Categories
Corporate Governance

Davis Polk Discusses SEC Chair’s Bid to Reframe Shareholder Proposals

SEC Chairman Paul Atkins’ speech last week in Delaware sounded to many like a death knell for shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8. In fact, it was far more strategic: the opening move to test whether Delaware corporate law even permits non-binding, or precatory, environmental and social proposals that have proliferated in recent proxy seasons.

A new legal theory, and a Delaware gambit

Chairman Atkins urged Delaware corporations to consider challenging E&S proposals on the ground that Delaware law does not permit shareholders to submit non-binding resolutions for a vote. The argument, originally advanced by a Delaware practitioner, posits that Delaware law recognizes only binding shareholder actions, and precatory proposals are ultra vires and therefore improper, violating Rule 14a-8(i)(1).

The Chairman suggested that companies could exclude these proposals by submitting no-action letters supported by a legal opinion from Delaware counsel. If the proponent were to submit a contrary opinion, the resulting conflict would create a case or controversy that the SEC could certify to the Delaware Supreme Court for resolution.

This is a novel and uncertain path. The Delaware Supreme Court is not obligated to take a certified question from the SEC, and it has never been asked to opine on whether Rule 14a-8 proposals are compatible with Delaware corporate law. But a well-framed test case could open the door to state law limits on a federal disclosure mechanism— a significant recalibration of the balance between the SEC and Delaware in corporate governance

The broader context: Corporate proxy statements as political battleground

To understand why this approach resonates is to recognize how Rule 14a-8 has evolved. Originally intended to facilitate limited shareholder communications through proxy statements, E&S proposals today, representing all sides of the political spectrum, often ask companies to adopt or abandon specific and fundamental business practices, disclose detailed metrics, or commit to policies far beyond the concerns of most shareholders. To many companies and their boards, it appears there are few issues that are too minor and requests too prescriptive that would be prohibited by the rules, and with little regard to the costs of implementation.

Many of these proposals are advanced by professional advocates who represent beneficial owners the company never meets, empowering a growing cottage industry that thrives on the access to corporate proxy statements that Rule 14a-8 provides as leverage to effectuate their agenda.

Even as support for such proposals as evidenced by shareholder votes has declined in recent years, companies still expend substantial time and resources addressing them. Some institutional investors continue to expect engagement with every proponent, no matter how tenuous the proposal’s connection to shareholder value or the futility of the conversation.

The SEC’s staff’s dilemma in determining no-action requests

The SEC staff remains the gatekeeper for excluding proposals that fail Rule 14a-8’s procedural or substantive requirements, committing significant resources every season to reviewing the no-action requests. But decades of evolving precedent, including decisions made by the last SEC administration that included the continued expansion of social policy exceptions to the ordinary business argument, have made application difficult. Chairman Atkins’ roadmap to involve Delaware attempts to shift interpretive authority away from the SEC.

Open questions and implications

The outcome of the question before the Delaware Supreme Court, assuming the court would even entertain the case, remains to be seen. If there are no competing legal opinions, the SEC staff would need to evaluate the merits of the company’s legal opinion and make a decision on that basis. Similar challenges could arise from corporations not incorporated in Delaware, in states that do not provide the right to certify the case to the courts.

The bottom line

Chairman Atkins’ remarks outline a potential realignment of authority over shareholder access to proxy statements as a forum to debate E&S issues – from the SEC’s interpretive discretion to the Delaware courts’ corporate law jurisdiction. For companies and their boards, the possibility of any change that would stem the annual wave of E&S proposals is appealing.

Beyond the state law scheme, the Chairman also made clear that the SEC is reevaluating Rule 14a-8 for potentially significant reform, rather than the piecemeal efforts that have taken place in past administrations that have both failed to meaningfully change the system and been subject to pendulum swings.

This post comes to us from Davis, Polk & Wardwell LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “Chairman Atkins’ Bid to Reframe Shareholder Proposals Puts Delaware in the Crosshairs,” dated October 20, 2025, and available here. 

Categories
Securities Regulation

Schulte Roth Discusses SEC Guidance That Meme Coins Are Not Securities

On Feb. 27, 2025, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance (“Division”) issued guidance that meme coins — defined as speculative crypto assets inspired by internet memes, cultural trends, or social media phenomena — do not constitute securities under federal securities laws. However, the Division’s guidance, which does not bind the Commission, was met with swift opposition from Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, who criticized the guidance as “an incomplete, unsupported view of the law” and warned that it suggests, without sufficient legal basis, that an entire category of assets falls outside the SEC’s jurisdiction.

Although it does not have the force of law (e.g., it is not an act of Congress or the result of a judicial decision), the Division’s guidance is encouraging to many. The statement does not resolve the regulatory uncertainty regarding crypto assets (including meme coins), but we expect formal Commission guidance on that topic in the near future.

The Division’s Meme Coin Guidance

The Division defined meme coins as those that “do not generate a yield or convey rights to future income, profits, or business assets.” Meme coins, according to the Division, are “typically purchased for entertainment, social interaction, and cultural purposes,” and are akin to collectibles. Their value, the Division argues, is primarily driven by speculative trading and market sentiment rather than any expectation of profits derived from a common enterprise or the efforts of others — factors central to the Howey test for determining whether an asset is a security. The Division opined that these meme coins do not qualify as “securities” under any definition in the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Because they are not “securities,” the Division reasoned that participants in the offer or sale of meme coins are not required to register their transactions with the SEC under the Securities Act or seek an exemption from registration. While this determination is not binding on the Commission, it will make it more difficult for another government agency to classify meme coins as securities. It also does not shield fraudulent or other unlawful activity involving meme coins from enforcement actions, including by the DOJ, CFTC, FinCEN, and state and foreign regulators, and it does not prevent a court from determining that meme coins are securities.

The Division’s stance comes with an important caveat: tokens that do not demonstrate the characteristics of meme coins and those that are marketed as “meme coins” to sidestep securities laws — but that functionally resemble securities — will still be evaluated based on their economic realities, not their labels. Participants should continue to exercise caution in evaluating whether a particular coin qualifies as a meme coin under the guidance.

Commissioner Crenshaw’s Criticism

Commissioner Crenshaw — the only Democrat on the SEC’s current three-person Commission — strongly opposed the Division’s guidance, arguing that it raises “more questions than it answers” about what qualifies as a meme coin and whether such a category has any meaningful legal distinction.

She criticized the guidance as a potential loophole for promoters seeking to circumvent the Howey test, arguing that, in reality, “meme coins, like any financial product, are issued to make money.” Crenshaw emphasized that the market exists on a continuum, with some meme coins being tied to fraudulent schemes and some functioning similarly to traditional securities. She concluded that Howey’s individualized inquiry “cannot be reconciled” with the Division’s broad determination that meme coins are “generally not securities.”

Takeaways

We expect continued formal and informal guidance from the SEC on meme coins and crypto more broadly. While the Division’s guidance should create new opportunities to offer, trade and list meme coins (on exchanges or other platforms), Commissioner Crenshaw’s sharp criticism of the Division’s guidance highlights that the SEC’s overall position on crypto remains unsettled. In addition, while the guidance does indicate that the SEC will not be particularly focused on meme coins, at the same time it may also bolster the CFTC’s nexus; if not a security, meme coins may be classified as commodities. While the CFTC’s direct jurisdiction would then only cover meme coin derivatives, it could also utilize its general anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority over spot commodities for the meme coins themselves.

To mitigate risks and ensure regulatory compliance, firms should:

• Stay ahead of evolving regulations by maintaining rigorous compliance protocols.
• Evaluate whether investing in speculative assets, like meme coins, is consistent with the firm’s investment strategy and disclosures.
• Conduct legal assessments of tokens to determine potential classification as securities.
• Maintain thorough records of crypto transactions.
• Vet counterparties, platforms, and custodians rigorously to minimize exposure to regulatory scrutiny.

This post comes to us from Schulte Roth & Zabel. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance Says Meme Coins Are Not Securities,” dated March 3, 2025, and available here. 

Categories
Corporate Governance Finance & Economics Securities Regulation

Ropes & Gray Discusses Third Circuit Coinbase Decision Pressuring SEC on Crypto Rulemaking

On January 13, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued an opinion requiring the SEC to provide a more complete explanation for its refusal to engage in formal notice-and-comment rulemaking regarding the application of securities laws to digital assets, finding that the agency’s one-paragraph denial of Coinbase’s request for such rulemaking was insufficiently reasoned, and thus arbitrary and capricious, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The decision was at least a partial win for Coinbase, which had requested that the Third Circuit require the SEC to engage in such rulemaking, and highlights the most recent example of judicial pressure on the agency to move away from what many have called the “regulation-by-enforcement” approach to crypto that defined Chair Gensler’s tenure atop the SEC.

Background

Coinbase initiated this action in July 2022 – almost a year before the SEC publicly filed an enforcement case against Coinbase in federal court in the Southern District of New York for allegedly operating as an unregistered broker, exchange, and clearing agency – by petitioning the SEC to create clear rules on how federal securities laws apply to digital assets. Coinbase argued that the SEC had not provided a consistent position while still pursuing enforcement actions. The SEC denied this request, citing other higher-priority agenda items and a preference for gathering more information through incremental (enforcement) actions. Coinbase asked the Third Circuit to review that denial under the APA, claiming that the denial was insufficiently reasoned and asking the Court to order the SEC to engage in its requested rulemaking.

Court’s Findings

The Court agreed with Coinbase that the SEC’s explanation was insufficient and remanded the issue back to the SEC for a more comprehensive explanation. Specifically, the Court found that:

  1. The SEC’s disagreement with Coinbase on the application of existing securities laws to digital assets was not well-reasoned.
  2. The SEC needed to explain which other regulatory efforts were more pressing and why digital asset rulemaking was not a priority despite the uptick in enforcement actions.
  3. The SEC needed to clarify why it preferred incremental enforcement actions over formal rulemaking.

While the Court’s decision was a step forward for Coinbase, it was not a complete victory. The Court denied Coinbase’s request to compel the SEC to engage in formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, and found that:

  1. There was no presumption in favor of rulemaking and that the SEC can continue to clarify its stance through enforcement actions.
  2. The SEC is entitled to significant deference in its decision-making process (and particularly where it decides not to make a decision by engaging in rulemaking).
  3. Although the SEC’s application of the Howey test to a particular digital asset may raise fair notice concerns in the context of an enforcement proceeding relating to that asset, the agency’s general position that digital assets may qualify as securities does not raise fair notice concerns in the context of a petition for broad and open-ended rulemaking.

Judge Bibas wrote a concurring opinion that provides further color on potential fair notice considerations. He questioned whether the SEC’s practice of enforcing rules without clear, pre-announced guidelines violates the U.S. Constitution. In his words, “[t]he SEC repeatedly sues crypto companies for not complying with the law, yet it will not tell them how to comply. That caginess creates a serious constitutional problem; due process guarantees fair notice.” Judge Bibas suggested that the SEC’s current approach leaves parties uncertain about compliance because they do not know how the “SEC applies the ill-fitting Howey test” in different circumstances and could compel a federal court in future cases to bar “enforcement-by-surprise” in order to ensure that the “SEC may not play gotcha” with the industry.

Next Steps

With the remand to the SEC now guaranteed to spill over into the Trump administration, much remains to be seen about how the agency will explain its denial of Coinbase’s petition for rulemaking in response to the Third Circuit’s directive. It is possible that the agency will provide a more fulsome explanation about its rationale that would be sufficient to comply with the Court’s ruling but still leave key questions unanswered – for example, in the oral argument before the Third Circuit, the SEC refused to confirm whether or not it views bitcoin and ether as securities, so the bar for giving additional information regarding the SEC’s approach is arguably low. That said, it is possible that the agency will reverse course in favor of rulemaking under the new administration, which is expected to be much friendlier to the industry as a whole.

This post comes to us from Ropes & Gray LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “Third Circuit Coinbase Decision Pressures SEC on Crypto Rulemaking,” dated January 16, 2025, and available here.

Categories
Litigation Securities Regulation

Cleary Discusses Second Circuit Decision That Syndicated Loans Are Not Securities

On August 24, 2023, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of state-law securities claims in Kirschner v. JP Morgan Chase,[1] concluding that the plaintiff failed to adequately plead that the syndicated term loans at issue were securities. This decision avoids large-scale disruption across a number of aspects of the $2.5 trillion syndicated loan market[2], including the daily functioning of bank lenders, the secondary loan trading market, the creation of loan participations and the markets for related investments such as loan funds and collateralized loan obligations.

Prior to this ruling, the Second Circuit had sought guidance from the SEC on the issue, but the SEC declined to provide an opinion on the matter.[3]

The case has been closely watched because a pronouncement by the SEC that syndicated loans were securities or a decision to that effect by the Court could have led to significant uncertainty and market disruption in the syndicated loan market, and could have encouraged similar suits against other arrangers. While the Court’s decision avoids these negative outcomes, it will likely cause arrangers of leveraged loans and perhaps borrowers to pay additional attention to the syndication process and the disclosures provided to potential assignees of leveraged loans. It remains to be seen whether the decision will have any effect on the overall convergence of terms between high yield bonds and widely syndicated leveraged loans that has been in process for more than a decade, or if there will be any effect on loans to investment grade borrowers.

Background

The dispute in Kirschner arose out of a $1.775 billion syndicated loan transaction that closed on April 16, 2014.[4] The loan at issue in this matter is generally referred to as “Term Loan B”—a relatively widely syndicated term loan with terms similar to those of high yield bonds. Several banks assigned portions of the term loan made to Millennium Laboratories LLC (“Millennium”) to institutional investor groups, including mutual funds, hedge funds and other institutions. The loans were evidenced by notes (the “Notes”).[5] After Millennium filed for bankruptcy in November 2015, the Millennium Lender Claim Trust (“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint in August 2017 on behalf of the Note investors against the arranging banks asserting claims under several state securities laws and the common law.[6]

After the completion of the April 2014 syndication, Millennium finalized a $256 million global settlement regarding various allegations of federal healthcare and anti-kickback violations with the Department of Justice on October 16, 2015, which led to its filing for bankruptcy protection.[7] On this basis, the complaint alleged that the defendant arranging banks (“Defendants”) made misstatements and omissions actionable under state securities laws because the offering materials failed to disclose Millennium’s underlying wrongdoing.[8]

On June 28, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, contending in part that the syndicated loan was not a security subject to state securities laws. Plaintiff opposed that motion, arguing that the loan was a security or that the determination of whether it was “is a fact intensive question and generally not appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss.”[9]

The District Court’s Decision

On May 22, 2020, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety, including holding that Plaintiff had failed to adequately allege that the syndicated loan was a security.[10]

In determining that the syndicated loan at issue was not a security, the district court applied the “family resemblance” test of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990).[11] In Reves, the Supreme Court held that “because the Securities Acts define ‘security’ to include ‘any note,’” courts “begin with a presumption that every note is a security.”[12] However, Revesrecognized that many specifically identified “instruments commonly denominated ‘notes’ . . . nonetheless fall without the ‘security’ category,” including “notes evidencing loans by commercial banks for current operations,” among others.[13] Revestherefore held that the presumption that a note is a security “may be rebutted . . . by a showing that the note bears a strong [family] resemblance . . . to one of the” categories of excluded instruments.[14]

The four considerations to be addressed when comparing an instrument to other excluded instruments under the “family resemblance” test are:

  1. the motivations that would prompt a reasonable seller and buyer to enter into the transaction;
  2. the plan of distribution of the instrument;
  3. the reasonable expectations of the investing public; and
  4. other risk-reducing factors, including the existence of another regulatory scheme, to render the application of the Securities Acts unnecessary.[15]

Two years after Reves was decided, the Second Circuit applied the family resemblance test to loan participations in Banco Español de Crédito v. Security Pacific National Bank, 973 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1992), and found they were not securities.[16]

Almost thirty years later, the district court in Kirschner, relying on Banco Español, applied the Reves factors, concluding that the second, third, and fourth factors weighed strongly in favor of the syndicated loans at issue not qualifying as securities, and that the first factor did not weigh determinatively in either direction.[17] Accordingly, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss the state securities law claims. Plaintiff appealed.

The Second Circuit’s Affirmance

On August 24, 2023, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding:  Millennium’s syndicated loan was not a security,[18] thereby maintaining long-held market expectations that syndicated loans are loans and not securities. In its opinion, the Second Circuit refers to the syndicated loans as “Notes” although it bears noting that in most Term Loan B syndications promissory notes are only provided at the option of the lender and therefore lenders do not receive a promissory note to evidence their loan.

Considering whether the district court properly dismissed the state-law securities claims on the basis that the syndicated loan Notes were not securities, the Court first rejected Plaintiff’s argument that because “determining whether a note is a ‘security’ is ‘fact-intensive,’ it is ‘not appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss.’”[19] The Court held “[t]hat a claim is fact-intensive does not preclude dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff fails to allege facts plausibly supporting a claim upon which relief can be granted.”[20] Thus, like the district court, on de novo review the Second Circuit applied the Reves factors:

Motivations of the Parties.  Examining the complaint, the Court found that the “lenders’ motivation was investment because the lenders expected to profit from their purchase of the Notes.”[21] But, the Court held, Millennium’s motivation was commercial in nature because the loan from which the Notes were syndicated was not meant to raise funds for its  business or to finance its investments, but rather to pay back outstanding debt, to make a shareholder distribution, and to pay back fees and expenses related to the loan transaction itself.[22] Accordingly, the Court concluded that “the parties’ motivations were mixed” such that on a motion to dismiss, the first Reves factor “tilts in favor” of Plaintiff.[23]

The Plan of Distribution.  Because the defendant banks had offered the Notes “only to sophisticated institutional entities” and proceeded to allocate the Notes to sophisticated institutional entities exclusively, the Court held that “the pleaded facts do not plausibly suggest the Notes were ‘offered and sold to a broad segment of the public.’”[24]

The Court rejected Plaintiff’s argument that the presence of a secondary market meant that the Notes were offered and sold to a broad segment of the public. The Court pointed to several restrictions on the assignment of the Notes that “rendered them unavailable to the general public,” including that the Notes could not be assigned to a “natural person,” that they could not be assigned without prior written consent from both Millennium and JP Morgan Chase (with some limited exceptions), nor could an assignment be for more than $1 million unless it was to a lender, a lender’s affiliate, or an approved fund.[25]

The Court further rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that Millennium’s loan restrictions were distinguishable from the loan in Banco Español, which had only 11 investors rather than the 400 institutional investment entities that participated in the syndication of Millennium’s loan, concluding that the loan here similarly restricted the general public from participating as in Banco Español.[26] Thus, the Court concluded that the second Reves factor weighed against concluding that the Notes are securities.

The Public’s Reasonable Perceptions.  Evaluating whether the lenders or purchasers would have reasonably perceived the Notes as securities, the Court held that the “sophisticated” purchasers were provided “ample notice” that the Notes were investments in a business enterprise rather than securities.[27] In particular, the Court looked to certifications by the loan participants that they independently “made their own appraisal of an investigation into the business, operations, property, financial, and other condition and creditworthiness of Millennium and made their own decision” to lend.[28] Again, the Court relied on Banco Español noting that “[t]his certification is substantively identical” to the certification made by purchasers in that case, “which was central to our determination that the buyers there could not have reasonably perceived the loan participations as securities.”[29] Moreover, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s assertion that the occasional reference in the loan documents to the buyers as “investors” was indicative that the buyers expected that the Notes were securities.[30] The Court noted that the loan documents “more consistently refer to the buyers as ‘lenders’”—aligning more with the understanding that the Notes were not securities.[31] Thus, the Court held that the third Reves factor weighed against the conclusion that the Notes are securities.[32]

Other Risk-Reducing Factors.  The final Reves factor considers whether there are other risk-reducing considerations such that imposing the regime of the Securities Acts becomes unnecessary. In particular, this factor looks to whether another regulatory scheme applies and whether the instrument is secured by collateral or is insured.[33]

The Court noted that here the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve and the FDIC had specific policy guidelines addressing syndicated loan terms.[34] In addition, the Notes were secured by a perfected first-priority security interest in tangible and intangible assets of Millennium.[35]

On this basis, the Court rejected Plaintiff’s arguments that those factors may have minimized risks to the defendant banks but not the risks to non-bank lenders (who were not directly regulated under such a banking regulatory scheme).[36] The Court explained that it had previously been unpersuaded by that same argument in Banco Español, citing to policy statements by bank regulators indicating that the purpose of their guidelines is to protect consumers.[37] The Court further explained that the SEC had submitted an amicus brief in Banco Español that argued for the application of the Securities Act to loan participations because, in its view at the time, the guidelines issued by the Comptroller of the Currency were insufficient to render the Securities Act unnecessary—a position that Court found unpersuasive in that case.[38] Here, the Court noted that it had solicited views on whether the Notes were securities in this case from the SEC, but after granting several extensions of time for the SEC to respond with its views, the SEC notified the Court that it was “not in a position to file a brief.”[39] As such, neither Plaintiff nor the SEC offered a compelling reason to revisit its ruling on this point from Banco Español. The fourth Reves factor therefore weighed against concluding that the Notes are securities.

