago.

The debate surrounding the decline in the number of IPOs and listed firms (e.g. Doidge et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2013) considers the regulatory cost of being public as one potential explanation. We investigate this hypothesis using our new regulatory cost estimates in a discrete choice model of IPO decision for a sample of 10,877 venture capital-backed firms.  We find that regulatory costs have a significant impact on these private firms’ decisions to go public: A one-standard-deviation increase in regulatory costs correlates with a 10 percent decrease in IPO likelihood. Removing all regulatory costs identified in our paper increases the average IPO likelihood from 2.47 percent to 3.72 percent. Eliminating the JOBS Act would lead to 145 fewer IPOs between 2012 and 2018.[1]

These results have several implications for regulators and practitioners. First, significant bunching below regulatory thresholds suggests that firms, on average, incur regulatory costs that outweigh the benefits of these regulations for firms (in the form of, for example, lower cost of capital). Second, our net regulatory costs estimates are useful inputs for policymakers’ evaluation of a regulation’s social benefits and costs. Third, regulatory costs have meaningful impact on private firms’ decisions to go public and could explain some of the shifts in the public versus private equity market that happened over the past few decades.

ENDNOTE

[1] We also examine the impact of our estimated regulatory costs on public firms’ decisions to go private and find a insignificant effect. The null result is likely explained by some of the regulatory costs being irreversible, upfront costs, which would enter into firms’ going public decisions but are sunk costs for their going private decision.

REFERENCES

Alvero, A., S. Ando, and K. Xiao (2019). Watch what they do, not what they say: Estimating regulatory costs from revealed preferences.

Alvero, A. and K. Xiao (2020). Fuzzy bunching. Available at SSRN 3611447.

Chetty, R., J. N. Friedman, T. Olsen, and L. Pistaferri (2011). Adjustment costs, firm responses, and micro vs. macro labor supply elasticities: Evidence from Danish tax records. The quarterly journal of economics 126 (2), 749{804.

Coates, J. C. and S. Srinivasan (2014, September). SOX after Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review. Accounting Horizons 28 (3), 627-671.

Doidge, C., G. A. Karolyi, and R. M. Stulz (2017). The US listing gap. Journal of Financial Economics 123 (3), 464-487.

Gao, X., J. R. Ritter, and Z. Zhu (2013). Where have all the ipos gone? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48 (6), 1663-1692.

Kleven, H. J. and M. Waseem (2013). Using notches to uncover optimization frictions and structural elasticities: Theory and evidence from Pakistan. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (2), 669-723.

Leuz, C. and P. D. Wysocki (2016). The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research. Journal of Accounting Research 54 (2), 525-622.

Parker, R. (2018). Hyping the cost of regulation. The Regulatory Review.

Saez, E. (2010). Do taxpayers bunch at kink points? American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2 (3), 180-212.

SEC (2011). Study and Recommendations on Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 for Issuers with Public Float between $75 and $250 Million. Technical report, Staff of the Office of the Chief Accountant, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

This post comes to us from professors Michael Ewens at the California Institute of Technology and NBER, Kairong Xiao at Columbia Business School, and Ting Xu at the University of Virginia. It is based on their recent article, “Regulatory Costs of Being Public: Evidence from Bunching Estimation,” available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Pandemic Disclosures: Covid-19 as a “Current Market Condition” for Mutual Funds

What constitutes a “current market condition” that mutual funds are required by SEC regulations to disclose? Current market condition risks arise because of changing market conditions that can affect investment performance.  For some U.S.-registered funds, Covid-19 is prompting new event-specific disclosures. In 2020 Q1-Q3, we see a dramatic increase in public health-related disclosures overall, and the emergence of new Covid-19 and quarantine risk disclosures.

While the SEC hasn’t mandated Covid-19 disclosures or provided guidance to funds (as it has with operating companies), it is clear that funds are not immune to the effects of Covid-19. For example, the SEC has relaxed its rules on in-person fund board management meetings, allowed for between-fund borrowing, delayed delivery of fund prospectuses and other information, issued investor fraud alerts around Covid-19, and published a COVID response page for funds on its website.

The onslaught of the Covid-19 global pandemic provides a natural event study for which funds disclose Covid-19 and how they do it. Our Mutual Fund Disclosure research group at Georgia State University’s Legal Analytics Lab started tracking Covid-19 disclosures after spending the last few years compiling and text-mining mutual fund prospectuses to develop theories of fund disclosures, test compliance with SEC regulations and guidance, and model financial performance and risk (see e.g., Promise and Perils of Plain English). In prior work studying disclosures from 2010-2018, we tracked language mirroring SEC guidance on current market conditions, as indicated by language such as “persist or worsen,” “not yet known,” etc.[1]  We found that, on average, 8 percent of investment companies disclosed changing market condition risks, with fixed income funds disclosing the most frequently.[2]

Few funds disclosed public health related events as a current or static market condition over the past decade as compared with other potential current market conditions. Compare, for example, Figure 1, displaying the number of various public health-related terms included in risk disclosures, and Figure 2, plotting the number of natural disaster mentions in fund risk disclosures. The number of public health citations is relatively small and remains relatively flat from 2010 to 2019. Natural disasters are cited as risk factors far more frequently – a trend that has mostly increased over the last decade.[3]

Figure 1: All Fund Public Health Keyword Count (log) by Year

Figure 2: All Fund Natural Disaster Keyword Count (log) by Year

Funds first introduced Covid-19 and pandemic-related disclosures in 2020 – a trend accompanied by an increase in public health disclosures unrelated to Covid-19.  In the first three quarters of 2020, 769 funds disclosed public health events. Of these 769, domestic equity funds comprise 191 – by far the largest fund class.  Despite increases in severe storms and wildfires, however, funds failed to meaningfully increase disclosing natural disaster events as compared with previous years.

Funds characterized the public health risks associated with Covid-19 in a variety of ways, ranging from “disease” generally to specific concerns about “quarantines” and “sanitation.” Figure 3 breaks down funds’ public health reference by token (word), number of funds using the term, and CRSP class.  Figure 3 also highlights domestic equity funds, the type most likely to disclose Covid-19 as a current market condition.

Figure 3: 2020 Public Health Keywords (with callout blocks for terms unique to 2020)

An appraisal of the full text of fund disclosure reveals that funds frame pandemic-related risk as a “current market condition.” The disclosure below describes what the fund views as a market-wide risk on domestic equity:

“The possibility that common stock prices will decline over short or extended periods of time due to overall market, financial, and economic conditions and trends, governmental or central bank actions or interventions, changes in investor sentiment, and other factors, such as the recent covid-19 pandemic, that may not be directly related to the issuer of a security held by the fund.”

Covid-19–specific language accounts for 34 percent of the 2020 public health disclosures and addresses themes such as global markets, lagging consumer spending, volatility, value, and investment specific risks such as interest rates, real estate, and commodities.  For example:

“The effects of this pandemic to public health and business and market conditions, including exchange trading suspensions and closures, may continue to have a significant negative impact on the performance of the funds investments, increase the funds volatility, exacerbate pre-existing political, social and economic risks to the fund, and negatively impact broad segments of businesses and populations.  In addition, governments, their regulatory agencies, or self-regulatory organizations may take actions in response to the pandemic that affect the instruments in which the fund invests, or the issuers of such instruments, in ways that could have a significant negative impact on the funds investment performance.  The full impact of the covid-19 pandemic, or other future epidemics or pandemics, is currently unknown.  For example, the outbreak of covid-19, a novel coronavirus disease, has negatively affected economies, markets and individual companies throughout the world, including those in which the fund invests.”

The remaining 66 percent of 2020 public health disclosures are generic, boilerplate statements – but the increase in frequency suggests a relationship to the global pandemic. For example, such language cites generally to “geopolitical and other risks, including environmental and public health risks may add to instability in world economies and markets.” Money market funds’ disclosures were most likely to contain boilerplate language (82 percent) of public health disclosures. In contrast, index and domestic equity funds were much more likely to cite specifically to the coronavirus pandemic as the source of public-health risk. Breakdowns by fund type are included in the table below.

The emergence of Covid-19 disclosures in mutual funds also reflects the flow of information from operating company disclosures to fund disclosures when reporting on portfolio risks.  In the first three quarters of 2020, 16.5 percent of fixed income funds disclosed public health risks. These disclosures are likely the result of May 2020 SEC guidance to issuers of municipal securities to provide as much information about current and operating conditions because the “fluid and unpredictable nature of the public health crisis and its financial and economic impacts on municipal issuers…” This guidance is reflected in subsequent fund disclosures, such as: “[T]he novel coronavirus (covid-19) pandemic has significantly stressed the financial resources of many municipal issuers, which may impair a municipal issuers ability to meet its financial obligations when due and could adversely impact the value of its bonds, which could negatively impact the performance of the fund.”

