Our examination of the votes cast by 155 mutual funds on over 6 million corporate election items during 2004-2017 led us to a surprising conclusion: We found that Institutional Shareholder Services’ (ISS) proxy advice did not lead funds to vote as if they were informed – more often than not it pushed them in the opposite direction.
The purpose of proxy advice is to allow funds to cast their votes as if they were informed, without having to actually become informed. Given the centrality of proxy advice in today’s corporate elections, the viability of shareholder democracy hinges on the advice’s … Read more
In the last two decades, the proxy advice market has consolidated into two companies that some believe control as much as 97 percent of that market, leaving little diversity in available advice. The companies, ISS and Glass Lewis, are opaque about the bases for their recommendations, and critics accuse them of offering simplistic one-size-fits-all solutions that do not increase shareholder value.  Complicating matters, investors don’t always agree on what sort of advice they want, especially when it comes to social issues: Traditional funds and socially responsible investors (SRI) disagree about whether firms should sacrifice profit for social goals. … Read more
Invigorating the shareholder proposal process is a top priority for corporate governance reformers. But the possibility that self-interested shareholders could use proposals to harass or pressure managers to accommodate their interests is a cause for concern. Union shareholders attract more critical comments than any other group: as pension fund managers they have an incentive to press for higher investment returns, but as worker representatives they also want wage and compensation policies that benefit current members. While some observers have argued that – for statutory and strategic reasons – unions will not use the proposal process for private purposes, there is … Read more