With three of the four factors weighing clearly against concluding that the complaint plausibly pleads the Notes are securities under Reves’ “family resemblance” test, the Court held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s state-law securities claims, such that the case would not proceed to discovery.[40]

Key Takeaways

In affirming the district court’s ruling, the Second Circuit maintained the present regulatory framework under which syndicated term loans do not constitute securities. A different ruling could have caused significant disruption to the syndicated term loan market, based on a number of factors including securities registration and disclosure requirements; requirements for broker-dealer (rather than bank) involvement in syndicating, distributing and transferring loans; and application of a broad securities law framework not amenable to loan transactions. Effects could have included limiting financing opportunities for smaller or privately held companies that are not in a position to access the capital markets for debt.

Nevertheless, to minimize the risk of other loans being viewed as securities, we expect to see arrangers and borrowers in the Term Loan “B” market, which is the mostly widely distributed loan market, be more disciplined around their disclosure practices so that the disclosures provided to potential lenders distinguishes the loans from securities even more clearly. In particular, legal boilerplate and legends should be specific to the loan context and differentiated from similar disclosures in the bond context. Lenders may also seek to use the decision to argue that the terms of these loans should be more distinct from high yield bonds than they are in the current market, although that was not a point of emphasis for the Second Circuit.

We do not expect the decision to affect traditional commercial lending, which includes the vast majority of loans to investment grade borrowers, whether in the form of a revolver, bridge loan or term loan. Similarly, we would not expect the decision to have a significant impact on syndication and disclosure practices for “pro rata” or Term Loan “A” loans, which are amortizing loans often made to non-investment grade borrowers that are originated and held by commercial banks, although we could see lenders under those facilities seeking to further distinguish the terms of their loans from Term Loan “B” loans in reaction to this challenge to the status of Term Loan “B” facilities presented by Kirschner.[41]

It remains to be seen if the decision will further feed the growth of the direct lending market, which has exploded from a largely middle market product to a real competitor to the Term Loan “B” market. Direct loans generally are not subject to broad syndication and instead are originated and held by non-bank lenders, such as funds. To the extent that the larger commercial banks are shier about providing commitments for Term Loan “B” facilities as a result of the decision, direct lending may have the upper hand. At the same time, it is worth noting that the Court’s decision in Kirschner relies, in part, on the fact that the commercial banks originating the syndicated loans are subject to a scheme of regulation to which direct lenders are generally not subject, rendering the latter potentially more susceptible to challenges of this sort.

Finally, a key aspect of the Court’s decision relies on the existence of restrictions on assignments of loans.  In fact, loan settlement is significantly less efficient than settlement for bonds or other types of securities because such restrictions require borrower or agent bank approval. It is possible that the decision could have a chilling effect on efforts to improve the liquidity of the loan market by changing how settlements are completed.

ENDNOTES

[1] Kirschner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 21-2726, 2023 WL 5437811 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2023).

[2] Reuters, SEC Punts on Whether Syndicated Loans are Securities, in Closely Watched Appeal (2023), https://www.reuters.com/legal/transactional/column-sec-punts-whether-syndicated-loans-are-securities-closely-watched-appeal-2023-07-19/.

[3] Id.

[4] A syndicated loan is a commercial credit provided by a group of lenders that is arranged by one or more commercial or investment banks.

[5] Kirschner as Tr. of Millennium Lender Claim Tr. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 17 CIV. 6334 (PGG), 2020 WL 2614765, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2020).

[6] Id. Plaintiff brought claims under the state-securities statutes of California, Colorado, Illinois, and Massachusetts. Id. at *5.

[7] Id. at *5.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at *7 (internal quotation marks omitted).

[10] Id. at *10. Plaintiff subsequently moved for leave to file a proposed amended complaint with respect to its common law claims, which was denied on September 30, 2021. Kirschner as Tr. of Millennium Lender Claim Tr. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 17 CIV. 6334 (PGG), 2021 WL 4499084 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021).  For more coverage of the district court’s decision, please refer to Cleary Gottlieb’s previous Alert Memorandum, “SDNY Holds Syndicated Loans Are Not Securities, Rejecting Challenge That Threatened To Disrupt $2 Trillion Market During COVID-19 Crisis,” published May 26, 2020.  https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/sdny-holds-syndicated-loans-are-not-securities.

[11] Kirschner, 2020 WL 2614765 at *6. For purposes of resolving Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the district court accepted Plaintiff’s assertionthat Reves, which considered the definition of a “security” for the purposes of the federal securities laws, applied to Plaintiff’s state law securities claims. Id.

[12] Reves, 494 U.S. at 65.

[13] Id.

[14] Id. at 67.

[15] See id. at 66.

[16] Banco Español, 973 F.2d at 55–56.

[17] Kirschner, 2020 WL 2614765 at *10.

[18] Kirschner v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 21-2726, 2023 WL 5437811, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2023). Before reaching the question of whether the loan was a security, the Court initially determined that it had jurisdiction over the action pursuant to the Edge Act, 12 U.S.C. § 632, which would provide for federal jurisdiction so long as the action was (1) of a civil nature, (2) at least one party to the suit was an Edge Act bank or corporation, and (3) the suit arose out of international or foreign banking. Id. at *6. Plaintiff challenged only the final element: whether defendant bank JP Morgan Chase had itself engaged in international or foreign banking in the loan transaction. Id. at *7. The Court held that JP Morgan Chase had satisfied the third element by directly assigning its interest in Millennium’s loan to foreign lenders. Id. at *7.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at *9 (italics omitted).

[22] Id.

[23] Id.

[24] Id.

[25] Id.

[26] Id. at *10.

[27] Id.

[28] Id. at *11 (alterations omitted).

[29] Id.

[30] Id.

[31] Id.

[32] In a slight departure from the analysis of the district court, the Second Circuit was unpersuaded by the argument that, because a court had not yet held that a syndicated term loan was a security, a court could never find that the reasonable expectations of the investing public could be such that a loan could be a security. Id. at n.104. The Court emphasized that instead of making sweeping generalizations about all loans, courts should look to the economics of each particular loan transaction, as Reves instructs.

[33] See id. at*11.

[34] Id. at *12.

[35] Id.

[36] Id.

[37] Id.

[38] Id.

[39] Id. at n.117.

[40] Id. at *13.

[41] Pro Rata Term Loans or Term Loan “A” loans generally include additional terms such as a financial covenant that are no longer present in most broadly syndicated Term Loan “B” loans. Notwithstanding this, in recent years some of the more borrower-favorable provisions in the Term Loan “B” market have carried over to this market as well.

This post come to us from Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “Second Circuit Affirms Syndicated Loans Are Not Securities, Avoiding Market Disruption,” dated September 21, 2023, and available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

A Tokenized Future: Regulatory Lessons from Crowdfunding and Standard Form Contracts

Cryptocurrencies and other digital assets (“crypto”) are surging in popularity.  If cryptos are securities (“investment contracts” under the Howey test), they must be sold in accordance with the federal securities laws.  This likely requires registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and initial and ongoing public filings – the same arduous process that exists for public companies with centralized management teams rather than decentralized autonomous crypto networks.

For those cryptos found to be securities, there is a regulatory scheme in place, as ill-suited to the occasion as it may be.  For cryptos that are not securities, there is substantial leeway to consider the best approach to balancing investor protection with allowing this important innovation to continue, whether the SEC or the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) ends up with regulatory authority over crypto.  A balance means not favoring a wild west approach, where it would all be unregulated and rely on common law fraud to police bad actions, nor would it mean implementing a heavy-handed securities-like regime prioritizing investor protection over innovation.  The Biden administration just released an executive order calling for the development of a framework for regulating crypto, making this post especially timely.[1]

In a new article, I start very much within-the-box on a regulatory proposal, acknowledging that some sort of disclosure should be given to protect investors.  Disclosure reduces information asymmetry ex ante and allows fraud enforcement and deterrence ex post.  How effective disclosure is, and whether its benefit outweighs its cost, depend on how much and what type of disclosure is required.  My article’s suggestions keep these two questions – how much and what type of disclosure – front and center.

As for how much disclosure, it has to be less than what the public offering process for securities would require.  Thus, my article starts by examining a recent SEC effort to offer scaled-back disclosure: crowdfunding.  Crowdfunding offers an analogous situation to crypto offerings in that it allows selling risky investments to unaccredited investors via general solicitation.  Yet this disclosure is still likely inefficient and unread by most investors.  While crowdfunding is still new, early studies show that companies often do not comply with SEC-required disclosures or that investors often do not read what is provided.  Critics call the required crowdfunding disclosures excessive for the small amounts being raised.  So shorter disclosure is necessary, but not sufficient.

This leads to the second question – “what type of disclosure?” – and to another context where tailored disclosure has received even more attention: standard form contracts, or so-called contracts of adhesion.  Unlike the newish crowdfunding, courts and scholars have wrestled with standard form contracts for a century.  Mostly these contracts are enforced because consumers have a duty to read what they agree to. Empirical studies reveal, however, that almost no one actually reads standard form contracts, just as with crowdfunding disclosures.  Perhaps consumers receive their relevant information about a purchase through other means: social media, friends, etc.  Perhaps they are just ignorant. But innovations like requiring a consumer to scroll to the end of terms before clicking “I accept” do nothing to improve reading.

In light of the intractable standard-form contract problem, in 2014 Yale law professors Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz made an interesting suggestion: Put a “warning box” disclosure on the first page of a standard form contract that includes only terms that would surprise and disadvantage the consumer.[2]  If a consumer would reasonably expect a term, no matter how onerous, it would not go in the warning box.  Also, if the consumer would be surprised but in a pleasant way, there would be no need for a warning box disclosure.  Only terms that most consumers would be unpleasantly surprised to learn would go in a warning box.  This is an attempt at tailored and helpful disclosure that doesn’t go too far.

The warning box proposal does what securities regulation tries to do: eliminate information asymmetry on the stuff that matters.  I use the Ayres/Schwartz suggestion to suggest a regulatory path forward for a tokenized future.  Let’s not give crypto the overkill securities law treatment, but instead the Ayres/Schwartz standard-form contract treatment:  short, simple mandatory disclosures of crypto features that would surprise and harm a buyer.

For well-known cryptos like Bitcoin, nothing would be required in the warning box.  Risks from investing in BTC, from potential environmental damage to price volatility, are well-known.  Tether developers, however, should have disclosed that its stablecoins were not fully backed by fiat currency reserves, and Ethereum developers should still be disclosing that gas fees can be much higher than normal transaction fees investors may be accustomed to.  Appearing along with the crypto’s whitepaper and link to its official website, a warning box strikes a good balance between innovation and regulation.

ENDNOTES

[1] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/03/14/2022-05471/ensuring-responsible-development-of-digital-assets.

[2] Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Contract Law, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 545 (2014), at 553, 583-87.

This post comes to us from Darian Ibrahim, the Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law at William & Mary Law School. It is based on his recent article, “A Tokenized Future: Regulatory Lessons From Crowdfunding and Standard Form Contracts,” available here.

Categories
Litigation Securities Regulation

Paul Weiss Discusses Federal Jury Verdict Finding Cryptocurrency Products Not Securities

On November 2, 2021, a federal jury in Audet v. Fraser found that four cryptocurrency-related products were not securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act. This case is significant because it appears to be the first time a jury has reached a verdict on whether cryptocurrency products are securities under the test articulated by the Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). This case thus is instructive in the developing area of law as to whether digital assets and other crypto-related products may be considered to be securities.

Plaintiffs brought suit on behalf of a class of individuals who purchased cryptocurrency-related products called “Hashlets,” “Hashpoints,” “Paycoin,” and “Hashstakers” (the “Products”). Plaintiffs initially sued GAW Miners, LLC and ZenMiner, LLC, the companies that developed the Products, along with GAW CEO Homero Joshua Garza and investor and director Stuart A. Fraser. But the two companies defaulted[1] and plaintiffs later dismissed Garza from the suit after he pleaded guilty to wire fraud in a related DOJ action,[2] leaving Fraser as the sole remaining defendant at trial.

GAW and ZenMiner initially sold physical crypto mining hardware to customers who would use its computing power to “mine” for virtual currency. Customers who purchased GAW and ZenMiner’s hardware-hosted mining products were told that they had purchased specific pieces of physical mining equipment and that they could request that their equipment be shipped to them at any time. Plaintiffs alleged that, in reality, the companies never had sufficient designated equipment to support the hosted mining services they sold to customers or to ship to customers upon request.[3] Unable to fulfill customers’ orders, the companies introduced “Hashlet contracts,” which entitled their customers to a share of the profits from the companies’ crypto mining profits. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants sold far more Hashlets worth of computing power than they actually had in their computing centers, and there was no equipment to back up the vast majority of Hashlets sold.[4] Defendants collected roughly $19 million in revenue from their sales of Hashlets.[5] Plaintiffs further alleged that, when the Hashlets scheme began to unravel, defendants pivoted and began selling “Hashpoints,”convertible promissory notes that could be converted into a new virtual currency called Paycoin. Before it launched Paycoin, GAW also sold “HashStakers,” which were digital wallets that could lock up Paycoin for 30, 90 or 180-day terms and generate fixed returns. Defendants launched Paycoin by promoting a $20 price floor and its wide acceptance by well-known merchants, neither of which ultimately proved to be true.[6]

Plaintiffs brought claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 and Sections 36b-29(a)(1) and (2) of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act, as well as claims for common law fraud. With respect to the common law fraud claims, the jury found that GAW Miners had engaged in a fraud concerning Hashlets but that plaintiffs did not prove that Fraser had aided and abetted in the company’s fraud.[7]

Some key takeaways from the jury instructions are as follows:

  • The jury found that none of the four Products were securities. The court explained that four of the plaintiffs’ five claims against Mr. Fraser required plaintiffs to prove that one or more of the Products were securities, and that the jury should therefore begin its deliberations with this question.[8] Plaintiffs relied on the fact that the SEC had previously asserted in a successful civil fraud action against Garza that Hashlets were securities.[9] The court instructed the jury on application of the Howey test, stating that “to establish that a Product is an ‘investment contract,’ the plaintiffs must prove that there was, with regard to that Product: (1) an investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with profits to be derived solely from the efforts of ” The instructions noted that “[f]or each of these elements, you must focus on what the buyers of the Products were led to expect about the nature of the Products.”[10] The court also gave specific guidance on the second and third elements. With respect to the “common enterprise” element, the instructions provided that “Plaintiffs must prove with respect to a specific Product, either: (1) that each individual buyer’s fortunes were tied to the fortunes of the other buyers by the pooling of their assets, usually combined with the pro-rata distribution of profits, i.e., distribution proportionate to the buyer’s investment; or (2) that the individual buyer’s fortunes were tied to the fortunes of GAW Miners, i.e., that the fortunes of the buyers and the Company were linked so that they would rise and fall together.”[11] And with respect to third element—whether profits are derived solely from the efforts of others—the court instructed the jury that “[i]f there was a reasonable expectation of significant investor control, then profits would not be considered derived solely from the efforts of others,” but “if the expectation was that the participants would be passive investors, then profits would be considered derived solely from the efforts of others.”[12] The jury found that none of the four Products were investment contracts.[13]
  • The court instructed the jury that a currency is not a security and defined “currency” as broader than merely fiat. With respect to the federal securities claim, the court noted in the jury instructions that “there is an exception to the definition of ‘securities’ available under the Exchange Act that is not available under the [Connecticut Uniform Securities Act]. Specifically, the Exchange Act provides that a currency is not a security. That means that, for the Exchange Act claim only, even if a Product meets the definition of an ‘investment contract’, it is not a ‘security’ if it is a currency.” Fraser had asserted an affirmative defense that Paycoin, GWC’s virtual currency, was properly considered a currency and therefore could not be a security. The court defined currency as “an item (such as a coin, government note, or banknote) that is generally accepted as payment in a transaction and recognized as a standard of value.” The court cautioned in the jury instructions that “it is important to note that merely describing a product as a ‘currency’ does not make it one. You should focus on the substance and economic reality of Paycoin, not its name or label. The Defendant has the burden of proving that Paycoin is a currency.”[14]

Implications

Over the last few years, courts have increasingly grappled with the question of when digital assets constitute securities. For example, in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Telegram, the court granted the SEC’s motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin Telegram from engaging in a plan to distribute a new cryptocurrency to certain sophisticated entities and high net-worth individuals.[15] And in United States Securities and Exchange Commission v. Kik Interactive Inc., the court granted summary judgment in favor of the SEC, holding that the defendant’s digital token product was an investment contract under Section 2(a)(l) of the Securities Act.[16] This case is significant because it is the first time a jury has reached a verdict on the question of whether particular cryptocurrency-related assets are securities, let alone found that such assets are not securities. The jury instructions in the Audet matter may serve as useful guidance for litigants and market participants considering whether digital assets may be securities. The court also provided a defendant-friendly instruction on the third element of the Howey test—often the most hotly contested element—by instructing the jury that profits are not derived solely from the efforts of others where there is “a reasonable expectation of significant investor control.” It will be interesting to see how defendants utilize this verdict in future cases.

ENDNOTES

[1]        GAW Miners Class Action FAQ, available at https://www.gawminersclassaction.com/Home/FAQ.

[2]        Charlie Osborne, “GAW Miners CEO earns prison time for defrauding customers of $9 million,” Zero Day Net (Sept. 17, 2018), available at https://www.zdnet.com/article/gaw-miners-ceo-earns-prison-time-for-defrauding-customers-of-9-million/.

[3]        Audet v. Fraser, No. 3:16-cv-940, ECF No. 57 at ¶ 6 (D. Conn. 2021).

[4]        Id. at ¶ 7.

[5]        Id.

[6]        Id. at ¶ 8.

[7]        Audet v. Fraser, No. 3:16-cv-940, ECF No. 330 at 13-14 (D. Conn. 2021).

[8]        Audet v. Fraser, No. 3:16-cv-940, ECF No. 326 at 20 (D. Conn. 2021).

[9]        Connecticut-Based Bitcoin Mining Fraudster Sentenced to Prison, SEC Litigation Release No. 24281 (Sept. 20, 2018), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2018/lr24281.htm.

[10]      Audet v. Fraser, No. 3:16-cv-940, ECF No. 326 at 21.

[11]      Id.

[12]      Id. at 21-22.

[13]      Audet v. Fraser, No. 3:16-cv-940, ECF No. 330 at 2 (D. Conn. 2021).

[14]      Audet v. Fraser, No. 3:16-cv-940, ECF No. 326 at 20-21 (D. Conn. 2021).

[15]      Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Telegram, et al, 448 F. Supp. 3d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

[16]      Secs. & Exch. Comm’n v. Kik Interactive Inc., 492 F.Supp.3d 169 (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

This post comes to us from Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “Federal Jury Finds Cryptocurrency Products Not Securities in Landmark Verdict,” dated November 18, 2021, and available here. 