While our findings shed light on funds’ compliance with current market-condition disclosure guidance from the SEC, it also raises additional questions. Why do we observe variation among fund types in disclosing public health risks? Among those that do disclose public health risks, why do we see variation between use of boilerplate and pandemic-specific language? More important, to what extent do these differences reflect substantively meaningful differences in fund performance and risk for years to come?

ENDNOTES

[1] Our full list of keywords included “not yet known;” “persist or worsen;” “continues to face;” “continues to experience;” “current market;” “recent events;” or “ongoing.”

[2] Domestic equity growth/income, foreign equity real estate, domestic equity sector funds (natural resources, commodities), and mortgage backed security funds disclosed current market condition risks in 10 percent or more filings.

[3] Figures 1 & 2 show the log of counts to display the low counts of public health disclosures years 2010-2019 compared with the high keyword counts in 2020.  We retain the log representation in Figure 2 to provide a comparison between the keywords of interest.  Public health and natural disaster keywords were generated through a combination of computational and manual reviews.  We have 31 key words for public health and 27 for natural disasters.  See https://sites.google.com/view/gsu-mutual-fund-research for a complete list of keywords and additional data.  We also note the dip in counts for 2019 in both graphs.

This post comes to us from professors Anne M. Tucker, Yusen Xia, and Susan Navarro Smelcer at Georgia State University. It is based on their mutual fund disclosure projects, detailed here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Paul Weiss Discusses SEC Guidance on Disclosure by SPACs

The Staff of the Division of Corporation Finance recently issued CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic 11 – Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (available here). This guidance highlights disclosure considerations for SPACs at both the IPO and business combination stages, with a focus on disclosures around conflicts of interest and the differing economic interests of SPAC sponsors, directors, officers and their affiliates (collectively, “SPAC Insiders”) as compared to the interests of the SPAC’s public shareholders.

IPO Disclosure Considerations

In an effort to elicit better disclosures when a SPAC goes public, the guidance poses questions for SPACs to address in the IPO registration statement on the following topics of concern to the Staff:

  • conflicts of interests – especially on the part of the SPAC Insiders, with regard to fiduciary and contractual relationships they have with entities other than the SPAC and competition for business combination opportunities, and the potential for conflicts in the business combination transaction itself;
  • the limited time that a SPAC has to complete a business transaction and its impact – including the financial incentives of the SPAC Insiders to complete a transaction, their influence over the approval of any transaction, the ability to amend governing documents to facilitate a transaction, the ability to extend the timeline to complete a transaction, and the prior SPAC-success track record of the sponsors, directors and officers;
  • the compensation and role of the underwriters – including any deferral of underwriting compensation until completion of the business transaction, what additional services the underwriters may be providing, any conflict of interest the underwriters may have (especially if providing additional services given deferred IPO underwriting compensation), and the timing, conditionality and manner (e., cash or other consideration) of the payment of compensation to the underwriters;
  • the economic terms of SPAC Insider investments – including the securities ownership of SPAC Insiders and the prices at which they acquired those securities (and the terms, amount and impact of any concurrent offering in which they may be participating), and any conflicts of interest arising from their securities ownership, compensation arrangements and relationships with affiliated entities that may create a financial incentive to complete a business transaction even if not in the best interest of other public shareholders —  the Staff specifically asks SPACs to clearly disclose that “if the SPAC fails to complete a business combination transaction, some of all of the sponsors’, directors’, and officers’ and their affiliates’ securities would have no value and the sponsors, directors, officers and their affiliates may incur a substantial loss on their investment”; and
  • the terms of SPAC issuances to its sponsor and others in private financings – including how, if applicable, the terms of different classes of securities compare to the rights, terms and risks of public securities offered in the IPO, the impact of any of these offerings (especially of convertible securities) on the SPAC’s capital structure, whether the SPAC will seek additional funding and how the price and terms of any securities the SPAC may issue in the future could compare to the securities offered to the public in the IPO and whether the SPAC Insiders may participate, or have an interest, in the financing, and the terms, and potential dilutive effect, of any forward purchase agreement (including whether the commitments are irrevocable).

Business Combination Disclosure Considerations

The guidance also poses specific questions for SPACS to address in the business combination context to elicit clearer disclosure in the business combination filing with the SEC on the following topics:

  • additional financing – whether additional financing is necessary to complete the business combination, how the terms of any financing may impact public shareholders, and, if the additional financing involves the issuance of securities, the material terms of such securities, including how the pricing and terms compare to, and differ from, the IPO, the financing’s impact on the capital structure and if convertible securities are to be issued, the terms of conversion and the impact on beneficial ownership of the combined company, and whether the SPAC Insiders are participating in the financing;
  • interests of SPAC Insiders in evaluating the transaction and other opportunities– including detailed information regarding the identification and evaluation of the proposed transaction, detailed information regarding the negotiations over the nature and amount of consideration, the material factors considered by the board in its approval of the transaction, how the board evaluated the interests of the SPAC Insiders, whether there are any conflicts of interest of the SPAC Insiders and how the SPAC addressed these conflicts, any interest the SPAC Insiders have in the target company (including the timing  and acquisition cost thereof), detailed information on how the SPAC Insiders will benefit (including quantifying any compensation payments or investment returns), and the total percentage ownership interest the SPAC Insiders may hold after the combination (including after the exercise of warrants and conversion of convertible debt); and
  • underwriters services and fees – including disclosure of all services and the timing, conditionality (e., contingency) and manner (i.e., cash or other consideration) of the payment of compensation to the underwriters, and any conflict of interest the underwriters may have (especially if providing additional services given deferred IPO underwriting compensation).

This post comes to us from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “SEC Division of Corporation Finance Issues SPAC Disclosure Guidance,” dated January 4, 2021, and available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Insider Trading and Strategic Disclosure

With COVID-19 cases rising rapidly around the world, Pfizer’s announcement on November 9, 2020, that its coronavirus vaccine was highly effective in early trials offered a rare bright spot for the coming winter.[1] But the news was soon dampened by word that the company’s CEO, Albert Bourla, sold some 60 percent of his Pfizer shares on the day of the announcement.[2]  According to Pfizer, Bourla’s sales occurred under a preset arrangement known as a 10b5-1 plan – so named for an obscure SEC rule designed to shield executives from spurious insider-trading accusations. The rule gives an affirmative defense against such accusations to public-company executives who commit to sell specified amounts of shares in advance.[3]

In the two decades since the rule’s adoption, research has shown that executives trading under it perform better than insiders engaging in ordinary trading,[4] in part because the rule permits executives to cancel prearranged trades later discovered to be disadvantageous.[5] The SEC has done nothing to address this obvious problems with the rule, leading the agency’s current chairman to call for immediate reforms.[6]  Yet little work has examined the link between insiders’ plans to sell under these SEC rules and the information public companies choose to disclose to investors.

In a new working paper, I present a preliminary analysis documenting the relationship between insider trading under predetermined plans and corporate disclosures. I show that, even when executives’ hands are tied as to when they trade, there appears to be a powerful relationship between insiders’ plans to sell and the news their companies disclose. I find that the likelihood, share volume, and dollar volume of insider sales under 10b5-1 plans are higher when good news is disclosed and  higher still when the disclosed news is better.[7] That is: The more insiders sell, the better news their companies choose to disclose.

In light of the recent events at Pfizer, I also consider whether these effects are concentrated in particular kinds of corporate announcements and within a particular industry. I show that the effect documented here is concentrated in earnings announcements and is especially common in the health care sector.  I also show that stock prices reverse after high levels of Rule 10b5-1 selling on positive news days, and that the price reversal increases with the share volume of Rule 10b5-1 selling – exposing ordinary investors trading during this period to losses.

One possible mechanism driving these results could be 10b5-1 plans in which sales are triggered mechanically by a transitory rise in the share price.  Such a trading rule could amplify the rewards to a “pump-and-dump” scheme whereby public companies disclose good news that induces investors to purchase stock, while failing to disclose that corporate executives have preplanned sales triggered by the share-price increase following these purchases.  While the exact contours of liability will likely turn on the disclosures (or lack thereof) in any given case, corporate insiders owe a fiduciary duty to their shareholders.  Failing to fully disclose the circumstances around a material corporate disclosure – including the gains that executives stand to realize from preplanned sales made pursuant to a trigger-price 10b5-1 plan – may constitute a materially deceptive scheme.

With this in mind, I consider legal reforms that might address concerns that the SEC’s rules in this area are subject to abuse. As noted above, SEC Chairman Jay Clayton has called for limited reforms, including a “cooling off” period restricting insiders from trading in the days immediately following the adoption of a 10b5-1 plan.  The evidence in this paper, however, suggests that such reforms would be inadequate, because insiders’ influence over the flow of information to the markets will continue long after such a period has expired.  Instead, I propose a disgorgement mechanism limiting insider profits from trading at ephemerally high stock prices that subsequently decline.

When corporate insiders engage in prearranged selling coinciding with a material disclosure that is followed by a long-run increase in the value of the company, they should be rewarded for creating value and share in the gains with other shareholders of the firm.  On the other hand, when insiders engage in prearranged selling coinciding with a material disclosure that is followed by a long-run decline in the company’s share price, there are strong reasons to require the insider to disgorge the gains that arose from trading at an ephemerally high stock price that subsequently declines.

ENDNOTES

[1] Jared S. Hopkins, Pfizer’s Covid-19 Vaccine Proves 90% Effective in Latest Trials, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-vaccine-from-pfizer-and-biontech-works-better-than-expected-11604922300.

[2] Jared S. Hopkins & Gregory Zuckerman, Pfizer CEO Joins Host of Executives at Covid-19 Vaccine Makers in Big Stock Sale, Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-ceo-joins-host-of-executives-at-covid-19-vaccine-makers-in-big-stock-sale-11605139164.

[3] 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-1(c).

[4] Taylan Mavruk & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do SEC’s 10b5-1 Safe Harbor Rules Need to Be Rewritten?, 2016 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 133 (2016).

[5] Alan D. Jagolinzer, SEC Rule 10b5-1 and Insiders’ Strategic Trade, 55 Mgmt. Sci. 224, 224-25, 235-36 (2009); see also M. Todd Henderson et al., Hiding in Plain Sight: Can Disclosure Enhance Insiders’ Trade Returns? (Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 411, 2012), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1646&context=law_and_economics.

[6] Paul Kiernan, SEC Chairman Urges Corporate Insiders to Avoid Quick Stock Sales, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-chairman-urges-corporate-insiders-to-avoid-quick-stock-sales-11605637892.

[7] In the paper, I specifically consider the possibility that these findings are driven by 10b5-1 plans that automatically trigger insider selling when the share price crosses a certain threshold.  As discussed in the paper, the use of share-price triggers raises questions under the securities laws because public companies rarely disclose the details of these plans (like the trigger price).  Moreover, executives tend not to disclose sales contemporaneously with the release of good news.  The subsequent disclosure of insider selling on Form 4 can take up to 48 hours – too late to ensure that investors are making informed decisions when purchasing shares of a public company.

This post comes to us from Joshua Mitts, associate professor of law and Milton Handler Fellow at Columbia Law School.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Biden and the SEC: Some Possible Agendas

This is the gossip season, and almost everyone has heard a rumor about who will be the next chair of the SEC. Although I was interviewed by the Biden transition team (for my views, not as a candidate), my sources are no better than those of others. Nonetheless, they all tell me that the next chair will be Gary Gensler, the former chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and current chair of the Transition Taskforce for Financial Regulation for President-elect Biden. In my view, he is probably the optimal choice — experienced, tough at enforcement, and well versed in the economics of securities markets. The only real question is whether he will hold out to become deputy secretary of the Treasury Department.

To be sure, presidents can go their own way or be compelled to favor others in order to balance the ticket along gender or racial lines. Other potential (and qualified) candidates include Preet Bharara (the former U.S. Attorney in Manhattan), Rob Jackson (a former SEC commissioner) and the senior current Democratic commissioner, Allison Herren Lee (who will probably be the interim chair if Chairman Jay Clayton resigns at the end of December).

More interesting to me is where might a Democratic SEC depart from the agenda pursued by Chairman Clayton. Here, although I recognize that Chairman Jay Clayton stayed within the mainstream — unlike other Trump chairs at other agencies — a host of topics exist on which Democrats will likely want to move in a different direction.

Only 10 such issues can be compressed into a single column (but there are many more):

1. ESG and Shareholder Voting. Under Clayton, the SEC reversed course and began to suggest that fiduciaries (for example, the investment advisers to mutual funds) were not required under all circumstances to vote their fund’s shares (which previously had been seen as a fiduciary duty to which investment advisers were subject). Although the SEC did not go nearly as far as the Department of Labor under Secretary Scalia, which has a proposed rule pending that would bar ERISA fiduciaries from voting the shares held by a pension plan unless the fiduciaries could show a likely financial benefit to the pension plan, both positions go too far and seem intended to curb activism by BlackRock and like-minded investors that favor ESG goals.

On the general topic of ESG, the SEC is 10 years behind Europe, where ESG disclosures are now mandatory. To be sure, ESG rankings and criteria are often unrationalized, contradictory, or inexplicable. But this actually calls for more SEC oversight, not less.

Why do ESG disclosures matter? Cynics may say that, whatever a corporate issuer discloses on ESG issues, the board will stay focused on shareholder wealth maximization and short-term profits. That is, however, too narrow a view. The reality is that “executives manage what they measure.”[1] The more the corporation is required to measure and disclose its impact (say, on climate change), the more it will attempt to improve its impact and rating. Fuller disclosure is a “soft law” lever for encouraging greater regard for these non-economic goals. If the Biden Administration intends to pursue a more activist climate change policy than the Trump Administration did, this is a lever that it needs to use.

Will a Biden Administration insist on mandatory ESG disclosures? Here, it is too early to predict, but that is a possibility. Anyone approaching the nomination hearing for the SEC needs to have thought out his or her position on this issue.

2. Proxy Advisers and Proxy Proposals. Over the dissent of its two Democratic commissioners, the SEC has subjected proxy advisers to burdensome new rules that require them to give advance notice to corporate issuers of the positions they will recommend on shareholder votes and to consider the issuers’ responses. These rules will stretch out the proxy solicitation process and possibly chill advisers’ ability to recommend policies disliked by managements. Still, they do not become fully effective until 2022, which gives a Democratic SEC time to reconsider and revise them.

Also, the Clayton SEC withdrew a critical no-action letter that protected proxy advisers from being deemed to have solicited a proxy by providing advice to their clients with respect to approaching votes. Currently, the SEC and Institutional Shareholder Services (“ISS”) are locked in litigation over this and related issues. Under a Democratic chair, the no-action letter could be reinstated (possibly with some modest changes) and the ISS litigation settled.

Similarly, the Clayton SEC revised Rule 14a-8 dealing with shareholder proxy proposals, in part by significantly increasing the necessary percentages that the vote must receive in order to be resubmitted in later years. This rule also seems ripe for reversal.

3. “Short-Termism. The European Commission has now decided that “short-termism” is a chronic problem that requires a number of important responses, including the revision of directors’ duties. It is unlikely that the U.S. will follow this specific approach, but pressure from hedge fund “wolf packs” is a continuing issue in the United States. For years, law firm Wachtell, Lipton has urged the SEC to address “short-termism” by closing the window under Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, which gives an acquirer or group 10 days to file its Schedule 13D. Chairman Clayton, an experienced M&A lawyer, had no interest in changing the balance of advantage in M&A transactions, but a number of Democratic “progressives” are skeptical of hedge fund activism and believe closing that loophole would be a useful improvement. Similarly, hedge fund “wolf packs” are able to dominate the board by threatening proxy contests because the definition of “group” under the Williams Act is loose and unconfining. It could easily be tightened by rulemaking. This is an area where the business community (which hardly loves hedge fund activists) and Democratic progressives could form an alliance. No prediction is here made that such a reform will occur, but it could be discussed and debated, depending on the chair’s preferences.

4. Regulation Best Interest. This alleged reform was adopted by the SEC last year on a strictly party-line vote. The new rule does not make the broker a fiduciary to its clients, and may even preempt state laws (such as that of California), which does deem a broker to be a fiduciary. A liberal Democratic commission could re-examine this weak reform and insist on revisions that made the broker a fiduciary (or at least spared state laws to such effect from preemption by the new rule). This would provoke a firestorm, and the new chair needs to choose his or her priorities.

5. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”). The Trump Administration proposed to shut this agency down by merging it into the SEC (which has been much more passive about auditors who acquiesce in client fraud). That was the PCAOB’s perverse reward for being the one agency in Washington that would not acquiesce in the conduct of wayward accountants. In light of WireCard and other recent auditing scandals, Democrats may want a tougher, more skeptical SEC. If so, they must recognize that the PCAOB is the only agency likely to deal objectively and appropriately with wayward auditors. (The possible reforms here could fill an entire column).

6. Deregulation of Exempt Offerings. In the last year, the SEC has liberalized the definition of “accredited investor” and greatly expanded the scope of the crowdfunding exemption, Rule 701, and Regulation A+. However, the one reform that has not been considered (but that the SEC staff has favored in past years) would be to subject the definition of “accredited investor” to inflation indexing. When Regulation D was adopted in the early 1970s, its $1 million and $250,000 minimum requirements to qualify as an accredited investor amounted to real money. Today, such numbers no longer do (when many young associates can qualify as accredited investors if bonuses are paid by their law firm). Because no disclosure must be provided under Regulation D if the purchasers are all accredited investors, brokers sensibly restrict all private placements to them. The brokerage industry loves this extraordinarily broad exemption, but it is a disgrace, and by itself largely explains why private placements now vastly exceed public offerings in the amounts annually raised.