Categories
Securities Regulation

Latham & Watkins Discusses Whether NFTs Are Securities

As the current crypto boom has progressed, it seemed Decentralized Finance (DeFi) had cemented its position as the dominant new narrative of this cycle. This view is supported by the tens of billions of dollars that have flowed into DeFi protocols over the past twelve months. Yet, amid renewed public interest, non-fungible tokens (NFTs) show signs that they should not be overlooked in discussions regarding the hottest new developments in the crypto space. As with any fast-moving market driven by explosive consumer interest and waves of money, regulators will likely take an interest and scrutinize market practices against existing regulations.

Background

NFTs entered public awareness during the crypto boom of 2017-18 and have recently experienced a resurgence, eclipsing the popularity they achieved in the previous market cycle. As widely reported, some recent issues of NFTs have sold out in seconds and can command seven or eight-figure purchase prices per unit.

NFTs are essentially unique digital assets with blockchain-based authenticity, ownership, and transferability features. They differ from other blockchain-based assets such as Bitcoin, Ether, and stablecoins that are identical and interchangeable (i.e., fungible). Most NFTs are currently issued on Ethereum; however, other blockchain platforms are also vying for market share in the space, with new NFT-focused protocols even being launched. NFTs can be purchased and sold peer-to-peer or on dedicated marketplaces online.

Are NFTs Securities?

In the case of NFTs that constitute art or collectibles, on the surface of things, such NFTs should arguably not be deemed to be securities. (Needless to say, any given NFT would have to be analyzed on its specific facts.) These NFTs are essentially finished products whose value is determined at a sale that is made directly to a buyer. For such NFTs to maintain or appreciate in value, there is typically no expectation or need for third parties to extend managerial efforts that will enhance the value of the NFT. As noted by the SEC staff in its 2019 Framework, “Price appreciation resulting solely from external market forces (such as general inflationary trends or the economy) impacting the supply and demand for an underlying asset generally is not considered ‘profit’ under the Howey test.” In other words, an NFT is not a security simply because it can increase in value.

However, NFTs that constitute art or collectibles may only be the tip of the iceberg. Many industry participants think the technological developments being driven by the demand for NFTs could lay the groundwork for expansion into an enormous variety of digital property rights. The analysis becomes more complex when considering the emerging trend towards these other areas, including the financialization of NFTs.

For example, certain projects propose to issue insurance policies in NFT form. This approach is based on the idea that each insurance policy is unique given such variables as the type of risk covered, extent of coverage, and premiums payable. In such structures, insurance writers contribute to a protection pool and receive a share of premiums from insurance buyers commensurate to their contribution to the protection pool. Such systems contemplate that the insurance writers will also be able to trade their share of the protection pool and accompanying rights to premiums on secondary markets.

Similarly, it is possible to mint NFTs in such a way that the original NFT issuer would receive a share of proceeds each time their NFT was sold — even long after their initial sale of the NFT. One can envision a scenario in which an artist could decide to sell such rights to future proceeds on a secondary market, perhaps even packaging them with rights to proceeds from other NFTs they created. Finally, platforms are emerging where NFTs can be used as collateral to borrow other cryptoassets.

In any of the foregoing scenarios, careful consideration would need to be taken to ensure that the underlying tokens being traded are not securities, so as to avoid the accompanying regulatory burden. If deemed to be a security, every sale of the token would need to be registered or exempt from registration under US securities laws. Furthermore, platforms dealing in the token would be required to register as a securities exchange or alternative trading system and broker-dealer.

Considerations for NFT Issuers

NFT issuers are advised to avoid marketing NFTs as an investment that can reward holders with appreciation, profit, or dividends. The concern here is that such marketing could transform a non-security into a security, such as in the Gary Plastic case, in which a secondary market for the instruments was touted. (For additional details, see page 102 of this Latham-authored analysis.)

In addition, issuers should avoid:

  • Marketing NFT sales as a fundraising effort to build a platform for future sales
  • Employing promoters, sponsors, or third parties whose marketing efforts are intended to drive the NFTs’ appreciation
  • Giving NFT buyers the impression that they can reasonably expect capital appreciation of the digital asset or to derive profits or from their asset as a result of the creator’s efforts or the efforts of any third party

This post comes to us from Latham & Watkins LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “NFTs: But Is It Art (or a Security)?,” dated March 12, 2021, and available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Davis Polk Discusses New SEC Climate and ESG Enforcement Task Force

On March 4, the Securities and Exchange Commission announced a newly created Climate and ESG Task Force in the Division of Enforcement. The Climate and ESG Task Force will work closely with other areas of the SEC as part of the agency’s recently enhanced efforts to address climate and environmental, social and governance, or ESG, matters.

Materiality

The 22-member task force will develop initiatives to identify ESG-related misconduct.  Its initial focus will be to review public company disclosures to identify “material” gaps or misstatements regarding climate risks. The Climate and ESG Task Force will also review investment adviser and fund disclosures and compliance systems relating to their ESG strategies.  Use of the term “material” is significant because of the current debate about whether climate change poses a material risk to all public companies.  The question of materiality is likely to be a key issue in any novel enforcement investigations regarding climate change disclosures.

Use of Data Analytics

The Climate and ESG Task Force will leverage sophisticated data analytics to identify potential investigation targets.  This practice is consistent with the Division of Enforcement’s current use of internal, risk-based data analytics to identify potential case leads, such as in the recent earnings per share (EPS) initiative that led to several case filings.  We expect that, as with prior data analysis initiatives, Enforcement will use automated searches of SEC filings to identify potential outliers in disclosures or other practices.

Coordination with Other SEC Initiatives

The Climate and ESG Task Force is the SEC’s latest initiative concerning climate change and ESG.  Last week, SEC Acting Chair Allison Lee directed the Division of Corporation Finance to review company disclosures, including an assessment of compliance with federal securities laws and the SEC’s 2010 climate change disclosure guidance.  In addition, the Division of Examinations announced this week an increased focus on climate-related risks and investment adviser disclosures and practices relating to their ESG products and services as part of its 2021 examination priorities.  Last month, the SEC created a new position, Senior Policy Advisor for Climate and ESG in the office of the Acting Chair, to advise the agency on ESG matters and push forward initiatives across the agency.  Finally, on the same day, the SEC named John Coates Acting Director of the Division of Corporation Finance.  Acting Director Coates stated last month at an Institute of Internal Finance meeting that the SEC “should help lead” the creation of an ESG disclosure system.  On the topic of materiality, he noted that public companies are increasingly issuing sustainability reports and suggested that investor demand for these disclosures is transforming what was once voluntary, into something “less voluntary.”

Skepticism from Republican Commissioners

Commissioners Hester Pierce and Elad Roisman expressed skepticism of the Climate and ESG Task Force in a public statement.  They asked:  “[S]houldn’t we wait for our Corporation Finance staff to complete its assessment of our existing rules relating to ESG disclosures to find out if they are unclear or in need of updating before we announce an initiative aimed at bringing enforcement actions in this area?”

Different From Prior Task Forces

The Climate and ESG Task Force is different from prior task forces that focused on traditional enforcement issues.  Examples include the Financial Reporting and Audit Task Force, the Microcap Fraud Task Force, and the Retail Strategy Task Force.  The new task force is unique in focusing on a single disclosure issue that has not been the subject of significant prior enforcement actions.

Takeaways

If the Climate and ESG Task Force results in enforcement actions, ESG funds might be the first targets because SEC examiners have been reviewing them for several years and because of significant investor demand for the funds.  Funds should avoid ESG puffery, self-audit to ensure practices and policies conform to what they are advertising, and provide appropriate disclosures about the evolving nature of ESG products.  Public companies should prepare for enforcement scrutiny by confirming the accuracy of statements in public filings about ESG programs, initiatives, and plans, and by maintaining internal documentation supporting the basis for ESG statements.  Companies also should include their sustainability reports in these reviews, even if they are not incorporated into SEC filings.

Overall, the SEC has taken several steps to signal change in the enforcement program in the short time since the change in administration.  We previously discussed the greater delegation of authority to issue formal orders of investigation (which grant subpoena power to SEC staff) and a change in policy regarding applications for waivers from disqualifications that result from some types of enforcement actions.  Combined with these prior changes, the new task force signals an effort to portray an enforcement program that is both more aggressive and increasingly focused on specific policy objectives.

This post comes to us from Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “SEC Establishes Division Climate and ESG Enforcement Task Force,” dated March 5, 2021, available here.

 

Categories
Securities Regulation

King & Spalding Discusses Takeaways from GameStop

The recent meteoric rise (and subsequent fall) of GameStop, AMC Theaters and a host of other “meme stocks” has prompted hedge funds, investment bankers, regulators and public company executives to critically re-examine their preparedness for extraordinary market volatility.

The meme stock phenomenon is unique in numerous respects that have been well documented.  What has drawn less attention, however, is the fact that the phenomenon highlights how other “mid-cap” companies could become the next meme stock – or be subject to highly volatile stock price movements that may not be identical to what transpired at GameStop and AMC, but are dramatic nonetheless.

This client alert examines key considerations for board members and C-suite executives seeking to prepare proactively or react swiftly to increased volatility in their company’s publicly-traded securities.

GameStop and Its Predecessors

GameStop recently found itself in the middle of a perfect storm for stock price volatility. Record numbers of new investors in the past year poured into the market, attracted by an industry-wide move to zero-commission trading and pandemic-induced idle time.  In January 2021, droves of new and existing investors, forming a highly-organized and like-minded online community, propelled GameStop’s stock price upwards over 1,700% in a matter of days, despite little change in the company’s underlying business.[1] Before GameStop, Hertz saw its stock pop almost 500% after it filed for bankruptcy.[2]  Similarly, Eastman Kodak increased 1,500% on news that it would start producing pharmaceutical ingredients.[3]  Predictably, these companies’ stock prices came back down to earth after the initial euphoria wore off.

The tech-savvy and vocal retail investor community often targets companies with significant short positions held by hedge funds.  For example, before the run-up in its stock, the short position in GameStop exceeded its float by 140%.[4]  It is the digital reincarnation of Occupy Wall Street[5] – meme populism for those who came of age in the internet generation.  However, what makes this new wave of investors unpredictable – and company boards and C-suite executives anxious – is their willingness to swing in and out of multiple stocks based solely on contagious, speculative enthusiasm, equally proud of their huge gains and heavy losses and willing to publicly disclaim any reliance on traditional fundamentals.

Key Considerations

How affected companies have responded to this new-found and often short-lived virality has greatly varied. Here are some of the key questions that directors and C-suite executives should carefully consider if they find themselves subject to the meme stock phenomenon or volatile market swings.

When Is Public Disclosure Necessary or Advisable?

When the story is being written about your company, your instinct may be to put out a message of your own, to garner some control over the news cycle.  But often the best course of action is to maintain a “no comment” posture to the extent practicable.

GameStop CEO, George Sherman, first spoke on January 28, 2021, 15 days[6] after the GameStop run began, touting the company’s commitment to inclusion, diversity and respect, but avoiding mentioning trading activity altogether.[7]  In other instances, regulators in the United States and abroad may affirmatively ask the company to comment when trading is volatile or an exchange halts activity altogether.  BlackBerry, for instance, released a statement on January 25, 2021 in response to a request from Canadian regulators, noting that BlackBerry was “not aware of any material, undisclosed corporate developments” and had experienced “no material change in its business or affairs that . . . would account for the recent increase in the market price or trading volume of its common shares.”[8]

Companies should also pay careful attention to messaging during the run up and subsequent retrace, as volatility often results in litigation – and companies should expect the plaintiffs’ bar to closely scrutinize all these statements to determine whether the targeted company “incited” the stock price run.  In the event that a company’s downturn results in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding, the King & Spalding team has analyzed how potential litigation claims relating to volatile trading would be treated in such a proceeding.[9]

What Could Happen at the Next Annual Meeting?

Companies that have been the target of meme stock volatility should anticipate potential disruptions at their annual meeting, as established institutional investors are replaced or supplemented by new, “meme stock” investors.  Management should be prepared to deal with these disruptions and formulate a plan prior to the meeting that addresses various contingencies.  The Company’s public relations team should consider closely tracking online messaging in advance of the meeting to seek insight into planned activities.  Moreover, if sufficient coordinated buying activity exists such that some subset of these new investors could reasonably be considered a “group” within the meaning of the Exchange Act’s Section 13(d) definition, the Company’s public relations team may need to likewise closely track public filings disclosing ownership thresholds.

Should the Company Consider a Capital Raise?

Flying high on the wings of an elevated valuation, one’s mind may naturally consider the question “how can my company capitalize on these tailwinds (however short)?”  “At-the-market” financing, which allows a company to sell new shares directly into the public markets at the going rate, has become increasingly common.  Take AMC Theaters, for example, which raised over $300 million in the midst of its run up, allowing both hedge funds looking to cover their short position and enthusiastic retail investors to purchase shares in the open market, while simultaneously raising funds to better a company bruised and battered by COVID-19.[10]  Additionally, AMC used convertible bond financing, which allowed the company to repay debt with stock instead of cash, to clear $600 million of debt off its balance sheet.[11]  One could also envision a future meme stock experiencing issues or opportunities with pending or planned M&A activity, especially where a mix of stock and cash consideration is contemplated.

While company management may wish to strike while the iron is hot, they should be wary of regulatory issues with these capital transactions.  The Securities and Exchange Commission has heightened its scrutiny of all transactions involving meme stocks.[12]  In 2020, the SEC raised concerns with Hertz’s pre-bankruptcy equity offering, including the adequacy of Hertz’s disclosures and the likelihood that investors would exit any proceeding with no return.[13]  Hertz ultimately discontinued its equity offering amid reported scrutiny from the SEC.

Going forward, the SEC is urging companies seeking to raise capital amid extreme price volatility to disclose risk factors specific to a GameStop-style stock surge and decline.[14] Acting SEC chair Allison Herren Lee emphasized the SEC’s growing focus on companies looking to make these types of raises noting, “we are going to make sure as we – you know, as we look to what they’re doing, whether or not they are trying to raise money in the middle of this. And if so, can they adequately disclose the risks associated with that? And are insiders in these companies trading?”[15]

Moreover, even if regulators ultimately allow capital raises at these increased valuations, company management should expect that shareholder litigation will ensue if and when losses are realized.

Can and Should Insiders Trade Company Stock?

In January 2021, GameStop’s CEO, George Sherman, became a billionaire on paper.[16]  However, there are structural and practical limitations that could prevent insiders from realizing such gains.  Publicly-traded companies often have restrictions on the sale of stock by certain key executive officers or require board approval before trades may be executed.  The SEC and the various stock exchanges also have disclosure requirements if insider trades are executed.  Moreover, there are real reputational risks associated with any insider selling down, let alone where insiders are taking significant profit from a short-term swing.

Additionally, executives should carefully revisit 10b5-1 plans that may have been adopted well before the stock price run.  While these plans may have been put in place on a “clear day”, the optics and reputational risk of ongoing insider activity, even pursuant to a Rule 10b5-1 plan, need to be considered as such trading activity may continue to harm the company and the executive long after the stock begins to stabilize.

Finally, company management should be mindful of public perception of indirect transactions employed by insiders to profit off the volatility. For example, George Karfunkel, a Kodak board member, donated $116 million worth of Kodak shares to a charity during its period of volatility, which had the benefit of being both a boon to the charity and generating a massive tax deduction for Mr. Karfunkel.[17] Mr. Karfunkel has since apparently reduced the gift significantly, but a probe by a special committee of Kodak’s board found that the gift “was not advisable from a corporate governance perspective” due to a possible conflict with company policy designed to avoid the appearance of insider trading.[18]

How Will Equity Incentive Compensation Plans Be Affected?

Public companies often incentivize their employees with performance-based bonus or equity awards, which may include both individual performance metrics and company-wide targets.  Such plans often also include options to purchase company stock at a specific strike price.  When a company experiences a rapid run up in its stock price, such run up may have significant implications for both achievement of performance metrics (depending on the annual goals set by the plan) and for an employee’s cost-benefit analysis in determining whether to exercise its option to purchase company stock.  If the company’s stock price subsequently falls dramatically, options may vacillate rapidly between in-the-money and out-of-the money.  Company management may wish to reconsider the terms of their equity incentive compensation plans, using compensation committee discretion often granted under the plan’s themselves.  However, such adjustments midstream have varied implications – including additional disclosure requirements, potential requirements to obtain stakeholder approvals and benefits and tax considerations.  Company management should work closely with benefits and tax counsel to evaluate the effect of a run up and subsequent fall on these compensation plans, evaluating whether action or inaction is the best course given the specific context.

Additional Regulatory Considerations

There will be regulatory investigations, including market manipulation, insider trading, and potentially scalping and touting, in nearly all of these meme stock scenarios.  Public company management should consider its existing compliance structures, cybersecurity protections, and insider trading policies well in advance of being a meme stock subject.  A robust set of compliance systems may be the difference between the public company merely being a source of information to regulators or law enforcement, or being a target of regulators and law enforcement.

ENDNOTES

[1] Matt Phillips and Taylor Lorenz, “‘Dumb Money’ Is on GameStop, and It’s Beating Wall Street at Its Own Game,” New York Times, Jan. 27, 2021 (available at https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/27/business/gamestop-wall-street-bets.html).

[2] Gregory Zuckerman and Mischa Frankl-Duval, “Individuals Roll the Dice on Stocks as Veterans Fret,” The Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2020 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/individuals-roll-the-dice-on-stocks-as-veterans-fret-11591732784?mod=article_inline).

[3] Eric Platt and Kadhim Shubber, “Kodak shares rise almost 1,500% on Covid drug loan deal,” Financial Times, July 30, 2020 (available at https://www.ft.com/content/4f36c65c-64e6-4b14-871d-df7fb95c435e).

[4] Katherine Greifeld and Lu Wang, “GameStop Short Interest Plunges in Sign Traders Are Covering,” Bloomberg, Feb. 1, 2021 (available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-01/gamestop-short-interest-plummets-in-a-sign-traders-are-covering).

[5] Heather Gautney, “What is Occupy Wall Street? The history of leaderless movements,” Washington Post, Oct. 10, 2011 (available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-leadership/what-is-occupy-wall-street-the-history-of-leaderless-movements/2011/10/10/gIQAwkFjaL_story.html).

[6] Catherine Thorbecke, “GameStop timeline: A closer look at the saga that upended Wall Street,” ABC News, Feb. 5, 2021 (available at https://abcnews.go.com/Business/gamestop-timeline-closer-saga-upended-wall-street/story?id=75617315).

[7] Press Release, “GameStop Earns Top Marks in Human Rights Campaign’s 2021 Corporate Equality Index,” GameStop, Jan. 28, 2021 (available at https://news.gamestop.com/news-releases/news-release-details/gamestop-earns-top-marks-human-rights-campaigns-2021-corporate).

[8] Press Release, “BlackBerry Comments on Trading Activity at Request of the Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada (IIROC),” BlackBerry, Jan. 25, 2021 (available at https://www.blackberry.com/us/en/company/newsroom/press-releases/2021/blackberry-comments-on-trading-activity-at-request-of-the-industry-regulatory-organization-of-canada).

[9] YOLO Investing and Treatment of Equity-Related Litigation Claims in Bankruptcy, available on King & Spalding’s Private Credit & Special Situations Investing Hub and here (finding that such lawsuits are subordinated in a bankruptcy proceeding to the same level as the holder’s equity pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Section 510(b)).

[10] Ben Mahaney, “AMC Explodes 301% After $305M Share Sale; Street Says Hold,” Yahoo! Finance, Jan. 28, 2021 (available at https://finance.yahoo.com/news/amc-explodes-301-305m-share-075559466.html).

[11] Alexander Gladstone and R.T. Watson, “Cinema Chain AMC Inks Financing Deal to Help It Survive Pandemic,” The Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2020 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/cinema-chain-amc-inks-financing-deal-to-help-it-survive-pandemic-11594418559).

[12] Public Statement, “Joint Statement Regarding Ongoing Market Volatility,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Jan. 27, 2021 (available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/joint-statement-ongoing-market-volatility-2021-01-27).

[13] Becky Yerak, “Hertz Sold $29 Million in Stock Before SEC Stepped In,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 10, 2020 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/hertz-sold-29-million-in-stock-before-sec-stepped-in-11597100128?mod=article_inline).