7. SEC Enforcement. Every few years, the issue is certain to be raised: Why does the SEC persist in “neither admit nor deny” settlements, which allow an issuer to avoid acknowledging any misconduct. In contrast, even deferred prosecution agreements require some admissions by the defendant. When Mary Jo White was confirmed as SEC chair, she promised to reconsider this pattern, but exceptions have been rare. In the interim, the Second Circuit has admonished Judge Rakoff that he has little or no authority to reject a proposed SEC settlement. But even if the SEC has this power, that does not imply that it should invariably use it. Here, a fuller study of the possible options might be the first step towards a stronger enforcement program. Today, under Trump, the SEC seldom sues public companies, but only chases after small-time brokers and other crooks. Democrats do not generally believe that public companies should be immune from SEC discipline and may want the commission to scrutinize Wall Street as well as Main Street.

8. Direct Listings. Direct listings may well be an efficient technique for IPO issuers to consider, but progress toward that end is currently stalled because direct listings effectively deny purchasers the ability to rely on the liability provisions of Section 11 of the Securities Act. This is because the “tracing” requirement of Section 11 cannot be satisfied,[2] unless the SEC takes action to make tracing feasible. It could, and should, but probably won’t.

9. “Principled” Disclosure. Under Chairman Clayton, the SEC has trimmed Regulation S-K by moving from rules to principles. This is not invariably wrong (or right). A careful review should be undertaken as to whether disclosure of material information has now become increasingly optional. Yes, there is a case for “principled” disclosure, but we do not know how it is working. A study of its impact is needed.

10. Budget. The SEC, of course, needs a much, much larger budget, which the Trump Administration regularly pruned.

ENDNOTES

[1] I borrow this phrase from my late colleague, Professor Louis Lowenstein, who used it to describe how disclosure affects managerial behavior. He was right.

[2] In one case, a federal district court has this year determined that the “tracing” of IPO shares is infeasible and therefore has exempted plaintiffs from such a requirement. See Pirani v. Slack Technologies, Inc., 445 F.Supp 3d 367 (N.D. Calif. 2020). However, the court granted an interim appeal, and the likelihood is that this decision will be reversed.

This post comes to us from John C. Coffee, Jr., the Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School and Director of its Center on Corporate Governance.

Categories
Finance & Economics

Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn Investors

The COVID-19 outbreak provides fertile ground for sweeping regulatory changes. On May 19, 2020, for example, President Trump issued “Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery Executive Order 13924”, which prompted the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and Department of Labor (“DOL”) to promulgate new rules to protect investors and facilitate capital formation. The SEC adopted amendments aimed at harmonizing and improving the “patchwork” exempt offering framework, while the DOL announced that 401(k) plan fiduciaries have the ability to invest in private equity funds.

The primary purpose of these changes is to democratize and equalize access to the private market. These policies address the concern that retail investors are missing out on investment opportunities due to fewer listed firms, fewer initial public offerings (“IPOs”), the increasing role of private markets in raising capital, and the soaring number of unicorns: private companies valued at $1 billion or more. Large investment firms, such as private equity funds, may also be interested in getting access to the individual investor market.

Despite regulators’ best intentions, their policy changes may not help investors, retirees, and entrepreneurs, and may even put them at greater risk (see here). In a new article, Alternative Venture Capital, I detail these concerns, take a look at the new policies, and argue that many of them fail to provide necessary protections and should never have been adopted.

The central issue is that policymakers must consider the rise in alternative venture investors and the ways in which those investors affect a unicorn firm, its capital needs, and the lack of disclosure of information, which affects future investors. In the last few years, new, non-traditional, deep-pocketed investors have made notable investments in large private technology companies, which have historically received much of their funding from venture capital investors. Institutional and high-net-worth investors, such as SoftBank, mutual funds, hedge funds, corporate venture capitalists, private equity, and sovereign wealth funds (together, “alternative venture capital” or “AVC” investors) are turning their attention to private markets in the hopes of capitalizing on the high returns of unicorn firms before they do an IPO.

The interest of these deep-pocketed investors has reversed the competitive landscape of unicorn funding. Rather than unicorn firms competing for a limited pool of funding, they are able to attract a nearly limitless pool of funds, leaving the deep-pockets to compete for the chance to invest. This reversal substantially alters the governance structure of unicorns and the nature of the relationships between these companies and their investors. Rather than investors shopping for a firm, unicorns are now allowed to pick and choose their investors, often to meet the desires of their controlling founders. This alone presents serious issues, given that founder objectives may not be aligned with the best interests of the company. Further exposing retail investors to such risks should be reason enough to give regulators pause.

Currently, retail investors, researchers, and regulators do not have detailed information on the identity of these new investors in our private markets, their incentives, risk tolerance, the contractual terms they negotiate, or other relevant data that would be helpful in understanding the new developments in the private markets. My article helps fill that gap.

AVC investors are focused on financing unicorns because of unicorns’ potential to disrupt the market, transform entire industries, and add value to the investors’ portfolios. In some instances, AVCs are even outbidding traditional VCs for opportunities to invest. Unicorn founders and AVCs have common interests. Unicorn founders want to continue controlling their firm by keeping it private longer and not subjecting themselves, their management decisions, trade secrets, or strategy to public market scrutiny. For unicorn founders, AVC is a new and very attractive path to allow early equity investors and talent to exit by providing liquidity for shareholders that are locked in, without requiring a traditional trade sale or IPO.

AVCs are further interested in investing in unicorns thanks to recent changes to our securities laws, the decline in IPOs, the extended period of low interest rates, a blend of financial and strategic incentives, and other geo-political considerations. They may bargain for different contractual rights than traditional VCs when investing in unicorns, and those rights include aggressive redemption rights and post-IPO pricing “ratchets.” These contractual mechanisms are designed to protect them from down-rounds and lower post-IPO valuations.

To illustrate, as Professor Coffee notes, WeWork’s S-1 filings (and revised filings) with the SEC indicate that the company’s AVC investors obtained new contractual rights that protected their expected rate of return (rather than monitoring rights) at the expense of other shareholders, including future investors. These IPO ratchets are contractual rights that give alternative investors additional shares in the last round of financing in case the valuation following the IPO falls below the pre-IPO valuation.

Should regulators encourage retail investors to invest in private firms such as WeWork, which were previously limited to sophisticated and wealthy players, such as accredited individuals and institutions? There are many risks associated with investing in illiquid assets or monitoring private fund investment advisers. To illustrate, the SEC recently issued a risk alert about investigations and enforcement actions against private fund investment advisers on lack of disclosures of potential conflicts of interest, excessive fees, and failures to implement policies on insider trading.

My article explains why the remedies offered to this problem are flawed. It also sheds light on the increasing array of new investors that policymakers must consider when making policy decisions regarding the capital needs of private companies. The power of these investors to dictate favorable terms for themselves, aimed at mitigating their own risk, exacerbates the information asymmetry between private firms and retail investors.

The new rules may encourage both sophisticated and non-accredited investors to invest in illiquid securities of high-risk private ventures. They may also diminish the already limited investor protections in private markets. The entire securities regulatory scheme is centered on the concept of disclosure of information to improve price discovery and efficiency and reduce information asymmetry. Without more disclosure, non-accredited purchasers will not be able to make informed decisions, especially concerning the risks associated with investing in privately-held firms.

The reality is that traditional investors in private markets, VCs and PEs, are now competing with non-traditional AVC investors over investments in unicorns. Raising large amounts of capital in late-stage and very-late-stage financings is the new norm for a unicorn. By making changes that allow firms to stay private longer, regulators have approached this problem from the wrong direction. Rather than encouraging more disclosure and forcing these companies to go public if they want to continue to raise capital, they have opened the door for retail investors to stumble through the darkness, while allowing large, sophisticated actors to quietly slip out and close the door behind them. Policymakers and regulators should consider ways to enhance our public markets and investor protections rather than trying to find substitutes for them.

This post comes to us from Professor Anat Alon-Beck at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. It is based on her recent article, “Alternative Venture Capital: The New Unicorn Investors,” available here.

Categories
Corporate Governance International Developments

Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility Legislation Around the World

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is typically assumed to be a voluntary rather than mandatory initiative. Yet, over the past few decades, a growing number of countries have adopted laws that explicitly require corporations to undertake CSR.

To date, most scholarly and policy attention has focused on laws that require companies to disclose extensive information about their social and environmental plans, actions, or performance.  In recent years, though, a growing number of countries have gone beyond disclosure to require CSR due diligence, corporate philanthropy, certain governance structures, and making CSR a duty under corporate law.

Mandatory CSR Due Diligence

CSR is increasingly understood as a management process, which inspires process-oriented laws. This regulatory approach requires companies to identify social and environmental risks associated with their business operations and establish and execute reasonable plans to prevent harm from the identified risks. France’s duty of vigilance law, adopted in 2017, is a pioneer of this approach. It requires companies that have more than 5,000 employees in France or more than 10,000 employees worldwide to develop, disclose, and implement a vigilance plan in order to identify risks and prevent severe human rights violations and environmental damage resulting directly or indirectly from the operations of the company or its subsidiaries, or subcontractors.  The plan should include mapping of risks, regular assessment procedures, actions to mitigate risks or prevent serious breaches, and warning and reporting mechanisms.  In case of non-compliance with the disclosure obligation, any interested party may give notice to the parent company or seek injunctive relief. More importantly, those harmed by the company’s failure to establish or implement a plan may launch a civil action and seek damages for corporate negligence.

Mandatory Corporate Philanthropy

CSR used to be seen as synonymous with corporate charity. As CSR has expanded beyond corporate charity to focus on managing any negative externalities resulting from daily business operations, though, corporate philanthropy is a narrow or even outdated aspect of CSR. Nevertheless, there seems to be growing interest in making it legally required. In 2009, Mauritius became the first country to enact mandatory corporate philanthropy, soon to be followed by India and Nepal.  While mandatory philanthropy statutes vary across countries, all essentially require companies to commit a certain percentage of their profits to designated CSR programs such as those to build schools or provide shelters for the poor.

Mandatory Governance Structures

A structural way to implement mandatory CSR is through a company’s board of directors, where the interests of shareholders, who want to maximize share price, and of other stakeholders, who have broader concerns, can be served. One version of this structural approach would include employee representatives on the board. A less dramatic version would be to require the creation of a CSR board committee. The CSR committee would be responsible for enacting and supervising the company’s CSR policies. South Africa’s 2008 corporate law offers an early example of this approach.

Mandatory CSR Duty Under Corporate Law

Mandatory CSR may refer to a general legal duty to act in a socially responsible way. That duty could be created under corporate law or as part of directors’ fiduciary duty. The UK 2006 Companies Act takes the latter approach by requiring directors to consider the interests of employees, consumers, suppliers, the environment, and the community when pursuing the interests of shareholders. By contrast, China’s Company Act, revised in 2006, expressly requires a company to “undertake social responsibility.”[1] And Indonesia’s Limited Liability Company Act, amended in 2007, explicitly requires that “companies in natural resources sectors or in connection with natural resources are obliged to implement corporate social and environmental responsibility.”[2]

Overall Assessment

My study’s comparison of approaches in various countries reveals that governments are often motivated to pursue their own interests unrelated to labor, environmental, or human rights protection. The non-CSR related motivations, such as appeasing political allies, shaming political enemies, or unloading welfare burdens to corporations, play a critical role in enacting the laws. The political interests of the governments carry far more weight than the nature of the pre-existing corporate law (whether shareholder-oriented or stakeholder-oriented) in explaining the adoption of mandatory CSR laws. Although the CSR laws appear mandatory, politics and the open-ended notion of CSR significantly weaken the compulsory nature of the laws. At least for now, the major function of the mandatory CSR laws appears largely expressive rather than regulatory or adjudicative. At best, the laws may send signals about appropriate corporate behavior and potentially lead to reconstruction of business norms that prioritize economic interests over social and environmental concerns. At worst, the mandatory CSR laws, as they currently stand, may be exploited as a way for politicians to send a symbolic message to their constituents that they care about society and nature. In other words, it could be nothing more than political greenwashing.

Nevertheless, considering that many laws began with tentative designs and compromises with politics but gradually improved, the recent CSR laws might be viewed optimistically as an experimental step toward development of better CSR legislation. With this positive view, the laws could be improved by strengthening them with government monitoring, legal punishment for non-compliance, and stakeholder recourse against companies that do not comply.

ENDNOTES

[1] Article 5 of China’s Company Act (2006).

[2] Article 74 of Indonesia’s Limited Liability Company Act (2007),

This post comes to us from Professor Li-Wen Lin at the University of British Columbia’s Peter A. Allard School of Law. It is based on her recent article, “Mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility Legislation around the World: Emergent Varieties and National Experiences,” available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Separating Owners from Control: The Proposed DOL Proxy Voting Rule and Other Actions on Shareholder Activism

On October 3, The Shareholder Commons and B Lab submitted their comment on a recent new rule (the “Proxy Proposal”) proposed by the Department of Labor (the “DOL.”)  The Proxy Proposal would limit independent proxy voting by pension trustees. It is part of a series of rules recently proposed or adopted by the DOL and the SEC that tilt the scales against shareholders and in favor of management on disputes related to social and environmental issues. This post summarizes one of the critical arguments from our comment, which applies to this entire series of new rules meant to limit the voice of shareholders.

Against Engagement: The Proxy Proposal and Other Recent Agency Action

The Proxy Proposal threatens ERISA trustees with liability if they spend resources on voting. In particular, the proposal:

  1. Directs trustees to discount the value of engagement at companies that represent a small percentage of a plan portfolio;
  2. Creates a presumption against using third party proxy advisers;
  3. Encourages plans not to voting at all in order to reduce expenses;
  4. Provides a safe harbor for a policy of voting with management;
  5. Provides a safe harbor for a policy of only voting on certain matters related to questions important to company value; and
  6. Provides a safe harbor for a policy of not voting on matters at companies that comprise a small percentage of a plan’s assets.

Another DOL rule proposed earlier in the year raises the bar for fiduciary action on any environmental or social issue. A separate rule recently adopted by the SEC will actually make it more expensive for fiduciaries to use professional proxy advisers, especially if the advisers recommend votes against management, while a second SEC rule will make it more difficult for shareholders to even introduce environmental and social proposals at shareholder meetings.

Together, these rules create significant obstacles to institutional investors and other shareholders seeking to limit harmful social and environmental impacts of the companies they own.  These rules represent a perverse form of anti-capitalist state corporatism: The federal government is preventing shareholders from managing their own capital in response to important social and environmental issues, at least where doing so might interfere with the wishes of corporate executives. In our comment, we explained why that  is bad for shareholders and bad for the economy.

The DOL’s Essential Error

All of these rules are based on an assumption that proxy voting and related governance engagement only affect the value of the company at which the votes and engagement take place. This leads the DOL to favor management recommendations (which are presumed likely to align with company interests) and to posit that the percentage of a portfolio represented by a company is positively correlated with the importance of its decisions on that portfolio.

This assumption and the resulting conclusions are just wrong: Decisions made at any portfolio company can and do affect the performance of the economy and thus the value of other companies. Accordingly, company action that harms other companies is likely to harm its own shareholders as well, because the vast majority of shareholders are broadly diversified and will own those other companies in their portfolios.

In light of this, shareholders are fully entitled to ensure that the companies they own act responsibly on environmental and social issues so that their own capital is not used against their interests – that is how markets are supposed to work. As Milton Friedman explained in a famous essay, the responsibility of corporate managers to shareholders is  “to conduct the business in accordance with their [shareholders’] desires.” (Friedman 1970.) The DOL’s interference with market forces will create inefficiency on a grand scale, as shareholders lose the ability to steward their own capital.

Portfolio Companies and Externalities

Sound investing practice mandates that fiduciaries adequately diversify their portfolios. This allows investors to reap the increased returns available from risky securities, while greatly reducing the risk from failure of individual companies; this is the insight that defines modern portfolio theory. This core principle is reflected in ERISA, which requires plan fiduciaries to act prudently “by diversifying the investments of the plan.”

Once a portfolio is diversified, the most important factor determining return will not be how the companies in that portfolio perform relative to other companies (“alpha”), but rather how the market performs as a whole (“beta”). Indeed, “[a]ccording to widely accepted research, alpha is about one-tenth as important as beta [and] drives some 91 percent of the average portfolio’s return.” (Davis, Lukomnik and Pitt-Watson.)   The importance of beta to “universal owners” – the long-term shareholders who are invested essentially in the entire market – has been described as follows:

[Universal owners’] portfolio performance depends on the economic growth and social value that their investments, and therefore society, create in aggregate.  Costs externalized by one set of investments onto society are likely to weigh down performance in other parts of the portfolio.  By extension, ‘universal owners’ will only benefit when investments have positive social value. (Wood.)

In its release proposing the Proxy Rule, the DOL cited “mixed evidence” of whether corporate environmental and social corporate responsibility leads to increased returns. But this interpretation of the evidence derives from the lacuna in its analysis: The DOL assumes that the only relevant data would involve an increase in the value of the company at which the voting took place:

As discussed above, one factor prompting the rise in shareholder activities by ERISA fiduciaries was the belief that participating in such activities was likely to enhance the value of a plan’s investment in a particular security. Since that time, however, research regarding whether proxy voting has reliable positive effects on shareholder value and a plan’s investment in the corporation has yielded mixed results. (Emphasis added.)

The DOL is asking the wrong question. Prudent trustees should challenge corporate behavior that harms a diversified portfolio by externalizing costs whenever that harm exceeds the benefit the trustee would receive as a shareholder of the company in question.  For example, if a company lobbies against emission regulations because its business model thrives on carbon-intensive practices, its shareholders may still insist that it refrain from such activity due to the overall burden of climate change on the economy and diversified portfolios.