[14] “Sample Letter to Companies Regarding Securities Offerings During Times of Extreme Price Volatility,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Corporation Finance, Feb. 8, 2021 (available at https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/sample-letter-securities-offerings-during-extreme-price-volatility#_edn1).

[15] Matt Levine, “Is Everything Securities Fraud?” Bloomberg, Feb. 3, 2021 (available at https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-02-03/goldman-sachs-goes-to-supreme-court-hedge-funds-won-on-gamestop-kkpoe6ws).

[16] Lance Lambert, “GameStop CEO’s shares are worth nearly $1 billion—and, boy, does he probably want to sell,” Fortune, Jan. 29, 2021 (available at https://fortune.com/2021/01/29/gamestop-stock-ceo-george-sherman-gme-shares-net-worth-billion/).

[17] Theo Francis, Mark Maremont, and Geoffrey Rogow, “Kodak Insider Makes Well-Timed Stock Gift of $116 Million to Religious Charity He Started,” The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 11, 2020 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodak-insider-makes-well-timed-stock-gift-of-116-million-to-religious-charity-he-started-11597154826).

[18] Mark Maremont, “Kodak Director Makes Retroactive Cut to Huge Charity Stock Gift,” The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 13, 2021 (available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/kodak-director-makes-retroactive-cut-to-huge-charity-stock-gift-11610571219).

This post comes to us from King & Spalding LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “From the Chat Room to the Board Room – Knowing Your Meme Stock,” dated February 12, 2021, and available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Weil Gotshal Discusses Supreme Court’s Upcoming Class Certification Case

On Friday night, December 11, 2020, tucked below its order denying Texas’s bid to overturn the results of the Presidential election, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to review what petitioners Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. and its former top executives (“Goldman”) billed as “the most important securities case to come before the Court since Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014) (Halliburton II).” That the Supreme Court granted Goldman’s petition in Goldman Sachs Group Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System without a well-developed circuit split suggests that some members of the Court are troubled by the pro-plaintiff, lower-court decisions in this case and how class certification issues are handled in securities actions.

Goldman’s petition raises two questions.

The first asks the Supreme Court to find that a court evaluating the propriety of class certification may consider the materiality of the alleged misstatements in deciding whether they had a “price impact,” as required for certification under the fraud-on-the-market theory of class-wide reliance. Because class certification is often a critical inflection point in securities cases, an opinion permitting “materiality-like” arguments in opposing certification will provide defendants a vital tool in defeating certification of class actions premised on “aspirational and generic statements of the sort that virtually every public company makes,” such as those that are at issue in the Goldman case.

Goldman’s second question addresses the vexing issue of shifting burdens of persuasion between plaintiff and defendant on the critical “price impact” issue on class certification. Hopefully the Supreme Court will clarify that, once the defense presents evidence of no price impact, then plaintiffs must shoulder the burden of showing that there was in fact price impact by a preponderance of the evidence. Goldman argues that this approach is consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 301, which provides that the burden “remains on the party who had it originally” “unless a federal statute provide[s] otherwise,” and no statute so specifies here.

Background of the Case

The Goldman case has already resulted in two trips to the Second Circuit and arises out of the subprime crisis and an SEC action against Goldman in connection with Goldman’s issuance of certain collateralized debt obligations. After the SEC commenced its enforcement action, Goldman’s stock dropped 13% and the inevitable private plaintiff securities class action followed. Plaintiffs alleged that Goldman violated the federal securities laws by making generic statements in SEC filings such as, “[w]e have extensive procedures and controls that are designed to identify and address conflicts of interest” and “[o]ur clients’ interests always come first,” among others, which supposedly artificially inflated Goldman’s stock price and caused investors losses when Goldman’s stock price fell following the SEC’s revelation of the “truth” about Goldman’s alleged client conflicts. Plaintiffs allege $13 billion in damages.

In opposing class certification, Goldman argued that, before the SEC filed its enforcement action, no fewer than 36 news articles had revealed Goldman’s alleged conflicts without any statistically significant accompanying decline in the company’s stock price, which severed the link between the alleged misstatements and their impact on price. But the district court disagreed and found that the SEC complaint divulged “hard evidence of Goldman’s client conflicts” for the first time. A majority of the Second Circuit panel deferred to the district court’s evaluation of the evidence and refused to entertain Goldman’s argument that its general statements about conflicts were immaterial and therefore incapable of having price impact given that Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013), held that investors need not prove materiality to obtain class certification.

Judge Sullivan dissented. He believed that “the nature of the alleged misstatements” should be fair game because it provides “the obvious explanation for why the share price didn’t move” after the 36 news reports. He proposed that, “[o]nce a defendant has challenged the Basic presumption and put forth evidence demonstrating that the misrepresentation did not affect share price, a reviewing court is free to consider the alleged misrepresentations in order to assess their impact on price.” He added that “[t]he mere fact that such an inquiry ‘resembles’ an assessment of materiality does not make it improper.” Goldman embraced Judge Sullivan’s framework in its petition.

The Supreme Court will now hear Goldman’s arguments that a securities class action cannot be certified where the alleged misstatements were not material and therefore had no price impact. For the fourth time in the last decade, the Supreme Court will once again try to clarify what arguments defendants may raise in opposing class certification in securities suits specifically and who holds the burden of persuasion on these critical class and securities law issues.

This post comes to us from Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “Supreme Court to Hear Goldman Securities Suit and Revisit Critical Class Certification Issues,” dated December 14, 2020, and available here.

Categories
Corporate Governance Securities Regulation

Columbia Law Professors Write Two of Top Corporate and Securities Articles

John C. Coffee, Jr., Zohar Goshen, and Joshua R. Mitts were among the authors of two of the best corporate and securities articles last year, the Corporate Practice Commentator has announced. The Columbia Law School professors were joined by Robert J. Jackson, Jr., a former professor at Columbia Law School and commissioner of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and now a professor at NYU School of Law.

The Corporate Practice Commentator’s Robert Thompson, a professor at Georgetown University Law Center, conducted the 26th annual poll to compile the list. Teachers of corporate and securities law voted to select the best of almost 400 articles. There are normally 10 selected, but this year there were 11, because of a tie.

The top 11 articles, listed in alphabetical order by last name of the initial author, are:

Ian Ayres, Edward Fox. Alpha Duties: The Search for Excess Returns and Appropriate Fiduciary Duties. 97 Tex. L. Rev. 445-515 (2019).

Adam Badawi, Elisabeth de Fontenay. Is There a First-Drafter Advantage in M&A? 107 Calif. L. Rev. 1119-1172 (2019).

Lucian Bebchuk, Scott Hirst. Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 119 Columbia L. Rev. 2029-2146 (2019).

John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Joshua R. Mitts, & Robert E. Bishop. Activist Directors and Agency Costs: What Happens When an Activist Director Goes on the Board? 104 Cornell L. Rev. 381- 466 (2019).

Lisa M. Fairfax. The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy. 104 Va. L. Rev. 1065-1122 (2018).

Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon. The New Titans of Wall Street: A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors. 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17-72 (2019).

Zohar Goshen, Sharon Hannes. The Death of Corporate Law. 94 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 263-315 (2019).

Henry T. C. Hu, John D. Morley. A Regulatory Framework for Exchange-traded Funds. 91 S. Cal. L. Rev. 839-942 (2018).

Elizabeth Pollman. Corporate Disobedience. 68 Duke L.J. 709-765 (2019).

Elizabeth Pollman. Startup Governance. 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 155-221 (2019).

Adriana Z. Robertson. Passive in Name Only: Delegated Management and “Index” Investing. 36 Yale J. on Reg. 795-851 (2019).

The announcement can be found here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Why Cryptocurrencies Should Be Evaluated As Fiat Money

What are cryptocurrencies: securities, commodities, or another form of established currency – a non-sovereign fiat currency? In my forthcoming article, “Cryptocommunity Currencies,” I argue that, like other self-governing bodies, communities that issue cryptocurrencies should be judged on how well they support their currencies, an approach very similar to how we have evaluated traditional sovereign issuers of currency. Indeed, as traditional-sovereign-issued currency becomes entirely digital, functional distinctions between it and widely-accepted non-sovereign fiat currency start to disappear. The primary way, then, to distinguish between the value of such currencies is to compare the quality of their institutional backing. Through that lens, some self-governing online communities are better organized and more supportive of their currencies than traditional sovereigns.

My article argues that cryptocurrencies should be regulated as a new category of non-sovereign fiat currency, and that such regulation should evaluate the institutional structures behind the currency as created and maintained by its community.

First, cryptocurrencies qua currencies are neither securities nor commodities but fiat currencies. (Here we are speaking of true cryptocurrencies, and not other forms of cryptoassets.) The distinguishing feature of cryptocurrencies as currencies is that they are intended to be traded directly for goods and services: They are not being offered by another party as a future investment nor are they valuable apart from their ability to be exchanged for something else.  Their primary use is as a method of payment.  This distinguishes cryptocurrencies from securities, which are often investments, such as stock; and from commodities, which have intrinsic value, such as wheat or pork bellies. See more on the legal definitions here.

For lay purposes, consider the distinction between the U.S. dollars (a fiat currency issued by a traditional sovereign) that you might use to buy tickets at a fair, and the tickets (or tokens) that you buy for use at the fair.  The U.S. dollars have the backing of the U.S. government and can be used widely.  By contrast, the tickets are valuable only by specific agreement within the fair, as payment for the goods and services offered by the promoters of the fair, and for only as long as the fair exists.  The fair tickets may be securities if they are an investment in the promoters’ efforts, or commodities if a market develops within the fairground for collections of fair tickets tradeable at a fixed rate for other items.  Either way, the fair tickets are not general tender broadly exchanged for goods or services outside of the limited efforts of the fair.  Thus, the terms and representations upon which those tickets are issued are very important and specific to the tickets’ value.  By contrast, the terms upon which you trade five U.S. one-dollar bills for a U.S. five-dollar bill or for a certain number of euros, pounds, or other currencies should not be the governing factor in those bills’ (euros, pounds, or other currencies) general applicability after your trade as tender.

As a programming note, this distinction between U.S. dollars (fiat currency) and fair tickets (tokens) maps well on the distinction between coins and tokens.  Cryptocurrencies (often “coins” with their own blockchain) typically have more extensive infra-structure than fair tickets (“tokens”), which run over the territory of their fairgrounds for limited application.  As one source summarizes: “The basic difference is relatively simple.  [Coins and tokens] are both used to define a unit of blockchain value.”  Coins “are unique digital currencies which are based on their own, standalone blockchains, [while]. . . tokens are built and hosted on existing blockchains.”  Coins intended to be general currency: “[a]lthough there are some blurry lines between the definition of [coins and tokens], the crypto community generally agrees that coins function as a method of payment.”   By contrast, “[t]okens operate on top of a blockchain and give access to a DApp [decentralized application], enabling the functions of that [specific] project.

Second, the SEC and other authorities have the test for whether cryptocurrencies should be subject to regulation backwards. The SEC’s director of the Division of Corporation Finance, William Hinman, for example, would look to the importance of a centralized promoter’s role in distinguishing Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) for regulation from cryptocurrencies that escape regulation such as Bitcoin.  Under the so-called “Hinman paradox,” why should cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ether escape regulation merely because they already exist as networks, and the SEC does not have to evaluate how their systems initially grow?  Although Bitcoin and Ether are arguably decentralized systems, representations about how their codes work were made at some point by someone trying to encourage new people to adopt them.  In fact, because the systems are arguably decentralized, such representations may have been made by more people in more places at more times for their own financial advantages.   Having more potential misrepresentations in the market for a mature product would seem to argue for a greater need to regulate, not to support an argument against regulation.

Additional problems with Director Hinman’s analysis stem from his focus on generational processes (with the perverse use of decentralization as a proxy for maturity), and not on the organizational qualities of the communities behind currencies.  In the case of Bitcoin, for example, a central person – the legendary Satoshi Nakamoto who invented the processes to create Bitcoin – involved a community around him to follow those uniting instructions.  The people following Nakamoto’s instructions are, of course, still part of Hinman’s “person or group to carry out essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts” necessary for a currency, but not considered as such under his analysis. Moreover, studies of Bitcoin show that Bitcoin is not as decentralized in performance as advertised – even by the SEC.  Nonetheless, there is no serious talk of regulating Bitcoin as a security.

Third, some cryptocurrencies now have better institutional support than some traditional sovereign-issued fiat currencies. What is so different from a government issuing currency for universal exchange than another entity issuing it?  One may say that no other entity has the market power of the U.S. or Chinese governments, but some corporations, for example, have more revenue, and arguably sophistication, than governments.  Consider that Apple in 2016 had more “cash . . . on hand . . . [than] the GDPs of two-thirds of the world’s countries.”  By 2017, in terms of revenue collected, “Walmart exceed[ed] [both] Spain and Australia.”  During that year, in fact, “[o]f the top 100 revenue generators [including both national governments and corporations],. . . 71 [were] corporations.”

But when communities are self-governing, they may still need external regulation.  The corporation is an excellent example. My article analyzes Facebook’s Libra cryptocurrency initiative, which by some estimates may be used by 2.4 billion people a month to buy goods and services by later this year. Although U.S. regulators and politicians have been cautious about this expansion of Facebook’s power, the article notes that the major arguments for being cautious are actually arguments in favor of regulation. In exploring the political objections to Facebook’s plans, national security concerns seem to fall into two broad categories: first, concerns about more widespread money-laundering and transactions of illegal goods; and second, concerns about challenge to the hegemony of the U.S. dollar. External regulation would help combat widespread money-laundering and transactions of illegal goods. Protecting the hegemony of the U.S. dollar may ultimately depend on the wisdom of the country’s foreign policy choices. But insofar as other steps are helpful, we should regulate what we can of our financial system or lose that power because rival sovereign currencies are already becoming digital, and cryptocurrencies will be based around the world anyway – à la Libra in light-touch Switzerland.

A deeper concern is that administering its own cryptocurrency will give Facebook even more financial data than the enormous amount of information that the company and its partners already collect on individuals.  Ironically then, the wider-spread use of other cryptocurrencies, insofar as individuals are allowed to remain anonymous within those payment systems (which may not be what Facebook allows through its exchange platform, Calibra), may help combat concerns about personal data abuse.

As neither securities nor commodities, cryptocurrencies fall into a significant hole in our regulatory system. My article calls on regulators and academics to rethink their assumptions about cryptocurrencies and the communities that develop them. We should recognize well-institutionalized cryptocommunity currencies as non-sovereign fiat currencies and regulate them accordingly.

This post comes to us from Professor Josephine Sandler Nelson (writing as J.S. Nelson) at Villanova Law School. It is based on her forthcoming article for the Cornell Law Review, “Cryptocommunity Currencies,” available here. The article is a tribute to the late Professor Lynn A. Stout.

Categories
Litigation Securities Regulation

Gibson Dunn Updates 2019 Year-End Securities Litigation

The number of securities cases filed in federal court continued at a furious pace for the third year in a row. This year-end update highlights what you most need to know in securities litigation trends and developments for the last half of 2019:

  • Oral argument in Liu v. SEC, No. 18-1501, is scheduled for March 3, 2020, when the Supreme Court will consider the power of the SEC—and potentially, by extension, other federal agencies—to order “equitable disgorgement” in light of the Supreme Court’s prior ruling in Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
  • Anticipation for the Supreme Court’s decision in Jander—a case expected to examine the intersection of federal securities laws and ERISA—fizzled recently when the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for the Second Circuit to consider issues not resolved by its prior decision.
  • Developments in the Delaware Court of Chancery include continued scrutiny of relationships between directors for purposes of independence analyses, consideration of when a stockholder letter constitutes a formal demand to take corrective actions, and determining whether a buyer is excused from closing on an acquisition when the target discovers that FDA approval of its only product is at risk because of its own officer’s fraud.
  • Although no defendant has been found liable as a “disseminator” since the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in Lorenzo, trial courts and the Tenth Circuit have begun to grapple with the case’s important implications.
  • We continue to observe Omnicare’s falsity of opinions standard developing into a formidable pleading barrier to securities fraud claims, with both the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits recently upholding dismissals at the pleadings stage.
  • Although the federal circuit courts of appeals did not provide any new guidance on “price impact” theories under Halliburton II during the second half of 2019, we expect the Second Circuit will soon reach a decision in Goldman Sachs II, which has been under consideration since June.
  • Finally, New York recently amended the statute of limitations for Martin Act claims, extending it from three years to six years.

I. Filing and Settlement Trends

Data from a newly released NERA Economic Consulting (“NERA”) study shows that 2019 was a year largely unchanged from 2018. To start, the number of new federal class action cases filed in 2019 was equal to 2018, which buttressed a trend of increased filings that began in 2017.

There has also been a continuation of the shift in the types of cases filed. The number of Rule 10b-5, Section 11 and Section 12 cases increased slightly in 2019, with 31 more filings than in 2018, while the number of merger objection cases fell.

The median settlement values of federal securities cases for 2019—excluding merger-objection cases and cases settling for more than $1 billion or $0 to the class—was roughly equivalent to those in 2018 (at $13 million, up from $12 million in 2018). However, average settlement values were down by more than 50% (at $30 million, down from $71 million in 2018). This discrepancy is due in large part to the settlement of one case in 2018 exceeding $1 billion. Excluding such an outlier, we see only a slight increase in average settlement values compared to the prior two years.

The industry sectors most frequently sued in 2019 continue to be the “Health Technology and Services” and “Electronic Technology and Technology Services” sectors, although 2019 saw the continuation of a downward trend in cases filed against healthcare companies following a spike in 2016.

A. Filing Trends

Figure 1 below reflects filing rates for 2019 (all charts courtesy of NERA). Four hundred and thirty-three cases were filed this past year, exactly matching the number of cases filed in 2018 and similar to the number of filings in 2017. However, this figure does not include the many class action suits filed in state courts or the rising number of state court derivative suits, including those filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery.

Figure 1:

B. Mix of Cases Filed in 2019

  1. Filings by Industry Sector

As seen in Figure 2 below, the split of non-merger objection class actions filed in 2019 across industry sectors is fairly consistent with the distribution observed in 2018, with few indications of significant shifts or increases in particular sectors. As in 2018, the “Health Technology and Services” and the “Electronic Technology and Technology Services” sectors accounted for over 40% of filings, although there was a slight drop in “Health Technology and Services”-related filings (at 21%, down from 25% in 2018). The other two sectors reflecting the largest changes from 2018 are “Process Industries” (at 4%, up from 1% in 2018) and “Consumer and Distribution Services” (at 6%, down from 9% in 2018).

Figure 2:

  1. Merger Cases

As shown in Figure 3 below, there were 170 merger objection cases filed in federal court in 2019. Although this is a 15% decrease from the number of such cases filed in 2018, the 170 filings continue the overall trend of a substantial increase in merger objection suits being filed in federal court after 2016, when the Delaware Court of Chancery put an effective end to the practice of disclosure-only settlements in In re Trulia Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 29 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).

Figure 3:

C. Settlement Trends

As Figure 4 shows below, the average settlement value in 2019 declined by more than 50% from $71 million in 2018 to $30 million, but still remained higher than the average of $26 million in 2017. This decrease in the average settlement value can primarily be attributed to the inclusion of a settlement in 2018 that exceeded $1 billion, thereby skewing the average for that year. If our analysis is limited to cases with settlements under $1 billion, there actually is a slight increase in the average settlement value in 2019 compared to the prior years.

Figure 4:

As Figure 5 shows, the median settlement value in 2019 was $13 million, which is similar to the median in 2018 ($12 million) and almost double the median value in 2017 ($7 million).

Figure 5:

As shown in Figure 6, the Median NERA-Defined Investor Losses and Median Ratio of Actual Settlement to Investor Losses by Settlement Year remained steady in 2019 at $472 million, following a return in 2018 to a number similar to those recorded during the period 2014 through 2016.

Figure 6:

Finally, Figure 7 shows that 2018 saw increases in the percentage of settlements in the $10 to $19.9 million range, $50 to 99.9 million range, and $100+ million range. The perecentage of settlements in the $20 to $49.9 million range returned to virtually the same level that at which it was located in 2017, after experiencing a significant bump in 2018.

Figure 7:

II. What to Watch for in the Supreme Court

A. Disgorgement in SEC Enforcement Actions

On November 1, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Charles C. Liu and Xin Wang A/K/A Lisa Wang v. SEC, No. 18-1501, to review a Ninth Circuit decision affirming summary judgment for the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) on a claim of securities fraud under Section 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act and ordering disgorgement of the entire amount that the petitioners had raised from investors.

Liu and Wang formed and controlled corporate entities presumably to build and operate a proton therapy cancer treatment center in Montebello, California. Liu financed the prospective cancer center with $27 million of international investments raised through the EB–5 Immigrant Investor Program—which allows foreigners to obtain permanent residency in the U.S. by investing at least $500,000 in a “Targeted Employment Area,” thereby creating at least 10 full-time jobs for U.S. workers.

Instead of pursuing proton therapy, Liu funneled over $20 million of investor money to himself, his wife Wang, and marketing companies associated with them. In fact, the bulk of the millions of dollars transferred occurred shortly after the SEC subpoenaed Liu as part of its initial investigation in February 2016. No permit was ever issued for the construction of the treatment center.

The SEC sought summary judgment on three securities fraud causes of action against the defendants but the district court addressed only the Section 17(a)(2) claim, given that it was a sufficient basis for the remedies sought by the SEC. See SEC v. Liu, 262 F. Supp. 3d 957, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2017). The SEC asked the court to, inter alia, order disgorgement of the total amount raised from the investors ($27 million) less the amount left over and available to be returned ($200,000). On the basis of its broad equitable power to order disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and further discretion to indicate the amount to be disgorged, the court granted the relief sought by the SEC. See id. at 975.

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, defendants argued that the district court’s disgorgement order was erroneous. SEC v. Liu, 754 F. App’x 505, 509 (9th Cir. 2018). Relying on Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017), defendants asserted that the district court lacked the power to order the disgorgement. Liu, 754 F. App’x at 509. In Kokesh, the Supreme Court held that disgorgement operates as a penalty, and any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action must be commenced within five years of the date the claim accrued. See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1645. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Kokesh expressly did not address the issue of whether a court had the equitable power to order disgorgement, thereby distinguishing it from Ninth Circuit precedent on this matter. See Liu, 754 F. App’x at 509.

In their petition for a writ of certiorari, Liu and Wang specifically questioned the equitable power to award disgorgement in the wake of Kokesh. They argued that circuit courts need guidance after Kokesh, and also challenged the use of what was characterized as “equitable disgorgement” by other agencies, including the FTC and the EPA. The Kokesh Court—in providing a historical summary of the SEC’s enforcement powers—seemed to express disapproval of the SEC’s continued use of disgorgement in enforcement proceedings. See 137 S. Ct. at 1640 (“The Act left the Commission with a full panoply of enforcement tools: It may promulgate rules, investigate violations of those rules and the securities laws generally, and seek monetary penalties and injunctive relief for those violations. In the years since the Act, however, the Commission has continued its practice of seeking disgorgement in enforcement proceedings.”).

Oral argument is scheduled for March 3, 2020. Based on the merits brief, it seems possible that the Court could issue a ruling further curtailing the SEC’s reliance on the disgorgement remedy in civil enforcement actions.

B. Intersection Between Securities Laws and ERISA

On June 3, 2019, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Retirement Plans Committee of IBM v. Jander, No. 18-1165. Fiduciaries of the IBM retirement plan had sought review of the Second Circuit’s decision, which reversed the district court’s dismissal of retirement plan participants’ putative class complaint alleging that the Committee members breached their duties of prudence and loyalty under ERISA by continuing to invest in IBM stock while in possession of inside information about the company’s supposedly fraudulent practices.

IBM offers its employees an ERISA-qualified employee stock ownership plan (“ESOP”), which invests primarily in IBM common stock. See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 910 F.3d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 2018). Employees sued, arguing that plan fiduciaries (who were company insiders) breached their duty of prudence under ERISA by continuing to invest the plan in IBM stock despite allegedly knowing its market price was artificially inflated due to the company’s concealment of troubles in IBM’s microelectronics business. See id. at 622–23. Employees claimed that fiduciaries should either have disclosed the issues with the business’s valuation or frozen further investment in IBM stock. See id. at 623.

The district court dismissed the employees’ complaint for failure to state a claim because they failed to meet the pleading standard set forth in Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. 409, 428 (2014), which requires ERISA plaintiffs to “plausibly allege an alternative action that the defendant could have taken that would have been consistent with the securities laws and that a prudent fiduciary in the same circumstances would not have viewed as more likely to harm the fund than to help it.” After employees amended their complaint to allege that disclosure of the fraud was inevitable and the harm of such disclosure would generally increase over time, as well as adding another possible alternative action fiduciaries could have taken, the district court again dismissed under Dudenhoeffer, because fiduciaries could reasonably conclude that all three alternatives would cause more harm than good.  See Jander v. Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM, 272 F. Supp. 3d 444, 451–54 (S.D.N.Y. 2017).

The Second Circuit reversed, holding that “when a ‘drop in the value of the stock already held by the fund’ is inevitable, . . . it is far more plausible that a prudent fiduciary would prefer to limit the effects of the stock’s artificial inflation on the ESOP’s beneficiaries through prompt disclosure.” Jander, 910 F.3d at 630 (citation omitted) (quoting Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 430). The Second Circuit found that the employees therefore met the Dudenhoeffer standard by alleging, in part, research suggesting that the employees’ losses would have been smaller if negative information were disclosed promptly. Id. at 629–30. Plan fiduciaries petitioned for a writ of certiorari.

After certiorari was granted, the fiduciaries (and the Solicitor General, on behalf of the SEC and the Department of Labor) focused on other arguments in their merits briefing. See Ret. Plans Comm. of IBM v. Jander, 2020 WL 201024, at *1 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2020) (per curiam). The fiduciaries argued for a bright-line rule that ERISA could never impose a duty on them to act on inside information. Id. The Government argued that requiring fiduciaries to disclose inside information under ERISA that is not otherwise required to be disclosed by the securities laws would conflict with the complex disclosure requirements imposed by those laws.

Rather than resolve the questions presented on the pleading standard in breach of fiduciary duty cases involving employee-benefit plans, on January 14, 2020 the Supreme Court vacated and remanded back to the Second Circuit for consideration of the issues raised in the merits briefing that were not resolved by the previous decision. Id. at *2. In remanding, the Court referenced its statement in Dudenhoeffer that the SEC’s views “might ‘well be relevant’ to discerning the content of ERISA’s duty of prudence in this context.” Id. (quoting Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 429).

Justice Kagan authored a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Ginsburg, noting that the Second Circuit could refuse to hear these new arguments if they were not properly preserved. Id. (Kagan, J., concurring). And if the Second Circuit did choose to address them, Justice Kagan opined that they would be hard to square with Dudenhoeffer, as that case “makes clear that an ESOP fiduciary at times has . . . a duty” to act on insider information given that it “sets out exactly what a plaintiff must allege to state a claim that the fiduciary breached his duty of prudence by ‘failing to act on inside information.’” Id. (quoting Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 423). Justice Kagan disagreed with the Government’s argument that ERISA only imposes such a duty when already imposed by the securities laws, explaining that Dudenhoeffer only holds that there is no duty to disclose when it would “violat[e],” or “conflict[]” with the “requirements” or “objectives” of those laws. Id. (quoting Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 428–29). Justice Kagan therefore left open the possibility that disclosure might be required under ERISA “even if the securities laws do not require it,” positing that in such a “conflict-free zone” the question would be whether a “prudent fiduciary would think the action more likely to help than to harm the fund.” Id. (citing Dudenhoeffer, 573 U.S. at 428).

Justice Gorsuch also authored a concurring opinion, disagreeing with Justice Kagan’s “broad[]” reading of Dudenhoeffer, and noting that the “pure question of law” raised in the case should be “addressed immediately.” Id. at *3 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Under Justice Gorsuch’s view, Dudenhoeffer does not impose liability on plan fiduciaries for “alternative actions they could have taken only in a nonfiduciary capacity.” Id.

As Jander involves important questions regarding the fiduciary duties of pension plan managers who invest in company stock, including the intersection between the securities laws and ERISA, readers can expect that this will not be the Supreme Court’s last word on the issue.

III.  Delaware Developments

A. The Delaware Court of Chancery Continues to Scrutinize Relationships Between Directors

Over the last several years, Delaware courts have reviewed independence among directors with seemingly increased scrutiny.  See, e.g., Marchand v. Barnhill, 212 A.3d 805 (Del. 2019) (director’s 28-year relationship with CEO’s family rebutted presumption of independence); Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124 (Del. 2016) (director’s 50-year friendship with controller rebutted presumption of independence); Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017 (Del. 2015) (director and controller’s co-ownership of airplane rebutted presumption of independence).  The Court of Chancery continued that apparent trend in In re BGC Partners, Inc., where it closely scrutinized the relationships between the members of BGC’s board of directors and the company’s controller. 2019 WL 4745121, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2019).

In BGC, stockholders of BGC purported to bring a derivative action against its controlling stockholder—who also served as its Chairman and CEO—and other directors based on the theory that the controller caused BGC to acquire and overpay for another company in which the controller owned a controlling stake. Id. at *1–2. As the controller’s interest in the transaction was conceded, the court’s analysis of whether the plaintiffs adequately pleaded demand futility and rebutted the business judgment rule turned on whether a majority of BGC’s directors were interested in the proposed transaction or lacked independence with respect to the controller. Id. at *9.

Based on a deep dive into three particular directors’ professional and personal connections to the controller, id. at *10–14, the court held that it could infer that a majority of directors lacked independence, id. at *9. For the first director, the court noted that he had a 20-year professional and personal relationship with the controller, including attending galas with each other’s families and the controller’s setting up a private tour of a museum for the director’s family. Id. at *11–12. For the second and third directors, the court focused on their service on the boards of other companies affiliated with the controller and how their income from this service was likely to be material relative to their other sources of income. Id. at *12–14. The Court also referenced both of these directors’ ties to a college to which the controller had made substantial donations. Id. Although one director was no longer affiliated with that college, the court explained that past benefits could be enough to create a sense of obligation to the controller. Id. at *12.

B. Court of Chancery Interprets Demand Letter

Whether a stockholder’s letter to the board is a “demand” affects the standard of review applicable to any litigation arising from that letter. If the letter is indeed a demand, then, under Delaware law, the stockholder has “tacitly concede[d]” that the board was able to exercise its business judgment in considering it. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 777 (Del. 1990). In Solak v. Welch, 2019 WL 5588877 (Del. Ch. Oct. 30, 2019), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a stockholder’s letter was a “demand” even though it did not expressly demand litigation.

The stockholder plaintiff in Solak sent a letter to the company’s board of directors “to suggest that the [board] take corrective action to address excessive director compensation as well as compensation practices and policies pertaining to directors.” Solak, 2019 WL 5588877, at *2. The letter asserted that the company’s compensation policy “lacks any meaningful limitations” and “warn[ed]” that “[t]he company is more susceptible than ever to shareholder challenges unless it revises or amends its director compensation practices and policies.” Id. The letter “suggest[ed]” that the board “take immediate remedial measures” and stated that the plaintiff “would consider ‘all available stockholder remedies’” if the board failed to respond within 30 days. Id. But the letter also included a footnote saying that “nothing contained herein shall be construed as a pre-suit litigation demand under Delaware Chancery Rule 23.1,” and that “[w]e do not seek or expect the board to initiate any legal action against its members.” Id.

The board sent a response letter explaining that it viewed the stockholder letter as a demand, and declined to take any of the remedial actions suggested in the stockholder letter. Id. at *3. So the stockholder sued, purporting to assert derivative claims. Id. At issue was whether the letter counted as a “demand” on the board. Id. at *4. The court explained that a pre-suit communication need not expressly demand litigation to be deemed a demand. Id. at *5–6. Rather, the letter need only “clearly articulat[e] the remedial action to be taken by the board” or “clearly demand[] corporate action.” Id. at *5. The letter’s “strong overtures of litigation” and suggested remedial measures met this test, notwithstanding its footnote purportedly disclaiming that it was a demand. Id. at *6–7. And because the letter was a demand, the strict demand-refused standard applied, which the plaintiff could not overcome. Id. at *8–9.

C. Despite Akorn, an MAE Is Still a Rare Event Requiring a Buyer to Carry a Heavy Burden

As we discussed in our 2018 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, in 2018, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery’s conclusion that a buyer had proven it properly terminated a merger agreement because the target had suffered a “material adverse effect” (or “MAE”)—a first for both courts. See Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, 2018 WL 4719347 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), aff’d, 198 A.3d 724 (Del. 2018). As the Court of Chancery explained, the test for an MAE is “whether there has been an adverse change in the target’s business that is consequential to the company’s long-term earnings power over a reasonable period, which one would expect to be measured in years rather than months.” Id. at *53.

In Channel Medsystems, the first case since Akorn to consider whether an MAE had occurred, the Court of Chancery confirmed that triggering an MAE clause remains a high bar. Channel Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp., 2019 WL 6896462 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019). In that case, Boston Scientific sought to be relieved from its agreement to acquire Channel after Channel learned and disclosed that fraud committed by its Vice President of Quality put at risk FDA approval of its only device even though “the FDA [had] accepted Channel’s remediation plan” and “made the FDA’s approval a distinct possibility.” Id. at *1. Indeed, one month before trial in Channel Medsystems, and “consistent with the timeframe for receiving FDA approval the parties expected when they entered into the [merger agreement],” the FDA approved the device. Id.

The Court of Chancery concluded that “Boston Scientific failed to prove based on both qualitative and quantitative factors that it was entitled to terminate [the parties’ agreement].” Id. at *36.

First, the court considered whether Boston Scientific held, at the time it purported to terminate the deal, “a reasonable expectation” that Channel “would reasonably be expected” to suffer a qualitatively significant adverse effect as of the closing date. Id. at *25, *29. But the court found virtually no contemporaneous evidence suggesting that Boston Scientific held such an expectation. Id. at *33. To the contrary, Boston Scientific had failed to take any reasonable steps to make an informed decision regarding the likely impact of the fraud on Channel and instead had relied solely on a report provided by Channel, which actually concluded the fraud had no impact on the device. Id. at *29–30.

Second, the court rejected Boston Scientific’s attempt to demonstrate the quantitative impact of the fraud on Channel’s value to Boston Scientific as of the date that the merger agreement was signed. Id. at *34. The court did so in large part because Boston Scientific based its expert’s analysis on assumptions that were not objectively reasonable. Id. In particular, Boston Scientific’s expert assumed that Channel’s only product would have to be held off the market for two to four years for remediation and retesting. Id. The court found that this assumption was not objectively reasonable, however, because “Boston Scientific’s own track record and the testimony of its own witnesses belie[d] the contention that it was necessary to remediate an retest [the device] before placing it on the market given the FDA’s approval of the device.” Id. at *28–29, 35.

IV. Lower Courts Grappling with Implications of Lorenzo

As we discussed in our 2019 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, on March 27, 2019, the Supreme Court held in Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019), that those who disseminate false or misleading information to the investing public with the intent to defraud can be found liable under Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act and under Exchange Act Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c), even if the disseminator did not “make” the statements and was thus not subject to enforcement under Rule 10b-5(b).

Importantly, in Lorenzo, the Court stated that “[t]hose who disseminate false statements with intent to defraud are primarily liable under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c),” as well as Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act, “even if they are secondarily liable under Rule 10b-5(b).” Lorenzo, 139 S. Ct. at 1104. This holding raises the possibility that secondary actors could face liability under Exchange Act Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c) simply for disseminating the alleged misstatement of another if a plaintiff can show that they knew the statements contained false or misleading information. Although this issue has yet to come up in other cases, over the last year, three lower federal courts have grappled with how to apply Lorenzo in other ways.

First, in April 2019, the Southern District of New York relied on Lorenzo to find that the SEC had adequately pleaded scheme liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though it had alleged no deceptive act other than misstatements or omissions. SEC v. SeeThruEquity, LLC, 2019 WL 1998027 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2019). The defendants, a stock research company and its co-founders, were accused of failing to disclose that they were paid by a company that they were recommending in their research reports. Id. at *1–3. They argued the SEC could not plead “scheme liability” under Rule 10b-5 because they had been accused of no deceptive acts beyond the misstatements themselves. Id. at *5. The court rejected this argument, stating that “[t]he complaint alleges that the defendants’ entire business model, beyond any misstatements or omissions, is deceptive.” Id.

Then, in August 2019, the Tenth Circuit expanded Lorenzo further, holding that scheme liability could be found based on a failure to correct a misstatement. See Malouf v. SEC, 933 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2019). In Malouf, the defendant had occupied two key positions at separate firms—one was a branch of the broker-dealer firm Raymond James Financial Services (“Raymond James”) and the other, UASNM, Inc. (“UASNM”), provided clients with investment advice. Id. at 1253–54. After Raymond James became concerned about the defendant’s dual role at the two firms, the defendant sold his Raymond James branch, which was to be paid for in installments based on the branch’s “collection of securities-related fees.” Id. at 1254. To collect on the sale, the defendant routed bond trades for his UASNM clients through the Raymond James branch so that the branch’s buyer could pay the defendant back with money accrued through commissions. Id. The defendant did not disclose this arrangement to anyone at UASNM, which publicly touted that it provided its clients with “impartial advice untainted by any conflicts of interest.” Id. Meanwhile, the defendant also helped decide what UASNM would include in its public disclosures, but “took no steps to remedy UASNM’s misstatements or to disclose his own conflict of interest.” Id. at 1254–55. Ultimately, after an outside consultant caught wind of the conflict, it was disclosed. Id. at 1255. During an enforcement action, the administrative law judge found that the defendant had violated, among other things, Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Exchange Act Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c). Id.

On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1253. In connection with Section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act and Exchange Act Rules 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c), the court stated “we conclude that [the defendant’s] failure to correct UASNM’s misstatements could trigger liability” because, under Lorenzo, “a person could incur liability under these provisions when the conduct involves another person’s false or misleading statement.” Id. at 1259–60 (citing 139 S. Ct. at 1101–03). In other words, the panel accepted that the defendant was liable because, although he did not disseminate UASNM’s alleged misstatements, he failed to correct the relevant disclosures that he knew were false.

Finally, in December 2019, in EnSource Investments LLC v. Willis, 2019 WL 6700403 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2019), a court found that Lorenzo did not apply to entities involved in an allegedly fraudulent scheme because those entities had not “disseminated any false statements.” Id. at *13. In EnSource, two entities were “under the umbrella” of another company and its founder, both of whom were defendants in the case. Id. at *1. The founder and parent company were found to have made misstatements “on behalf” of the entities. Id. at *13. Rather than holding that these entities had a duty under Lorenzo to correct the misstatements made on their behalf, the EnSource court simply found that because the entities did not disseminate the misstatements, Lorenzo did not apply. Id. at *13.

It remains to be seen whether cases such as SeeThruEquity or Malouf will be confined to their facts or whether courts will adopt or expand on these holdings to increase the reach of scheme liability. We will, of course, provide an update on the direction that courts take Lorenzo and scheme liability in our 2020 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update.

V.  Falsity of Opinions – Omnicare Update

As we discussed in our prior securities litigation updates, lower courts continue to explore application of the standard set forth in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, 575 U.S. 175 (2015), for determining falsity of an opinion. In its Omnicare decision, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of liability for false opinion statements under Section 11 of the Securities Act and held that “a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an ‘untrue statement of material fact,’ regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong.” Id. at 186. According to that standard, an opinion statement can give rise to liability only when the speaker does not “actually hold[] the stated belief,” or when the opinion statement contains “embedded statements of fact” that are untrue. Id. at 184–85. In the “omission” section of the opinion, the Court held that a factual omission “about the issuer’s inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion” gives rise to liability when the omitted facts “conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself.” Id. at 1329.