Externalized costs include harmful emissions, resource depletion, and the instability and lost opportunities caused by inequality. The collective costs of such externalities are absorbed by diversified shareholders because they degrade and endanger the stable, healthy systems that corporate financial returns depend upon. Economists have long been aware that, while individual companies can “efficiently” externalize costs from their own narrow perspective (and the perspective of a shareholder of that single company), diversified shareholders pay these costs through a lowered return on their diversified portfolios. (Hansen and Lott). Legal scholars have more recently made the same observation in exploring the scope of duties of institutional investor trustees. (Coffee; Condon).

If a plan fiduciary focuses only on individual company performance, and not on the external environmental and social costs created by portfolio companies, the fiduciary may be sacrificing the 91 percent of potential return attributed to market return in order to optimize the 9 pecent that comes from alpha. Externalized social and environmental costs can play an outsized role in that 91 percent.

In support of this idea, our comment cites recent scholarship connecting climate change, inequality, and racial injustice to reduced GDP. It also cites evidence that more than half the profits of publicly listed companies around the globe are matched by costs that those same companies impose on the economy. The comment also discusses how PRI, an investor initiative whose members have $89 trillion in assets under management, issued a report detailing how the pursuit of profit by an individual company can reduce the return of diversified owners even if the company is included in their portfolio.

The DOL Misses the Point

Both the DOL and SEC entirely miss this point in their recent actions – indeed, the DOL’s most recent release expressly assumes that proxy voting on any matter broader than the economic value of the security being voted could not affect the value of the plan, positing a stark dichotomy between the two: “the type of proposal (e.g., those relating to social or public policy agendas versus those dealing with issues that have a direct economic impact on the investment).” But as the foregoing discussion illustrates, it would be imprudent for a trustee to ignore opportunities to increase beta through engagement with companies, whether or not related to social or public policy agendas.

Indeed, in the release describing the Proxy Rule, the DOL acknowledges that it is structured to encourage companies to create negative externalities, but fails to account for that cost anywhere in its rulemaking:

However, to the extent that there are any externalities, public goods, or other market failures, those might generate costs to society on an ongoing basis. For example, a fiduciary may vote for a proposal on a corporate merger or acquisition transaction to maximize shareholder value even though implementation of the proposal would bring about impacts in an affected geographic area that would be adverse for local businesses or residents.

Unsaid is the obvious truth that many of those externalities will harm other companies that make up the plan portfolio, as the PRI details in its work. The Proposed Rule and other agency actions by the DOL and SEC make it less likely that shareholders will be able to address these externalities, to the detriment of the very retirees and investors the DOL and SEC are supposed to protect.

REFERENCES

John C Coffee, Jr., The Future of Disclosure: ESG, Common Ownership, and Systematic Risk (2020)

Madison Condon, Externalities and the Common Owner, 95 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (2020)

Stephen Davis, Jon Lukomnik and David Pitt-Watson, What They Do with Your Money (2016).

Milton Friedman, Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, New York Times Magazine (1970).

Externalities and Corporate Objectives in a World with Diversified Shareholder/Consumers, Robert G. Hansen and John R. Lott, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis vol. 31, issue 1(1996).

Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (2015).

Schroders, Foresight (2020).

David Wood, What Do We Mean by the S in ESG?, in The Routledge Handbook of Responsible Investment, 553 (2016).

This post comes to us from Frederick Alexander, founding partner and chief executive officer of The Shareholder Commons.

Categories
Securities Regulation

How to Talk When a Machine is Listening: Corporate Disclosure in the Age of AI

The annual report, like other regulatory filings, is more than a legal requirement; it provides an opportunity for public companies to communicate their financial health, promote their culture and brand, and engage with a full spectrum of stakeholders.  How readers process all this information affects their perception of, and hence participation in, the business in significant ways.  More and more companies are realizing that the target audience for disclosures is no longer just human analysts and investors, but also robots and algorithms that recommend what shares to buy and sell after processing information with machine learning tools and natural language processing kits.

This development was probably inevitable, given technological progress and the sheer volume of disclosure materials.  In any event, companies that wish to communicate and engage with stakeholders need to adjust how they talk about their finances and brands and make forecasts in the age of AI.  That means heeding the logic and techniques underlying the language- and sentiment-analysis facilitated by large-scale machine-learning computation. An example of that sort of computation is a process that identifies positive, negative, and neutral opinions in, say, all disclosures by a company, a task that is beyond the processing ability of human brains. While the literature is catching up to and guiding investors’ use of machine learning and computational tools to extract qualitative information from disclosure and news, there has been no analysis of the feedback effect: how companies adjust the way they talk while knowing that machines are listening.  Our new paper fills this void.

We start with a diagnostic test that connects the expected extent of AI readership for a company’s SEC filings on EDGAR (measured by Machine Downloads) with how machine-friendly its disclosure is (measured by Machine Readability).  The first variable, Machine Downloads, is constructed with historical information by tracking IP addresses that conduct downloads in batches.  We deem Machine Downloads a proxy for AI readership, both because a  request by a machine request is a necessary condition for machine reading, and because the sheer volume of machine downloads makes it unlikely that human readers alone can process them. The second variable builds on the five elements identified by recent literature as affecting the ease with which a machine can parse, script, and synthesize.

We show that, in the cross-section of filings, a one standard deviation change in expected machine downloads is associated with 0.24 standard deviation increase in the Machine Readability of the filing. On the other hand, other (non-machine) downloads do not bear any meaningful correlation with machine readability, validating Machine Downloads as a proxy for machine readership. We further validate that Machine Downloads and Machine Readability are reasonable proxies (for the presence of machine readership and the ease for machines to process) by showing that trades in a company’s shares happen more quickly after a filing becomes public when Machine Downloads is higher, with even stronger interactive effect with Machine Readability. Such a result also demonstrates the real impact of machine-process on information dissemination.

After establishing a positive association between a high AI reader base and more machine-friendly disclosure documents, we further explore how firms manage “sentiment” and “tone” perceived by machines.  It is well-documented that corporate disclosures attempt to strike the right tone with (human) readers by conveying positive sentiments and favorable tones without being explicitly dishonest or noncompliant.  Hence, we expect a similar strategy tailored to machine readers.  While researchers and practitioners had long relied on the Harvard Psychosociological Dictionary to construct “sentiment” as perceived by (mostly human) readers by counting and contrasting “positive” and “negative” words, the publication of Loughran and McDonald in the Journal of Finance in 2011, (“LM” hereafter) presents an instrumental event to test our hypothesis pertaining to machine readers.  This is because not only Loughran and McDonald (2011) presented a new, specialized finance dictionary of positive/negative words and words that are informative about liability and uncertainty, but also the word lists that came with the paper has served as a leading lexicon for algorithms to sort out sentiments in both the industry and academia.

As a first step, we establish that firms which expect many machine downloads avoid LM-negative words but only after 2011 (the year of publication of the LM dictionary).  Such a structural change is absent with respect to words deemed negative by the Harvard Dictionary, which was known to human readers for many years. As a result, the difference, LM – Harvard Sentiment, follows the same path as the LM Sentiment, suggesting that the change in disclosure style is indeed driven by the publication of the LM dictionary.

Loughran and McDonald (2011) developed multiple additional dictionaries of “tone” words aiming at capturing a richer set of annotations of a financial document, including dictionaries of litigious, uncertain, weak modal, and strong modal words. The authors show that the prevalence of words in each category predicts firm outcomes such as legal liability and reaction from the capital markets. We find that firms with higher expected machine readership became more averse to words from these dictionaries following the Loughran and McDonald (2011) publication. The combined results suggest that managers revise their corporate disclosure in consideration of multi-dimensional effects of their words to the eyes of the machines.

While our analyses thus far focus on the textual information, the application of the underlying theme (i.e., “how to talk when a machine is listening”) to the speech setting serves as a test beyond the textual setting.  Earlier work found that managers’ vocal expressions can convey incremental information valuable to analysts covering the firm. Given that machine learning software makes vocal analytics more and more effective, managers should also recognize the possibility that their speech needs to impress machines as well as humans. Applying a popular pre-trained machine learning software to extract two emotional features well-established in the psychology literature, valence and arousal (corresponding to positivity and excitedness of voices) on managerial speech in conference calls, we find that managers of firms with higher expected machine readership speak in more positive and excited  tones, supporting the anecdotal evidence that managers increasingly seek professional voice coaches.

Our paper is the first to show how corporate disclosure in writing and orally has been reshaped by machine readership employed by algorithmic traders and quantitative analysts.  Our findings indicate that increasing AI readership motivates firms to prepare filings that are more friendly to machine parsing and processing, highlighting the growing roles of AI in the financial markets and their potential impact on corporate decisions.  Firms manage sentiment and tone perception that is tailored to AI readers by avoiding words that are perceived as negative by algorithms.  While the literature has shown how investors and researchers apply machine learning and computational tools to extract information from disclosure and news, our study is the first to identify and analyze the feedback effect, which can lead to not only better dissemination of information, but also unexpected outcomes, such as manipulation and collusion.