Omnicare’s falsity of opinions standard continues to serve as a significant pleading barrier to securities fraud claims. In Carvelli v. Ocwen Financial Corp., the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to show the defendant’s “statements of opinion are mutually exclusive of—or even inconsistent with—[the company]’s alleged knowledge,” and therefore the complaint failed to meet the pleading standard set forth in Omnicare. 934 F.3d 1307, 1323 (11th Cir. 2019). The court noted that merely an inference that the company “could or should have known” that its belief about the company’s economic vitality conflicted with the company’s “persistent” technology problems is insufficient to show the company did not believe its statements of opinion. Id. (emphasis original).

In its first decision applying the standard for opinion liability post-Omnicare, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a case concerning an oil company’s stated belief that it was in “substantial compliance” with regulatory obligations. Police & Fire Ret. Sys. of City of Detroit v. Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P., 777 F. App’x 726 (5th Cir. 2019) (“Plains II”). As discussed in our 2018 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update, the Southern District of Texas dismissed allegations that statements concerning compliance were misleading on the basis that a regulatory agency had identified issues that concerned only a different and small part of the company’s varied operations. In re Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P. Sec. Litig., 307 F. Supp. 3d 583, 621–22 (S.D. Tex. 2018). The Fifth Circuit concurred that the company’s “belief statements” regarding its compliance “were broadly applicable and therefore were not rendered false or misleading” by issues that affected “a small percentage” of the company’s pipelines. Plains II, 777 F. App’x at 731.

In the latter half of 2019, several courts reached differing conclusions on whether companies could be held liable for opinions about the results of scientific research. In Lehman v. Ohr Pharmaceuticals, plaintiffs alleged that a company’s optimistic announcements about second-phase drug trials were misleading where the company omitted that the results were only meaningful because the control group fared significantly worse than in historical trials. 2019 WL 4572765 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019). The Southern District of New York disagreed, relying on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Tongue v. Sanofi, in which the court found that a pharmaceutical company’s statements were not misleading even though they did not “include a fact that would have potentially undermined Defendants’ optimistic projections.” Id. at *3 (citing Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 212 (2d Cir. 2016)). Judge Preska also cautioned against courts issuing decisions that would compel caution rather than optimism about the results of such an experiment: “[T]he law does not abide attempts at using the judiciary to stifle the risk-taking that undergirds scientific advancement and human progress. The answer to bad science is more science, not this Court’s acting as the Southern District for the Inquisition.” Id. at *5.

By contrast, in Micholle v. Ophthotech Corp., the court considered whether an opinion that a change in testing methodology had no “meaningful” impact on who was eligible to participate in a certain drug trial was actionable in light of plaintiff’s allegations that there was at least a 17% difference. 2019 WL 4464802, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2019). The court denied dismissal because “[m]ateriality is a fact-specific inquiry” and an “investor may well have considered the degree of similarity between the parameters of a new clinical trial and those of a recently completed—and purportedly very successful—clinical trial important.” Id. at *13.

There were a handful of reported decisions that focused on whether a complaint sufficiently pled the omission of contrary facts that rendered positive opinions regarding the company’s business misleading. For example, in Hawaii Structural Ironworkers Pension Trust Fund v. AMC Entertainment Holdings, Inc., plaintiffs plausibly alleged that opinions about the “smooth” process of integrating a recent acquisition implied “that there were no significant or systemic obstacles to [the] integration.” 2019 WL 4601644, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2019). Similarly, in Vignola v. FAT Brands, Inc., a Central District of California court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss statements concerning the experience and track record of the company’s senior leadership team. 2019 WL 6888051, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2019). The court considered that while investors do understand that opinions generally are formed by weighing competing facts, here, the company allegedly omitted the key fact “that the same leadership team had previously steered the subsidiaries of its same flagship brand into bankruptcy.” Id. at *10 (emphasis original).

VI. Halliburton II  Market Efficiency and “Price Impact” Cases

We are continuing to monitor significant decisions interpreting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258 (2014) (“Halliburton II”). The federal circuit courts of appeals did not provide any new guidance in the second half of 2019, but certain questions have been recurring in trial courts recently. Recall that in Halliburton II, the Supreme Court preserved the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption, permitting plaintiffs to maintain the common proof of reliance that is required for class certification in a Rule 10b-5 case, but also permitting defendants to rebut the presumption at the class certification stage with evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not impact the issuer’s stock price. The key questions we have been following in the wake of Halliburton II are the following: (1) How should courts reconcile the Supreme Court’s explicit ruling in Halliburton II that direct and indirect evidence of price impact must be considered at the class certification stage, Halliburton II, 573 U.S. at 283, with the Supreme Court’s previous decisions in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011) (“Halliburton I”), and Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013), holding that plaintiffs need not prove loss causation or materiality until the merits stage?; (2) What standard of proof must defendants meet to rebut the presumption with evidence of no price impact?; and (3) What evidence is required to successfully rebut the presumption?

As previously discussed in our 2018 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, the Second Circuit addressed the first two questions in Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Barclays”) and Arkansas Teachers Retirement System v. Goldman Sachs, 879 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Goldman Sachs”). Those decisions remain the most substantive interpretations of Halliburton II. Barclays held that after a plaintiff establishes the presumption of reliance applies, the defendant bears the burden of persuasion to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. Barclays, 875 F.3d at 100–03. Though this appeared to put the Second Circuit at odds with the Eighth Circuit, which cited Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence when reversing a trial court’s certification order on price impact grounds, IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., 818 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2016), the inconsistency was not enough to persuade the Supreme Court to take up the issue, Barclays PLC v. Waggoner, 138 S. Ct. 1702 (Mem.) (2018) (denying writ of certiorari).

In Goldman Sachs, the Second Circuit vacated the trial court’s ruling certifying a class and remanded the action, directing that price impact evidence must be analyzed prior to certification, even if price impact “touches” on the issue of materiality.  Goldman Sachs, 879 F.3d at 486. Recent district court decisions in the latter half of 2019 have embraced this approach when reconciling Halliburton II with Halliburton I and Amgen. See, e.g., In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co. N.V. Sec. Litig., 2019 WL 5287980, at *21–23 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2019) (concluding price impact analysis appropriate prior to class certification even if it may “touch on materiality”); Di Donato v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., 2019 WL 4573443, at *6 (D. Ariz. Sept. 20, 2019) (explaining that a plaintiff need not prove materiality at the class certification stage). The Southern District of New York again certified the Goldman Sachs class, In re Goldman Sachs Grp. Sec. Litig., 2018 WL 3854757, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018), holding that while the price had not moved in response to previous statements on the same subject as the alleged corrective disclosures, those disclosures were sufficiently different to credit plaintiff’s expert’s “link between the news of [defendant]’s conflicts and the subsequent stock price declines,” and that defendants’ expert testimony was insufficient to “sever” that link. Id. at *4–6. The Second Circuit agreed to review the decision recertifying the class, see Order, Ark. Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs, Case No. 18-3667 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2019) (“Goldman Sachs II”), and the case was fully briefed, argued and taken under consideration in June. A decision could be reached in the case any day now.

In 2019, the Third Circuit also weighed in, providing some guidance on the type of evidence defendants must present to rebut the presumption of reliance at the class certification stage. That court affirmed the district court’s grant of plaintiff’s motion for certification, finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering conflicting expert testimony. Vizirgianakis v. Aeterna Zentaris, Inc., 775 F. App’x 51, 53–54 (3d Cir. 2019). Most significantly, the Third Circuit rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiff’s expert’s event study, which was offered for the purpose of proving market efficiency (i.e., that the stock price moved in reaction to news about the company), was actually evidence that the statements at issue had no price impact. Id. at 53. Specifically, Defendants argued that because plaintiff’s expert had not proven a stock price movement in response to one of the alleged corrective disclosures at the statistically significant 95% confidence level, the relevant statement had no price impact. Id. at 53. The Court observed that plaintiff’s expert’s report was not written for the purpose of proving or disproving price impact and plaintiff’s inconclusive evidence regarding a stock price movement is not evidence of a lack of price impact. Id. at *53. Similar attempts to use plaintiffs’ market efficiency studies as evidence of a lack of price impact have been rejected by a number of district courts as well. See, e.g., In re Signet Jewelers Ltd. Sec. Litig., 2019 WL 3001084, at *13–15 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2019) (“Defendants’ failure to . . . supplement [their expert’s] report with an event study showing the absence of price impact is, on its own, a basis for rejecting Defendants’ arguments.”); Di Donato, 2019 WL 4573443, at *13 (“The lack of statistically significant proof that a statement affected the stock price is not a statistically significant proof of the opposite[.]”) (emphasis original); accord Chicago Bridge, 2019 WL 5287980, at *12–14 (noting that even statistically insignificant findings of causes of price impacts should be considered, albeit possibly granted less weight than statistically significant findings).

These cases suggest defendants should consider performing their own event studies if defendants intend to argue a lack of price impact rather than simply criticizing event studies offered by plaintiffs. Defendants should also account for the precise facts and circumstances of each case before settling on a strategy for challenging price impact in whole or in part.

We will continue to monitor developments in Goldman Sachs II and related cases.

VII.  Statute of Limitations for Martin Act Claims Extended to Six Years

On August 26, 2019, New York Governor Andrew Cuomo signed into law a bill extending the statute of limitations for all claims brought pursuant to the Martin Act, New York’s blue sky law, to six years. This reverses a 2018 decision from New York’s highest court, which held that many Martin Act claims must be brought within three years. See generally Schneiderman v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 31 N.Y.3d 622 (2018). According to the bill’s sponsor memo, a “six-year timeline was essential to some of the most meaningful cases that have reined in Wall Street excesses, halted fraudulent practices, and returned millions of dollars to defrauded consumers and investors,” and the law’s drafters expect this new six-year period to give New York’s Attorney General time to make “extensive investigations” into “novel areas of business practices.” See NY State Senate Bill S6536, The New York State Senate, https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s6536.

As readers will know, the Martin Act permits New York “to investigate and enjoin fraudulent practices in the marketing of stocks, bonds and other securities within or from New York State.” Credit Suisse, 31 N.Y.3d at 629. The Martin Act defines “fraudulent practices” “expansive[ly],” and “prohibitions against fraud, misrepresentation and material omission are found throughout the statutory scheme.” Id.; N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. §§ 352–353. Moreover, unlike common law fraud, Martin Act liability does not require any showing of “scienter or justifiable reliance on the part of investors.” Credit Suisse, 31 N.Y.3d at 632. A violation of the Martin Act can lead to both civil and criminal liability. N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. §§ 353, 358.

In 2018, in Credit Suisse, the New York Court of Appeals held that different theories of Martin Act liability would be subject to different limitations periods. When a case was premised on a legal theory akin to “fraud recognized in the common law,” the applicable statute of limitations would be six years, but for liability premised on the more “expansive” notions of a “fraudulent practice” solely created by statute, the applicable limitations period would be three years. See Credit Suisse, 31 N.Y.3d at 633–34 (dismissing stale claims).

Credit Suisse now has been expressly superseded. It is too early to predict the practical impact of this development. However, it is reasonable to assume that New York enforcement officials will quickly take advantage of the longer limitations period. In a joint statement with New York Attorney General Letitia James, Governor Cuomo trumpeted the new law as “enhancing one of the state’s most powerful tools to prosecute financial fraud so we can hold more bad actors accountable, protect investors and achieve a fairer New York for all.” New Law Strengthens AG James’ Authority To Take On Corporate Misconduct, New York State Attorney General (Aug. 26, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/new-law-strengthens-ag-james-authority-take-corporate-misconduct. Attorney General James stated that “[a]s the federal government continues to abdicate its role of protecting investors and consumers, this law is particularly important. New York remains committed to finding and prosecuting the bad actors that rob victims and destabilize markets.” Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Increasing New York’s Capacity to Prosecute Financial Fraud, Official Website of the State of New York (Aug. 26, 2019), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-increasing-new-yorks-capacity-prosecute-financial-fraud.

This post comes to us from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “2019 Year-End Securities Litigation Update,” dated February 18, 2020, and available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Blockchain Will Not Solve the Proxy Voting Problem

The U.S. proxy voting process is widely viewed as inefficient, opaque, and frequently inaccurate. The conventional wisdom is that voting inaccuracy has arisen largely as a result of decisions made in the 1960s to transition to a system of share immobilization[1] pursuant to which most shares are held in “street name”[2],[3] by securities intermediaries as a fungible mass of shares that is not directly traceable to any individual.[4] In particular, although the street name system facilitates securities trading, holding shares in fungible bulk makes it difficult, if not impossible, for street name investors to confirm that their shares are voted in accordance with their wishes since there is purportedly no way to provide end-to-end voting confirmations.

Consequently, a number of academics[5] and practitioners, including several SEC commissioners,[6] expressed an interest in exploring whether blockchain technology could provide end-to-end vote confirmations by enabling market participants to trace share ownership to the ultimate beneficial owner and bypass the layers of intermediaries. But while blockchain technology may work in certain cases, it probably will not be the panacea that its proponents expect.

Reliance on blockchain technology presumes that the aforementioned problems are primarily a function of existing technology. But several  securities industry pilot projects have demonstrated that end-to-end vote confirmations are already possible under the existing proxy voting system, and in any event, the Depository Trust Corporation’s (“DTC”) Direct Registration System (“DRS”) Service has enabled investors to avoid holding their securities in street name since 1996. In addition, while blockchain technology could facilitate end-to-end voting, investors would have to hold custody of their own tokens[7]  and, for a number or reasons, many investors will not.[8]  More to the point, blockchains use public key cryptography, and the loss of private keys associated with a particular token would result in the loss of that token.  Due to the complexities of safeguarding private keys, and the severe consequences for failing to do so, many token holders have relied on centralized exchanges or third-party custodians to hold their tokens and, absent better key management technology, there is little reason to think that this trend will change.  While this would seem to contradict one of the primary rationales for adopting blockchain technology –  eliminating intermediaries – the logic is clear; how many times have you used the login reset function on a financial website because you have forgotten your username or password?[9]

There may be other problems with migrating the existing trading and clearance system to a blockchain.[10]  In particular, putting equity securities on a blockchain may increase the risk of a cyber attack on a holder of those securities. That’s because  trades involving equity securities on a blockchain are cleared and settled nearly instantaneously,[11] and the asset used in clearing and settling and such a trade is likely to be another blockchain token that is either a bearer instrument or easily converted into another token that is a bearer instrument.[12] The proceeds of such an attack can, therefore, be easily laundered.  Securities holders might avoid the problem by not disclosing that they own securities tokens, but most state laws require issuers to maintain records on the identity and holdings of their security holders and to give that information to security holders under certain circumstances.[13]  Federal securities laws also require security holders that meet certain ownership criteria to file beneficial ownership reports under Sections 13[14] and 16[15] of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.[16]

Finally, if equity securities are converted into tokens, there will presumably be an incentive to implement some form of blockchain voting.  Yet a number of researchers have pointed out that using blockchains may exacerbate the problems inherent in internet voting.[17] Moreover, unless the voting procedures are carefully thought out and implemented, migrating to a blockchain-based voting system could also facilitate vote buying.[18]

ENDNOTES

[1] See Transfer Agent Regulations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-76743, Dec. 22, 2015, at pages 11 – 36, available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2015/34-76743.pdf (“Transfer Agent Release”).  See also Kenneth Levine, Was Trade Settlement Always on T+3? A History of Clearing and Settlement Changes, Friends of Financial History, Issue 56, Summer 1996, at 20 – 26, available at https://archive.org/stream/friendsoffinanci00muse_12#page/20/mode/2up.

[2]Street Name,” which stands for “Wall Street name,” refers to the practice of registering securities into the name of a nominee rather than the name of the investor. See Transfer Agent Release at page 20, FN 45.

[3] See Transfer Agent Release at page 38. Beneficial share ownership now comprises over 85% of share ownership in U.S. corporations. See Written Statement of the Independent Steering Committee of Broadridge, Nov. 14, 2018, at page 2, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4725-4649189-176471.pdf, and SEC, Roundtable on Proxy Voting Mechanics,” May 23, 2007, available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxyvotingbrief.htm (“Proxy Voting Mechanics Roundtable”).

[4] See SEC, November 15, 2018: Roundtable on the Proxy Process Proxy Roundtable Transcript, Nov. 15, 2018, available at https://www.sec.gov/files/proxy-round-table-transcript-111518.pdf (“2018 Roundtable Transcript”)(“So the SDA statement is disturbing. We believe that the most important reasons for inaccuracies are fundamental, the current system of share immobilization with a fungible share mass, which Katie[Sevcik] referred to, with no traceable link to a specific holder.”)(statement of Ken Bertsch, Executive Director of the Council of Institutional Investors (“CII”), at page 38).

[5] See, e.g., Panisi, Federico and Buckley, Ross P. and Arner, Douglas W., Blockchain and Public Companies: A Revolution in Share Ownership Transparency, Proxy-Voting and Corporate Governance? 2 Stanford Journal of Blockchain Law & Policy 2019, May 1, 2019, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3389045 (positing that “…blockchain could enable the tracking of share ownership through the complete settlement cycle, enhancing the ‘shareholder democracy’ of listed companies, and benefiting their corporate governance and the market in their shares”); and Geis, George S., Traceable Shares and Corporate Law. Northwestern University Law Review, v. 113, Forthcoming; Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2018-13; Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2018-05, Feb. 2018, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3129042 (positing that “The rise of distributed ledgers and blockchain technology is poised to allow for specific share identification and precise records of share provenance,” which in turn “…will change the structure of shareholder lawsuits, alter the allocation of corporate governance rights, and require lawmakers to rethink fundamental principles of shareholder responsibility for corporate misdeeds.”).

[6] See, e.g., Kara M. Stein, Opening Remarks at the 2018 SEC Staff Roundtable on the Proxy Process, Nov. 15, 2018, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/stein-remarks-2018-roundtable-proxy-process (“…I am interested in hearing how technology can help proxy mechanics. For example, should companies be able to use distributed ledger or blockchain technology to identify and reach their shareholder bases more efficiently?”); and Jay Clayton, SEC Rulemaking Over the Past Year, the Road Ahead and Challenges Posed by Brexit, LIBOR Transition and Cybersecurity Risks, Dec. 06, 2018, available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-clayton-120618 (“Another significant initiative for 2019 is improving the proxy process… There was consensus among the panelists that the proxy “plumbing” needs a major overhaul. I encourage market participants to explore what such an overhaul would entail and to consider how technology, including distributed ledger technology, could improve the proxy plumbing.”).  See also Kenneth A. Bertsch, Executive Director, and Jeffrey P. Mahoney, General Counsel, CII, Jan. 31, 2019 Letter to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, SEC, available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-725/4725-4864575-177347.pdf (“January 2019 CII Letter”)(“In this letter, we suggest specific regulatory relief the SEC could provide to foster the use of innovative technology by permitting issuers to elect to place their equity securities on a private, permissioned blockchain.”)

[7] Some commentators refer to “tokens” as the digital assets that are built on top of another network (such as the Ethereum blockchain), and “coins” as the digital assets that are unique to a particular blockchain (e.g., Ether is the native digital asset of the Ethereum blockchain) and therefore do not need to rely upon another coin. See Sherwin Dowlat and Michael Hodapp, Cryptoasset Initiation Report Network Creation, Satis Group, Jul. 11, 2018, at page 2, available at https://research.bloomberg.com/pub/res/d28giW28tf6G7T_Wr77aU0gDgFQ). While the economic and behavior incentives created by each differ, the Article will refer to both as Tokens.

[8] While one of the purported selling points of Tokens is that they enable the holder to become his/her/its own bank, there is little evidence that most people would voluntarily chose to do so.  See, e.g., Preethi Kasireddy and Nathaniel Whittemore, LIVE DEBATE: People don’t want to be their own bank, Twitter, Mar. 19, 2019, available at https://twitter.com/iam_preethi/status/1108065479824859136 (concluding that while many people would appreciate the option to do so, most would not choose to be their own bank); and Rocco, On Abstraction and Risk, Medium, May 28, 2019, available at https://medium.com/alpineintel/on-abstraction-and-risk-e981e06830f3 (“It’s important to know the risks with using these services, but “being your own bank” isn’t the most appealing thing to most of humanity. There’s a reason why banks are popular, even after all of the fraud they’ve engaged in.)(emphasis in original).  See also CZ on Centralization Vs. Decentralization, Binance Blog, Feb. 12, 2019, available at https://www.binance.com/en/blog/301982828007075840/CZ-on-Centralization-Vs-Decentralization?ref=tokendaily (opining that leaving Tokens on a centralized exchange is probably safer for most people than being their own bank).

Further evidence that most people would not choose to hold their own Tokens can be seen in the number of applications that have been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) seeking permission to list a Bitcoin Exchange Traded Fund (“ETF”).  While ETFs can provide investors exposure to assets that would otherwise be difficult to obtain and/or diversify risk by providing exposure to a basket of assets, none of those rationales would seem to explain the perceived attractiveness of a Bitcoin ETF since investors can purchase Bitcoin directly from virtually any cryptocurrency exchange, and a Bitcoin EFT, by definition, only provides exposure to a single asset.  Moreover, since investors in EFTs pay at least some fees to the ETF’s sponsors, it is difficult to see how an investment in a Bitcoin EFT could outperform a direct investment in Bitcoin.  Taken together, this suggests that the primary appeal of Bitcoin EFT is that it would provide a way to gain exposure to Bitcoin without the need to actually own Bitcoin. See, e.g., Jay Baris and Joshua Ashley Klayman, In Pursuit of Perfection? A Primer On Digital Asset-Related ETPs, Jun. 2019, available at https://www.shearman.com/-/media/Files/Perspectives/2019/06/Primer-on-Digital-Asset-Related-ETPs.pdf?la=en&hash=009A8A7C2519F294AE1899061D884B7C0DD02A5C.

[9] To state the obvious, there is no analogue to the “forgot my password” function in private key management – i.e., once the private key is lost, it is gone.  Of course, one could attempt to “hack” the private key to recover it, but if that were a viable option, the value of the associated blockchain would plummet since its associated cryptographic security scheme would be compromised.

[10] Before going any further, it is helpful to note that there is not a proxy voting system per se, but rather a set of market practices and regulatory requirements that evolved over time to leverage the existing securities trading and clearing system to facilitate security holder voting. As such, unless the existing securities trading and clearing system is restructured entirely, only incremental changes can presumably be made to the proxy voting system. On that point, Chairman Clayton closed the Panel discussion by cautioning the participants regarding potential changes to the existing securities trading and clearing system. See 2018 Roundtable Transcript (“Third, I just want to note this for people who are maybe watching and aren’t focused on proxy but are focused on trading and other things. I do think we have to have respect for our intermediary system. It’s not just an intermediary system for ownership and voting, but it’s an intermediary system for trading, and it adds to efficiencies in trading.” (statement of Chairman Jay Clayton, at pages 112 – 113).

[11] For example, although Overstock subsidiary tZero’s newly launched alternative trading system (“ATS”) will initially operate during normal market hours between 9:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. EST, tZero’s technology platform allows it to conduct trading on a 24/7 basis, and the management team indicated that that was an eventual goal. See Anna Baydakova, Overstock’s tZERO to Trade Tokens During Wall Street Hours Only, CoinDesk, Jan. 28, 2019, available at https://www.coindesk.com/overstocks-tzero-to-trade-tokens-during-wall-street-hours-only.

[12] With the exception of so-called non-fungible Tokens such as the ERC-721 Tokens used to represent individual CryptoKitties, Tokens are intended to be completely fungible and therefore are essentially bearer instruments.  For regulatory reasons, however (e.g., compliance with securities laws), certain Tokens are designed to be only transferred between certain pre-cleared accounts for regulatory reasons, and in that sense, are not truly bearer instruments.

[13] More to the point, most state laws provide an issuer’s security holders with the right to inspect its books and records under certain circumstances, including the issuer’s securities ledger.  See, e.g., §220(b) of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (the “DGCL”), available at http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc07/index.shtml#220 (“Any stockholder, in person or by attorney or other agent, shall, upon written demand under oath stating the purpose thereof, have the right during the usual hours for business to inspect for any proper purpose, and to make copies and extracts from…The corporation’s stock ledger, a list of its stockholders, and its other books and records…”).  In addition, prior to any meeting of the security holders, the issuer is typically required to prepare a complete list of the security holders entitled to vote at such meeting, and make that list available for inspection by the issuer’s security holders.  See, e.g., DGCL §219(a), available at http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc07/index.shtml#219 (“The corporation shall prepare, at least 10 days before every meeting of stockholders, a complete list of the stockholders entitled to vote at the meeting…arranged in alphabetical order, and showing the address of each stockholder and the number of shares registered in the name of each stockholder.”)

[14] See Exchange Act Rule 13d-1 [17 CFR 240.13d-1], available here https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?amp;node=17:4.0.1.1.1&rgn=div5#se17.4.240_113d_61 (imposing a reporting requirement on the direct or indirect beneficial owner of more than five percent of any class of voting equity securities registered under Exchange Act §12, subject to certain exceptions.)

[15] See Exchange Act Rule 16a-2 [17 CFR 240.16a-2], available here https://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-idx?amp;node=17:4.0.1.1.1&rgn=div5#se17.4.240_116a_62 (imposing a reporting requirement on the direct or indirect beneficial owner of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities registered under Exchange Act §12, and any director or officer of the issuer of such securities.)

[16] While this is also a risk faced by holders of non-equity Tokens such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, the difference is that holders of these Tokens typically are not required to disclose their ownership.

[17] See, e.g., David Jefferson, The Myth of “Secure” Blockchain Voting, U.S. Vote Foundation, available at https://www.usvotefoundation.org/blockchain-voting-is-not-a-security-strategy#_ftn1; Jesse Dunietz, Are Blockchains the Answer for Secure Elections? Probably Not, Scientific American, Aug. 16, 2018, available at https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/are-blockchains-the-answer-for-secure-elections-probably-not/; Ari Juels, Ittay Eyal and Oded Naor, Blockchains won’t fix internet voting security – and could make it worse, The Conversation, Oct. 18, 2018, available at https://theconversation.com/blockchains-wont-fix-internet-voting-security-and-could-make-it-worse-104830 (“Juels, Eyal & Naor”); and Stephen Shankland, No, blockchain isn’t the answer to our voting system woes, C|Net, Nov. 05, 2018, available at https://www.cnet.com/news/blockchain-isnt-answer-to-voting-system-woes/.  Regarding the risks of internet voting in general, please see New Report Identifies Steps to Secure Americans’ Votes; All U.S. Elections Should Use Paper Ballots by 2020 Presidential Election; Internet Voting Should Not Be Used at This Time, The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, Medicine, Sep. 06, 2018, available at http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=25120; Sarah Jamie Lewis, Olivier Pereira & Vanessa Teague, The use of trapdoor commitments in Bayer-Groth proofs and the implications for the verifiabilty of the Scytl-SwissPost Internet voting system, Mar. 12, 2019, available at https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/vjteague/UniversalVerifiabilitySwissPost.pdf and by Sarah Jamie Lewis, Olivier Pereira and Vanessa Teague, Trapdoor commitments in the SwissPost e-voting shuffle proof, available at https://people.eng.unimelb.edu.au/vjteague/SwissVote (analysis identifying a security flaw that would theoretically permit the administrators of Swiss Post’s e voting solution to alter votes without detection.  Swiss Post’s system is currently used in the Swiss cantons of Fribourg, Neuchâtel and Thurgau); J. Alex Halderman and Vanessa Teague, The New South Wales iVote System: Security Failures and Verification Flaws in a Live Online Election, Last Revised Jun 05, 2015, available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.05646; Scott Wolchok, Eric Wustrow, Dawn Isabel, and J. Alex Halderman, Attacking the Washington, D.C. Internet Voting System, available at http://www.ifca.ai/fc12/pre-proceedings/paper_79.pdf; Independent Report on E-voting in Estonia, Open Rights Group, available at https://estoniaevoting.org/; and Chris Culnane, Mark Eldridge, Aleksander Essex, Vanessa Teague, Trust Implications of DDoS Protection in Online Elections, submitted Aug 03, 2017, available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1708.00991.

[18] See, e.g., Juels, Eyal & Naor; Philip Daian, Tyler Kell, Ian Miers, and Ari Juels, On-Chain Vote Buying and the Rise of Dark DAOs, Hacking, Distributed, Jul. 02, 2018, available at http://hackingdistributed.com/2018/07/02/on-chain-vote-buying/ (“On-Chain Vote Buying”); and Phil Daian and Ali Yahya, a16z Podcast: Voting, Security, and Governance in Blockchains, Feb. 09, 2019), available at https://a16z.com/2019/02/09/voting-blockchains-governance-security-cryptoeconomics/?ref=tokendaily (“a16z Podcast”). See also Marty Bent and Matt Odell, Tales from the Crypt Rabbit Hole Recap: Week of 2018.11.12, beginning at 30:00, available at https://anchor.fm/tales-from-the-crypt/episodes/Rabbit-Hole-Recap-Week-of-2018-11-12-e2j942 (discussing the downsides of blockchain voting).

This post comes to us from Park Bramhall, senior counsel at the law firm of Lowenstein Sandler LLP. It is based on his recent article, “Blockchain Isn’t Always the Solution (or Why Tokenizing Equity Securities Is Not the Answer to the Proxy Voting Problem),” available here.  While Mr. Bramhall is a lawyer with Lowenstein Sandler, he has published this post independently and apart from the firm. Accordingly, the post does not reflect the views or positions of Lowenstein Sandler, its partners or employees, or any of its clients.

Categories
Finance & Economics

Initial Crypto-asset Offerings, Tokenization, and Corporate Governance

Blockchain and other types of distributed ledger technology pose various new legal and economic questions for companies. Are crypto-asset holders a new kind of corporate stakeholder? If so, are they like shareholders or bondholders, and how can they participate in the governance of a company? Are smart contracts useful tools for corporate governance? How can free-rider problems in initial crypto-asset offerings (ICOs) be solved? What is the governance of a decentralized autonomous organization (DAO)? And is there such a thing as algorithmic or distributed governance for firms?

In a new article, “Initial Crypto-asset Offerings (ICOs), tokenization and corporate governance”, we offer an interdisciplinary analysis of, and contribute to the legal and economic literature on, the potential impacts of distributed ledger technology, ICOs, STOs, and digital tokens/crypto-assets on corporate governance. The article discusses Initial Crypto-asset Offerings, which consist of ICOs and security token offerings and issuances (STOs), and several developments based on distributed ledger technology (DLT). Unlike many academic and regulatory papers, we do not focus on legal issues such as whether crypto-assets are securities[1].

DLT, its implementation through ICOs, STOs, and smart contracts, and their regulation are too new to reach definitive conclusions. Initial Crypto-asset Offerings, tokenization and tokenomics, for example, are only five years old. We are only witnessing now the potential digitalization of “financial or tangible”[2] assets and the creation of new kinds of investor rights, which raise substantial governance issues. Security tokenization could generate several beneficial effects, including simplification of regulation implementation, fractionalization of assets, redefinition of traditional asset classes (e.g. debt, equity, derivatives), and lower issuance fees (through a more efficient execution, clearing, and settlement process of securities trades)[3]. It could also provide issuers with new asset distribution channels and access to a global pool of capital with increased liquidity and more market exposure, particularly on public DLTs where transactions are public and transparent to anyone with internet connection.[4]

From a corporate governance perspective, the use of DLT and smart contracts could help in “retrofitting”[5] and strengthening the digitalization of companies’ management and in solving long-standing issues by, for example, restructuring “the old-fashioned and rigid Annual General Meeting of shareholders.”[6]

There is also an increasing probability that a new kind of corporate stakeholder will emerge: crypto-asset holders. These new actors, in conjunction with DLT and smart contracts, could lead to changes in securities issuance and trading and in shareholder involvement and dialogue with management. These new factors could reduce the cost of accessing information for minority shareholders and enhance transparency in governance while reinforcing the rights of various corporate stakeholders (due to the issuance of utility tokens)[7]. They could also create a larger role for stakeholders, rather than just shareholders, and enhance firms’ reputations online and client experiences.

The article also emphasizes the potential emergence of new ways to think about firms, management, shareholders, and other stakeholders. The path towards decentralization and the aggregation of several smart contracts could not only affect the current state of corporate governance rules, and the nexus of contractual relationships within a firm, but also the definition of a firm. The role of the board of directors, for example, could be fundamentally disrupted and evolve to a mere supervisory role of automated decisions made by computer technology. It could even become obsolete, because there are no managers or boards of directors in a decentralized autonomous organization (“DAO”). From an economic standpoint, we consider that DAO’s construction as a network of smart contracts could be compared to the “nexus of contracts” described by Jensen, Meckling, and Fama as the fundamental definition of firms[8], and propose to define DAO as a nexus of computer code contracts.

The possibility that a company would be governed by algorithmic code instead of humans (the so-called “algorithmic governance”) is still at an early stage. It is possible nevertheless that the evolution of corporate governance could be enhanced by algorithmic code. In the long term, based on a belief that algorithms are more trustworthy than humans, it could be possible to establish governance rules at least partially in computer code, and to delegate some decisions by the management of a company to algorithms that would automatically, under certain conditions, execute smart contracts and other actions.

ENDNOTES

[1] French Financial Markets Authority, “Towards a new regime for crypto-assets in France”, AMF, 15 April 2019; Directorate General for Economic Development, Research and Innovation (DG DERI) of the State of Geneva, “Guide: Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) in the Canton of Geneva”, 28 May 2018; Swiss federal financial regulator FINMA, “Guidelines for enquiries regarding the regulatory framework for initial coin offerings (ICOs)”, 16 February 2018; J. Rohr and A. Wright, “Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets”, Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 527, 5 October 2017; US federal financial markets regulator Securities and Exchange Commission, “Report of Investigation under 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO”, Release No. 81207, and “Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings”, 25 July 2017.

[2] United Kingdom regulator Financial Conduct Authority, English HM Treasury and Bank of England, “Cryptoassets Taskforce: final report”, October 2018, p. 13.

[3] D. Yermack, “Corporate Governance and Blockchains”, Oxford Review of Finance, Volume 21, March 2017.

[4] H. Marks, “The future of US securities will be tokenized”, Medium, 22 May 2018.

[5] Retrofitting is defined by Fenwick and Vermeulen as “adding digital solutions to older systems, models and organizations in the belief that this will “future proof” an existing approach and make it more efficient.” Cf. M. Fenwick and E. Vermeulen, “Technology and Corporate Governance: Blockchain, Crypto and Artificial Intelligence”, ECGI Working Paper No. 424/2018, November 2018, p. 13.

[6] A. Lafarre and C. Van Der Elst, “Blockchain Technology for Corporate Governance and Shareholder Activism”, ECGI.com, Law Working Paper N° 390/2018, March 2018; A. Lafarre and C. Van der Elst, “Blockchain and the 21st century annual general meeting”, European Company Law Journal 14, no. 4, 2017; P. Boucher, “What if blockchain technology revolutionized voting?”, European Parliamentary Research Service, September 2016.

[7] V. Akgiray, “Blockchain Technology and Corporate Governance”, Report for the OECD Corporate Governance Committee’s roundtable discussion on blockchain technologies and possible implications for effective use and implementation of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 6 June 2018.

[8] M. Jensen & W. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol.3, Issue 4, pp. 305-360, October 1976; E. Fama & M. Jensen, “Separation of Ownership and Control”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.26, No 2, pp. 301-325, June 1983; A. Wright and P. de Filippi, “Decentralized Blockchain Technology and the Rise of Lex Cryptographia”, SSRN, March 2015, p.15.

This post comes to us from Stéphane Blemus, legal counsel at the French-Swiss Kalexius Law Firm and a PhD student on blockchain and capital markets regulation at Paris Sorbonne University, and from Dominique Guégan, emeritus professor of mathematics at Paris Sorbonne University and research associate at the University Ca’ Foscari in Venice. The post is based on their recent paper, “Initial Crypto-Asset Offerings (ICOs), Tokenization and Corporate Governance,” available here.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Cleary Gottlieb on Government Scrutiny of Cryptocurrencies and ICOs

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018, Judge Raymond J. Dearie of the Eastern District of New York issued a decision holding that Initial Coin Offerings (“ICO”) may qualify as securities offerings and therefore be subject to the criminal federal securities laws. This ruling came as two U.S. regulators—the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)—announced separate actions under securities laws against companies engaged in the cryptocurrency marketplace, including the sale of digital tokens. As the popularity of cryptocurrencies grows and businesses and entrepreneurs increasingly turn to ICOs to raise capital, these developments may serve as guideposts for how cryptocurrencies and ICOs will be viewed by courts and federal regulators in cases to follow.

Background

In United States v. Zaslavskiy,[1] the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) alleged in an indictment that Maksim Zaslavskiy, the founder and sole owner of two companies purportedly in the business of investing in real estate and diamonds, engaged in securities fraud in connection with two unregistered ICOs through which he promised token purchasers profits from his companies’ investments. Specifically, the government alleged that Zaslavskiy violated securities laws by soliciting investments in two cryptocurrencies which he claimed were backed by real estate investments and diamonds, despite neither the tokens nor the underlying investments actually existing. Zaslavskiy moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that (1) the underlying cryptocurrencies did not involve securities and therefore were not governed by securities law and (2) federal securities laws are unconstitutionally vague as applied to cryptocurrencies generally and specifically as to the particular underlying coins at issue in the case.

In denying Zaslavskiy’s motion, the court found that the government’s indictment satisfied requirements of due process and notice by alleging that the cryptocurrencies were investment contracts and thus securities. The court noted that the “subsidiary question of whether the conspirators in fact offered a security, currency, or another financial instrument altogether, is best left to the finder of fact . . .,”[2] yet the court considered the parties’ arguments to “confirm [its] conclusion that the Indictment calls for a trial on the merits.”[3] The court stated that the indictment pled sufficient facts that, if proven, would permit a finding under the Howey test[4] that “Zaslavskiy promoted investment contracts (i.e. securities), through the [cryptocurrency] schemes.”[5] Additionally, the court rejected Zaslavskiy’s argument that securities laws are vague as applied to his case on the grounds that “securities laws are meant to be interpreted ‘flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purpose’”[6] and that Howey and its progeny have provided “clear guidance to courts and litigants as to the definition of ‘investment contract’ under the securities laws.”[7]

On the same day as the Zaslavskiy decision, the SEC announced it had settled charges against an “ICO Superstore” and its owners, while FINRA instituted its first cryptocurrency-related disciplinary hearing against a former broker who issued cryptocurrency in exchange for equity ownership in a worthless public company. In the Matter of TokenLot LLC., the SEC alleged that the respondents “promoted and sold digital tokens that included securities” without registering as a broker-dealer.[8] In its complaint, FINRA alleged that the respondent engaged in securities fraud and the illegal distribution of an unregistered cryptocurrency by making fraudulent statements about the nature and value of the underlying company and failing to register the cryptocurrencies.[9]

Implications

Treatment of Cryptocurrencies as Securities: The approaches taken by Judge Dearie, the SEC, and FINRA illustrate the continued difficulty of determining consistent principles for when a cryptocurrency qualifies as a security. The court’s decision in Zaslavskiy suggests that general allegations that a cryptocurrency instrument satisfies the Howey test may be sufficient to fulfill requirements for indictments at the motion to dismiss stage. This relieves the government of a potentially significant pleading burden when bringing similar actions, but does not encourage clarification of clear standards for application of the Howey test and may create a risk of inconsistent determinations since the ultimate decision will be left to a jury. Nor is this unique to the criminal context – civil courts have made similarly sweeping findings in preliminary stages of litigation that certain cryptocurrencies may be securities, but have yet to issue final rulings based on specific factual findings. Similarly, the SEC’s summary conclusion in TokenLot that the tokens at issue “included securities,”[10] without even identifying those tokens, is in line with SEC Chairman Jay Clayton’s previous suggestions that most ICOs are securities, but does not explain the particular facts and circumstances that transformed those cryptocurrencies into securities. The SEC’s conclusion also seems to diverge with FINRA’s suggestion in its complaint that the underlying cryptocurrency was “transformed . . . into a security” only after it was “tied to [the company’s] stock,”[11] or the CFTC’s position that many cryptocurrencies are instead commodities. Thus, businesses and individuals engaged in digital currencies and ICOs must continue to pay close attention to the evolving landscape in enforcement actions for guidance on when cryptocurrencies are securities.