This post comes to us from Sean Cao at Georgia State University’s J. Mack Robinson College of Business, Wei Jiang at Columbia Business School, and Baozhong Yang and Alan L. Zhang at Georgia State University’s J. Mack Robinson College of Business. It is based on their recent paper, “How to Talk When a Machine is Listening: Corporate Disclosure in the Age of AI,” available here

Categories
Securities Regulation

Exchange-Traded Confusion: How Industry Practices Undermine Product Comparisons in Exchange Traded Funds

Despite their popularity[1] and growing importance in U.S. capital markets,[2] exchange traded funds (ETFs) are incredibly difficult (at times even impossible) to accurately compare side-by-side.  In a new article, I show how a variety of discretionary industry practices undermine simple “apples to apples” comparisons in ETFs. Comparative challenges are compounded by the limitations of disclosure and the ability of investors to understand the information disclosed.

For instance, there is significant diversity in the number of indices, and wide discretion in how an index is replicated. My article illustrates how similarly named ETFs often perform (and are constructed) very differently – complementing prior scholarship noting the proliferation of “custom” ETF indices and critiquing passive investing as “delegated management.”[3]

When an ETF deviates from the index it replicates it incurs a cost commonly known as “tracking error.”  Similarly named ETFs often exhibit very different tracking errors. Tracking errors are influenced by the way an index is replicated and adjusted, an ETF’s size, operational costs, how it is managed, arbitrage and settlement practices, and how its net asset value (NAV) is calculated.[4]

Tracking errors are an effective cost, which alongside other overlooked costs (like transacting in the secondary market at a price premium or discount to an ETF’s NAV) can materially erode investors’ expected returns.  These subtle, but often material, costs are difficult to assess when comparing ETFs side-by-side. Secondary market premiums and discounts largely emanate from instability in the ETF arbitrage mechanism.[5]  Yet ETFs tracking similar indices vary in their arbitrage robustness since stability of the arbitrage function is particular to a given fund.[6]  This can result in similar funds having different discounts or premiums at the same time.[7]

Such underappreciated costs are not the only factor obscuring ETF comparisons. Using numerous case studies, I show how discretionary ETF industry practices and factors make it exceptionally hard to accurately compare purportedly similar products. Those practices and factors include inconsistent NAV calculation methods; custom baskets in ETF arbitrage; product structural distinctions; variable trading expenses; marketing and fund naming practices; basket composition discretion in similarly named funds; hidden (like liquidity “rents”[8]) or contextual costs; and variation in securities lending, cash, and liquidity management practices.

The limitations of investors and disclosure also inhibit ETF comparisons.  My article surveys critiques of rational choice theory and applies numerous studies in judgment decision making (JDM) to the context of ETF investors making comparative product assessments.  Investors must navigate JDM challenges of an ever-expanding ETF product “paradox of choice”[9] and “information overload”[10] in the volume of accumulating disclosures.

JDM literature stresses that how information is presented is a critical factor in making rational choices.  To make informed decisions, disclosures must be effectively processed, and the use of reference points and anchors, relative assessments, comparative context, disclosure ordering, and attribute “evaluability”[11] can significantly improve judgments around indirect costs and otherwise difficult to understand fund characteristics.  My article shows how the current disclosure regime for ETFs falls short when viewed through the lens of JDM best-practices and may in fact be facilitating investor flows in favor of the largest incumbent ETF issuers.[12]

There is positive momentum around investor-focused reforms in ETFs.  Recent rule changes by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Rule 6c-11) help investors compare ETF product attributes and performance side-by-side.[13]  Yet Rule 6c-11 stops short of giving investors all the tools needed to accurately assess ETFs side-by-side.

Investor comparative assessments would be materially improved by standardizing the format and layout of ETF sponsor websites for information presentation; facilitating uniform calculation methodologies for key ETF variables (notably NAV); simplifying and providing greater comparative transparency around how indices are constructed and replicated; and creating an exchange traded product naming convention with standard terms for sustainable investing.

For maximum comparative impact, a systematized electronic reporting system, where ETF sponsors provide standardized data for key ETF variables to a freely accessible, centrally-controlled, public repository, should be considered – and my article shows how this idea is supported by numerous ETF industry stakeholders.[14]  Additional studies, aligned with JDM literature, are also worthwhile on how disclosures can be strategically ordered, digitally enhanced, and contextually supplemented (including visual displays) around ETF operational concepts like arbitrage instability and index composition methodology. Also, the emerging ETF “model portfolio” industry, and “cash-like” ETFs, should be assessed to reduce the opacity of information and make it easier for investors to compare them, and my article provides several suggestions to this end.

ETFs present a compelling case study to assess the effectiveness of a securities disclosure regime biased toward voluminous, text-heavy documents. Disclosure serves many worthy ends,[15] but when it comes to facilitating simple side-by-side comparatives for ETF investors, it falls short. While I don’t advocate uprooting traditional disclosure, a centrally-managed “aggregation” solution that facilitates easy product comparisons is warranted as a regulatory paradigm shift given the growing significance of the ETF market.[16] Such a mechanism was considered, but ultimately not required, in creating Rule 6c-11.[17]

ENDNOTES

[1] Recent estimates suggest that from 2008 to 2019 the number of ETFs globally increased from 1617 to 6940, while the ETF market grew from $716 billion to over $6 trillion.  See ETGFI, ETFGI report assets in the global ETFs and ETPs industry which will turn 30 years old in March started the new decade with a record 6.35 trillion US dollars (January 16, 2020), https://etfgi.com/news/press-releases/2020/01/etfgi-reports-assets-global-etfs-and-etps-industry-which-will-turn-30.

[2] Bloomberg reports that 70 percent of the exchange traded product market (the vast majority of which are ETFs) are U.S. products.  See Rachel Evans & Carolina Wilson, How ETFs Became The Market, Bloomberg (September 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-growing-etf-market/. The importance to U.S. capital markets of ETFs (particularly credit variety) was prominently illustrated in the unprecedented recent purchasing of ETFs by the Federal Reserve in response to the coronavirus pandemic.  See Katherine Greifeld & Luke Kawa, Fed’s Historic Step Into Credit Markets May Cure ETF Dislocations, Bloomberg (March 23, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-23/fed-credit-backstop-fuels-surge-in-investment-grade-bond-etfs.

[3] Adriana Z. Robertson, Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing, 36 Yale J. on Reg. 795, 796-798 (2019).

[4] See Steve Johnson, Why ‘tracking difference’ is a vital metric for passive ETFs, Financial Times (July 27, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/80917014-0d39-438c-b3b8-cb645d3c2a43; Edwin J. Elton, Martin J. Gruber & Andre de Souza, Passive Mutual Funds and ETFs: Performance and Comparison, NYU Stern School of Business Working Paper (April 29, 2019), at 3-6, available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/eelton/working_papers/Passive_Mutual_Funds.pdf.

[5] See Ryan Clements, New Funds, Familiar Fears: Do Exchange Traded Funds Make Markets Less Stable? Part I, Liquidity Illusions, 20 Hou. Bus. & Tax L. J. 14, 25-26, 30-32 (2020).

[6] See Ben Johnson. Navigating ETF Discounts and Premiums During Turbulent Times, Morningstar (March 20, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/973313/navigating-etf-discounts-and-premiums-during-turbulent-times.

[7] Id.; see Henry T.C. Hu & John Morley, A Regulatory Framework For Exchange Traded Funds, 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 839, 846 (2018).

[8] See Marta Khomyn, Talis J. Putnins & Marius Zoican, The Value of ETF Liquidity, European Finance Association 2020 Helsinki (March 26, 2020), available http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561531.

[9] See Barry Schwartz, The Paradox of Choice, Why More is Less (2005); the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) has called the product selection in ETFs “the Baskin Robbins of choices,” see Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, SIFMA Insights: US ETF Market Structure Primer, 5 (September 2018), available at https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SIFMA-Insights-US-ETF-Primer.pdf.

[10] See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 417, 421 (2003).

[11]  See Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67(3) Organizational Behav. & Hum. Decision Processes, 247-257, 250 (1996).

[12] A host of concerns associated with the growth of the “giant three” ETF issuers (BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street) have been noted recently in the scholarly literature, particularly economies of scale. See Lucian Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 721 (2019).

[13] U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Exchange Traded Funds, Investment Company Act Release No. 33,646 (September 25, 2019), 84 Fed. Reg. 57,162, 57,166 (Oct. 24, 2019) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 232, 239, 270, 274), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2019/33-10695.pdf (hereinafter “Rule 6c-11”). Rule 6c-11 mandates a variety of standardized disclosures, including daily ETF portfolio holdings, but allows discretion in how ETF firms present the information on their websites.  See Rule 6c-11 at 187, 205.

[14] See Ryan Clements, Exchange Traded Confusion: How Industry Practices Undermine Product Comparisons in Exchange Traded Funds, Virginia L. & Bus. Rev (forthcoming, 2020) at pg. 54-56, 60-61 available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3680219.

[15] Disclosure serves many desired policy goals and is an alternative to ex ante merit review of investment products. Such goals include investor protection, efficient decision-making, capital formation, price discovery, the efficient distribution of risk, remedying informational asymmetries, directing incentives, correcting agency problems, ensuring fair dealing, and deterring fraud. See Michael D. Guttentag, Evolutionary Analysis in Law: On Disclosure Regulation, 48 Ariz. St. L.J. 963, 974 (2016); Michael D. Guttentag, An Argument for Imposing Disclosure Requirements on Public Companies, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 123 (2004).

[16] See Ryan Clements, Are ETFs Making Some Asset Managers Too Interconnected To Fail? 22(4) U. Pa. J. of Bus. L. 772 (2020).

[17] See Rule 6c-11, supra note 13 at 78.

This post comes to us from Professor Ryan Clements at the University of Calgary Faculty of Law. It is based on his recent article, “Exchange Traded Confusion: How Industry Practices Undermine Product Comparisons in Exchange Traded Funds,” forthcoming in Volume 15 of the Virginia Law & Business Review and available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

SEC Chair Clayton Discusses Modernizing Framework for Disclosures

Good morning. This is an open meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, under the Government in the Sunshine Act. I would like start today’s meeting by welcoming Commissioner Crenshaw to her first open meeting.

Today [August 26], we are considering amendments to modernize the description of business, legal proceedings, and risk factor disclosures that companies are required to make under Regulation S-K.  These amendments are part of the Commission’s broader efforts to retroactively review and improve our public company disclosure framework and related requirements.

First, I want to put this work in context.  The rules we adopt today update various Regulation S-K items that essentially have not changed in over 30 years.  Our economy, and the world economy, have changed markedly in that time, and many of our rules, which were well rooted in the characteristics of the economy of the 1970s and 1980s, simply have not kept up.  Here, I note that in general, the longer you wait to update these regulations, particularly prescriptive regulations — I think of it like years of deferred maintenance in a home — the harder it can be to do.  I applaud the staff for their years-long efforts and thoughtful approach to modernize these and other disclosure requirements as well as similar efforts they have undertaken with respect to many of our other rules.

These efforts began well before my arrival at the Commission and have included, for example, the accredited investor definition, which we comprehensively amended this morning for the first time in over 35 years.  The SEC staff’s active review of the definition included a proposal in 2007 and staff report issued in 2015.  I thank our various predecessors for commencing and pursuing this work.

Congress also deserves thanks, as a number of updates to our public company disclosure rules, including today’s amendments, stemmed from the Commission’s Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative launched in response to the evaluation of disclosure requirements mandated by Section 108 of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act and later directives in the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) Act.  Under this initiative, the Commission has been comprehensively reviewing the disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X and updating them to facilitate timely disclosure of material information to investors.  In 2016, the Commission issued a concept release providing a broad overview of, and requesting comment on, business and financial disclosure requirements under Regulation S-K.[1]

Subsequently, the 2018 disclosure update and simplification amendments sought to eliminate requirements that were duplicative of, or overlapped with, other disclosure requirements, U.S. GAAP or other developments.[2]  More recently, the Commission also updated the required financial disclosures about guarantors and guaranteed securities,[3] as well as financial disclosures about acquired and disposed businesses.[4]  As I said, these modernization efforts have spanned years, involved several iterations of the Commission, and reflect the hard work and deep expertise of the SEC’s dedicated, mission-oriented staff.

The rules we adopt today build on our materiality-based disclosure framework.  The effectiveness of this framework in providing the public with the information necessary to make informed investment decisions has proven its merit time and again as markets have evolved when we have faced unanticipated events.[5]  This has been widely demonstrated in registrant disclosures regarding the effects of COVID-19.  We have seen disclosures shift to emphasize matters such as liquidity, cash needs, supply chain risks, and the health and safety of employees and customers.  This has served as a reminder that our rigorous, principles-based, flexible disclosure system, where companies are required to communicate regularly and consistently with market participants, provides countless benefits to our markets, our investors and our economy more generally.

One improvement in today’s rules I want to highlight is the topic of human capital.  I fully support the requirement in today’s rules that companies must describe their human capital resources, including any human capital measures or objectives they focus on in managing the business, to the extent material to an understanding of the company’s business as a whole.  From a modernization standpoint, today, human capital accounts for and drives long-term business value in many companies much more so than it did 30 years ago.[6]  Today’s rules reflect that important and multifaceted shift in our domestic and global economy.

Our rules also are designed to elicit disclosure tailored to each company’s particular industry and business model, while being flexible enough to continue to allow for fulsome disclosure as businesses evolve in the future.  For example, take the final rule’s approach to the use of metrics in the area of human capital.  As I noted, today’s rules require that, in crafting their human capital disclosure, companies must incorporate the key human capital metrics, if any, that they focus on in managing the business, again to the extent material to an understanding of the company’s business as a whole.  Experience demonstrates that these metrics, including their construction and their use, widely from industry to industry and issuer to issuer, depending of a wide array of company-specific factors and strategic judgments.  As I have said previously, I would expect that the material human capital information for a manufacturing company will be vastly different from that of a biotech startup, and again vastly different from that of a large healthcare provider.  And the human capital considerations for a multi-national car manufacturer will be different from that of a regional home manufacturer.[7]  It would run counter to our proven disclosure system, particularly as we first increase regulatory emphasis in an area of such wide variance, for us to attempt to prescribe specific, rigid metrics that would not capture or effectively communicate these substantial differences.  That said, under the principles-based approach, I do expect to see meaningful qualitative and quantitative disclosure, including, as appropriate, disclosure of metrics that companies actually use in managing their affairs.[8]

I also want to note that, on a personal level, I continue to believe that many high quality companies tend to invest in and actively manage the development of human capital.  I cannot remember engaging with a high quality, lasting company that did not focus on attracting, developing and enhancing its people.  To the extent those efforts have a material impact on their performance, I believe investors benefit from understanding the drivers of that performance.

As I described, the rules we’re considering today reflect a concerted effort by Commission staff, and I thank them for their dedication to modernizing our rules.  I have focused in these remarks on human capital but want to be clear that all of today’s updates – the description of business, risk factors and legal proceedings – benefit from the same rigor, experience and expertise of the staff.

In particular, I would like to acknowledge the following staff members for their contribution to this effort:

From the Division of Corporation Finance:  Bill Hinman, Lisa Kohl, Johnny Gharib, Betsy Murphy, Felicia Kung, Sean Harrison, Sandra Hunter Berkheimer, and John Diamandis.

From the Division of Economic and Risk Analysis:  S.P. Kothari, Hari Phatak, Vlad Ivanov, and Kelvin Liu.

From the Office of the General Counsel:  Bob Stebbins, Bryant Morris, and Shaz Niazi.

I will now turn it over to Bill Hinman, Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, for the staff’s presentation of their recommendation.  S.P. Kothari, our Chief Economist and DERA Director, will then summarize his views on the potential economic effects of the final rules.

ENDNOTES

[1] Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Release No. 33-10064 (Apr. 13, 2016) [81 FR 23915].

[2] Disclosure Update and Simplification, Release No. 33-10532 (Aug. 17, 2018) [83 FR 38768].

[3] Financial Disclosures About Guarantors and Issuers of Guaranteed Securities and Affiliates Whose Securities Collateralize a Registrant’s Securities, Release No. 33-10762 (Mar. 2, 2020) [85 FR 21940].

[4] Amendments to Financial Disclosures about Acquired and Disposed Businesses, Release No. 33-10786 (May 20, 2020).

[5] The Importance of Disclosure – For Investors, Markets and Our Fight Against COVID-19, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-hinman

[6] For example, the release notes that in 1988, the largest 500 U.S. companies in Standard & Poor’s Compustat Daily Updates database had an average market capitalization of $2.42 billion and a ratio of intangible assets to market capitalization of 7.26%.  In 2019, the largest 500 companies had an average market capitalization of $54.98 billion and a ratio of intangible assets to market capitalization of 22.71%.  Modernization of Regulation S-K Items 101, 103, and 105, Release No. 33-10825 (Aug. 26, 2020), at note 266.

[7] Remarks on Telephone Call with Investor Advisory Committee Members (Feb. 6, 2019), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/clayton-remarks-investor-advisory-committee-call-020619.

[8] As is the case with non-GAAP financial measures, I would also expect companies to maintain metric definitions constant from period to period or to disclose prominently any changes to the metrics used or the definitions of those metrics.

This statement was made on August 26, 2020, by Jay Clayton, chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, at an open meeting of the SEC.