Piecemeal Guidance: Relatedly, the Zaslavskiy court’s rejection—particularly in a criminal context—of the “vague as applied” argument adds fuel to the ongoing debate about whether regulators have provided sufficient guidance on when virtual currencies will be deemed to be securities. Some in the industry have indicated an appetite for formal guidance on the SEC’s position on digital currencies, yet to-date guidance has come largely through enforcement actions, which offer narrow and irregular insight. As we previously explained, the SEC’s occasional standalone guidance, like The DAO report, has addressed only limited types of assets without consideration to the Investment Company Act or Investment Advisers Act, thus leaving key questions unresolved. And the Zaslavskiy court’s suggestion that “[w]hether and when the SEC chooses to engage in formal rulemaking regarding the regulation of digital assets is of no moment here” is unlikely to stimulate the SEC into greater action.[12]

Evolution in Enforcement Beyond Warnings and Fraud: Finally, TokenLot reflects a break in trend from prior SEC practice in multiple respects. Most notably, TokenLot stands in contrast to prior SEC cryptocurrency cases that have largely alleged outright fraud. In TokenLot, the SEC alleged no fraud, but instead that TokenLot’s promotion and sales of cryptocurrencies as an unregistered broker-dealer violated securities laws. Additionally, as the SEC’s press release emphasized, TokenLot is the SEC’s first case charging an unregistered broker-dealer for selling digital tokens after it issued its 2017 DAO Report. Together, this suggests that the SEC’s Cyber Unit will continue to expand the range of crypto-related cases that fall within its enforcement purview.

ENDNOTES

[1] Memorandum & Order, 1:17-cr-00647-RJD-RER (E.D.N.Y.), ECF No. 37 (Sept. 11, 2018).

[2] Id. at 7.

[3] Id. at 8.

[4] In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), the Supreme Court set forth the foundational test for whether a transaction qualifies as a form of security known as an “investment contract.” Under Howey, an investment contract is a “contract, transaction, or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.” Id. at 298-99.

[5] Memorandum & Order, supra note 1, at 16.

[6] Id. at 19.

[7] Id. at 20.

[8] Securities Act Release No. 10543, Exchange Act Release No. 84075, Investment Company Act Release No. 33221, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-18739, ¶ 2 (Sept. 11, 2018).

[9] Complaint, Dep’t of Enf’t v. Ayre, FINRA Office of Hearing Officers, Disciplinary Proceeding No. 2016049307801 (Sept. 11, 2018).

[10] TokenLot, supra note 8, ¶ 2.

[11] Complaint, supra note 9, ¶ 37.

[12] Memorandum & Order, supra note 1, at 21 n. 10.

This post comes to us from Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton LLP. It is based on the firm’s blog post, “Federal Court, SEC, and FINRA Scrutinize Cryptocurrencies and ICOs,” dated September 17, 2018, and available here.

Categories
Finance & Economics Securities Regulation The Dodd-Frank Act

Did Deregulation End the “Quiet Period” of Low-Risk Banking?

From the New Deal until the 1970s, banks were on a tight leash. Regulators controlled the rate of interest they could pay on deposits. Banks could not underwrite or deal in corporate securities. With some exceptions, they could not expand geographically.

These restrictions were gradually eliminated beginning in the 1970s. Simultaneously, banking grew riskier. From the end of World War II to 1970, bank failures were virtually nonexistent. From that time on, the U.S. experienced waves of bank distress culminating in the financial crisis of 2007-09.

It is tempting to conclude that the deregulation caused the instability. I believe, however, that this confuses correlation with causation. The evidence supports a different causal story:  Macroeconomic instability unrelated to banking regulation made banks riskier. Regulators responded by loosening regulatory restrictions that were viable in an era of stable inflation and interest rates but had become untenable during the Great Inflation of the 1970s. This post will provide a brief summary of the argument that regulatory change did not cause the end of the “quiet period” of low-risk banking and, in particular, did not cause the financial crisis of 2007-09.[1]

The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement established a system of pegged exchange rates in which many developed countries agreed to maintain a nearly fixed exchange rate between their currencies and the U.S. dollar, and the U.S. agreed to allow foreign governments and central banks to convert dollars to gold at a fixed rate. The system imposed a degree of discipline on the signatories’ fiscal and monetary policies. Should a country spend excessively or hold domestic interest rates too low, it would find it difficult to maintain its currency’s tie to the dollar or, in the case of the United States, to gold.

For a 20-year period beginning in the late 1940s, the United States experienced extraordinary macroeconomic stability while operating within the constraints of the Bretton Woods system. The federal budget and current account were roughly in balance. Inflation averaged less than 2 percent per year. Interest rates were low and stable. The yield curve sloped persistently upward, allowing banks to borrow short, lend long, and make a consistent and predictable profit.

In 1971, however, facing growing inflation, a current-account deficit, and outflows of gold, President Nixon decided to sever the dollar’s link to gold. For the next 10 years, the annual increase in the Consumer Price Index would average 8.7 percent.

The United States was not the only country to experience a quiet period followed by tumult. This chart, reprinted from my above-cited article, shows median inflation rates, in percent (dashed line) and the percentage of countries experiencing banking crises (solid line) for more than a century in 66 countries accounting for over 90 percent of world GDP, courtesy of Carmen Reinhart’s web page:

Source: Reinhart and Rogoff, This Time is Different

I hope this simple chart is enough to persuade the reader that the quiet period was not primarily a function of U.S. banking regulation. It was a global phenomenon among countries with widely divergent regulatory systems.

It is also somewhat misleading to call what happened in the 1970s and 1980s “deregulation.” The number of regulatory restrictions to which banks were subject grew steadily during both decades. The principal change was in the method of regulation. In banking, as in transportation, communications, and other fields, the United States abandoned the attempt to segment markets and restrict competition within each balkanized sector. Instead, banks would be subject to safety-and-soundness regulation through capital and other prudential requirements.

In a series of thoughtful and carefully researched articles summarized in a companion blog post, Professor Arthur Wilmarth argues that the regulatory changes that began in the 1970s were not inevitable. On the specifics, he is clearly correct: Congress and regulators made choices and might have made different ones. The regulatory system we had just prior to the 2007-09 financial crisis was not the inevitable result of economic forces.

But I remain convinced that I’m right on the big picture: It’s a Wonderful Life-style banking (taking demand deposits paying 0 percent and savings deposits paying 2.5 percent, making mortgage loans paying 5.5 percent, pocketing the difference and going home at 3:00) existed because it was a wonderful economy. It was inevitable that banking would become different, and riskier, once that environment changed. The details might have come out differently, but change and additional risk were unavoidable.

Why did banks suddenly and more or less simultaneously become interested in mortgage securitization and securities and derivatives activities? They wanted to reduce the risks of the maturity transformation banking model, primarily by substituting fee-generating activities for interest rate spread-generating activities. Securitization allows banks to earn fees for originating and servicing mortgages while shifting interest rate and prepayment risk to investors. Securities brokerage and underwriting generate fee income, which banks thought would be less volatile than interest rate spreads. Swaps allow banks to hedge interest rate and exchange rate risks and to earn a bid-ask spread by making markets.

From the late 1980s through the early 2000s, macroeconomic volatility again declined, producing the so-called Great Moderation. In principle, regulators could have responded to the reduction in risk by dialing back the new powers banks had obtained. As Professor Wilmarth correctly notes, however, Congress instead enshrined them into statutory law.

Banks responded to the more benign interest rate environment by shifting activity back to borrowing short and lending long. Instead of whole mortgages, however, they held (theoretically) less risky AAA-rated tranches of mortgage-backed securities and CDOs. Shadow banks got into the game as well.  Instead of retail deposits, they financed their mortgage-related holdings through repo and commercial paper.

Banks, regulators, and economists all concluded that this new form of maturity transformation was safer than the old form because banks now had the tools to manage interest rate and prepayment risk. Moreover, thanks to geographic diversification, subordination, and other credit protections, the senior securities were default-proof unless housing prices declined nationwide by double-digit percentages, something that had never happened before.

Unfortunately, it did happen beginning in 2006. Short-term creditors of financial institutions came to doubt the value of even AAA-rated collateral. In the event, securitized mortgages performed as designed. A recent analysis finds cumulative realized losses of about 2.3 percent on AAA-rated RMBS through 2013. But even this was too much for short-term lenders: If you have the right to exit immediately at 100 cents on the dollar, it is entirely rational to do so rather than roll over your short-term loan and risk losing even a couple of cents. As a result, the trading prices of these securities fell dramatically as financial institutions rushed to liquidate them to pay back short-term creditors.

Could Congress have prevented the financial crisis by refusing to enact the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), which permitted universal banking? I am unconvinced that universal banking was a major cause of the crisis. The first systemically important institutions to come to grief, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch, were stand-alone investment banks.

Indeed, here’s the irony: Had Glass-Steagall never existed, stand-alone investment banks might not have existed either. We would more likely have had a system of universal banks engaged in lending, deposit taking, and securities and derivatives activities. If so, Lehman, et al. would have had access to insured deposits and the Fed’s discount window and been subject to prudential regulation by banking regulators (the SEC is an investor protection agency, not a prudential regulator; its brief foray into the latter did not go well.) Would this have prevented these entities from getting into so much trouble? Maybe not, but at a minimum, the Fed and FDIC would have had much clearer authority to intervene when they did get in trouble.

How much is securitization to blame for the crisis? In the mid-2000s, lenders extended mortgage credit based on housing values rather than borrower ability to repay.  Investors readily purchased the resulting securities, believing that residential real estate prices could not decline as sharply and widely as in fact occurred.

One common explanation for this phenomenon is misaligned incentives: Banks didn’t care about the quality of the mortgages they originated because they planned to sell them off. The weakness in this explanation is that the same banks that originated subprime loans and the same investment banks that underwrote subprime RMBS and CDOs also invested heavily in these securities. Had subprime lending been driven primarily by misaligned incentives, originators and underwriters would have shunned the asset class in their own investment accounts.

Why did mortgage originators make so many subprime loans during the mid-2000s? The reach for yield at a time of low interest rates was a factor. So was government pressure on banks and the GSEs to facilitate home ownership among low-income households. Another simple factor, which also helps explain the global dimension of the crisis, was that the global demand for AAA-rated, dollar-denominated assets exceeded the supply. Trade and investment imbalances led investors in China and other countries to search for dollar-denominated “safe” assets. For centuries, financial institutions have used real estate as collateral for obligations that are thought to be “safe as houses,” and they did so in the run-up to the crisis.

All of these factors have some explanatory power. I do not, however, believe that GLBA or a decades-long deregulatory wave were important contributors to the crisis.

ENDNOTE

[1] The arguments are adapted from my article Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, 104 Va. L. Rev. 235 (2018); the SSRN version can be downloaded here.

This post comes to us from Paul G. Mahoney at the University of Virginia School of Law.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Revisiting the SEC Ruling on Whether Cryptocurrencies are Securities

In June 2018, the cryptocurrency community waited with baited breath for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) decision on whether cryptocurrencies were securities, commodities, or something else.

If the commission treated them as securities, they would be subject to much greater oversight and regulation, and many U.S.-based holders would divest their holdings while incentives to innovate would decline. If, however, the SEC decided that cryptocurrencies were not securities, investors and innovators might find them even more attractive. In the end, the SEC reached a split verdict: The largest cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin and Ether would not be treated as securities but as commodities, and the newer Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) would be treated as securities

Cryptocurrency markets viewed the decision as largely positive and as having given greater legitimacy to a still nascent space whose image is mired in ambiguity to some degree. Several other points are also notable about the decision.

First, it reflects the power of the market phenomenon known as first-mover advantage, in that coins that had already been disseminated widely received better regulatory treatment.

Second, the decision highlights the importance of having a large number of participants in the market for any commodity, such that they collectively provide greater stability to the market. This reflects the underlying reasoning of the SEC in treating the established coins as commodities: Their widespread use is a trait common to commodities.

Third, and most important, the SEC’s decision highlights the need to strike a balance between innovation and accountability. The SEC wisely chose to impose oversight on new coins, which are riskier than older ones. Striking such a balance represents an effort to spur innovation, but at a measured pace and in a way that avoids the accountability risks that arise from the absence of regulation.

The SEC’s judgment sets an example for regulators in other countries, where there is still lingering (though declining) doubt about how cryptocurrencies should be regulated. What’s more, the SEC’s logic is robust and avoids a one-size-fits-all regulatory regime that might have dissuaded both investors and developers from greater participation in cryptocurrencies. It also conforms with the SEC’s “commitment to capital formation

As recently as a year ago, the regulatory regimes for cryptocurrencies around the world were largely underdeveloped and reactive. But now, there is a growing sense of clarity about what sorts of regulatory approaches are appropriate to address the risks posed by a fast-moving innovation.

This post comes to us from Usman W. Chohan, an economist at the University of New South Wales, specializing in the structures of accountability in cryptocurrencies.

Categories
Securities Regulation

Gibson Dunn Offers 2018 Mid-Year Update on Securities Litigation

The continued explosion in the number of securities class action filings is once again the big headline in our half yearly update.  The now-sustained increase in both the number of filings and average and median settlement amounts—including a five-fold increase in average settlement amounts in the first half of 2018 to $124 million from $25 million in 2017—is causing significant alarm in the securities defense bar, prompting insurance carriers and others to seek regulatory reform and explore other alternatives to reverse these trends.  The trends and critical case law updates are explored in detail below.

I. Filing and Settlement Trends

In the first half of 2018, new securities class actions filings are on pace to repeat the 2017 results of significantly exceeding annual filing rates in previous years.  According to a newly-released NERA Economic Consulting study (“NERA”),[1] 217 cases were filed in the first half of this year.  While this lags slightly behind the first half of 2017, which saw 246 new filings, the 2018 rate nonetheless substantially outpaces the average number of 235 cases filed annually over the five years from 2012-2016.  At the current pace, filings for 2018 are projected to reach 434 total cases—compared with 428 total cases filed in 2017.  So-called “merger objection” cases, which more than doubled each year from 2015 to 2017, remain a driving force although the rate of increase in the number of such cases filed has greatly slowed.  NERA projects that the number of merger objection cases filed in federal court in 2018 will be slightly greater than 2017, representing 218 projected filings of the 434 total projected federal filings for 2018 compared to 203 merger objection filings in 2017.

While the total number of such federal filings is not projected to increase drastically over the number of filings in 2017, both average and median settlement amounts are up significantly in the first half of 2018. Notably, median settlement amounts as a percentage of alleged investor losses also increased significantly, and have broken a pattern that has persisted for decades.  In the last fifteen years, median settlement amounts have never exceeded 3% of total alleged investor losses.  In the first half of 2018, that percentage is 3.9%, up sharply from 2.6% in 2017.

The industry sectors most frequently sued in 2018 continue to be healthcare (25% of all cases filed), tech (23%), and finance (16%).  Cases filed against healthcare companies in the first half of 2018 are showing the continuation of a downward trend from a spike in 2016.  Cases filed against tech and finance companies are both on pace for increases from 2017.  The tech sector’s share of filings is showing a near-doubling from 2017, with the first-half 2018 numbers indicating 23% of cases filed in this sector—up from 12% in 2017.

A. Filing Trends

Figure 1 below reflects filing rates for the first half of 2018 (all charts courtesy of NERA).  Two hundred and seventeen cases have been filed so far this year, annualizing to 434 cases. This figure does not include the many class suits filed in state courts or the rising number of state court derivative suits, including many such suits filed in the Delaware Court of Chancery.

B. Mix of Cases Filed in First Half of 2018

  1. Filings by Industry Sector

New filings for the first half of 2018 show a marked increase in cases targeting defendants in the tech industry, reversing a downward trend from 2016 and 2017.  Tech sector filings have spiked significantly, from 12% of the total in 2017 to 23% of the total for the first half of 2018.  Healthcare still owns the dubious honor as the top industry in the category of new filings, at 25% of total filings, but the industry is showing a continued downward trend from a high of 34% in 2016.  Among the top five industries by number of new cases filed so far in 2018, healthcare is the only sector on pace for fewer filings than in 2017.  Tech, finance, consumer and distribution services, and producer/manufacturing sectors each are on pace for increases from 2017.  Outside of the top-five industry sectors for new filings, all other measured industry sectors show a decline in their respective 2017 shares of new cases filed.  Of these sectors, the two reflecting the largest decline are consumer durables and non-durables (at 5%, down from 10% in 2017) and energy and non-energy minerals (at 2%, down from 7% in 2017).

  1. Merger Cases

As shown in Figure 3, 109 “merger objection” cases have been filed in federal court in the first half of 2018 alone—continuing a high rate of such filings from 2017, which saw a drastic increase in the number of such cases over previous years.  If the 2018 pace continues, this year will see an increase both in the total number of these cases filed in federal court and in the percentage of federal filings that are merger objection filings.

C. Settlement Trends

As Figure 4 shows below, after a significant decrease year-over-year from 2016 to 2017, average settlements jumped from $25 million in 2017 to an eye-popping $124 million in the first half of 2018.  As we have noted in previous updates, in any given year the statistics can mask a number of important factors that contribute to any particular settlement value.  Average and median settlement statistics also can be influenced by the timing of large settlements.  In 2017, there were no settlements at $1 billion or greater; while in the first half of 2018, $3.0 billion of a total $3.8 billion of aggregate settlement value is accounted for by settlements of $1 billion or more.    Removing settlements over $1 billion shows a much smaller increase in the average settlement—from $25 million in 2017 to $28 million in the first half of 2018.  However, as Figure 5 shows, the median settlement value, even when excluding settlements over $1 billion, still shows a significant increase from $6 million in 2017 to $16 million in the first half of 2018.  In the first half of 2018, the percentage of settlements above $100 million shows a continuation of a downward trend—from 15% in 2016 to 8% in 2017 to 6% in the first half of 2018.  The percentage of settlements below $10 million decreased substantially from 61% in 2017 to 39% in the first half of 2018, while over the same period settlements valued between $20 million and $49.9 million increased substantially from 14% to 32%.

II. What to Watch for in the Supreme Court

A. Making Sense of “Gibberish”—Cyan and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act

As readers may recall, on November 28, 2017, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County Employees Retirement Fund, No. 15-1439.  The fundamental issue in Cyan was whether Congress intended to preclude state court jurisdiction over “covered class actions” under the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) when it enacted the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (“SLUSA”) in 1998.  As amended by SLUSA, the 1933 Act provides for concurrent state and federal court jurisdiction “except as provided in section 77p of this title with respect to covered class actions.”  15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).  The Court also considered a secondary question raised by the U.S. government as amicus curiae:  whether SLUSA granted defendants the ability to remove a 1933 Act class action from state to federal court.

As we reported in our 2017 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, at oral argument, several Justices referred to SLUSA’s jurisdictional limitation as “obtuse” at best and “gibberish” at worst and seemed frustrated by the statute’s confusing language.  See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, 47.  Those concerns were not reflected, however, in the Court’s decision:  In an opinion authored by Justice Kagan and joined by all other Justices, the Court concluded on March 20, 2018 that SLUSA did not preclude state court jurisdiction over 1933 Act suits.  Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Employees Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (2018).

Parsing the statutory text, the Court explained that the “except clause” in § 77v(a) only precluded concurrent jurisdiction over class actions based on state law.  Id.  Consequently, “as a corollary of that prohibition,” SLUSA allowed state courts the ability to remove state law-based suits to federal courts for dismissal.  Id.  The Court also noted that the statute was silent with respect to class actions based on federal law, and interpreted this silence to suggest that Congress did not intend to deprive state courts of the ability to hear those cases.  Id.

The Court declined to accept Cyan’s textual argument that the definition of “covered class actions,” located in § 77p(f)(2), which denotes individual lawsuits seeking damages on behalf of more than 50 people or in which at least one named party seeks “to recover damages on a representative basis,” as well as groups of lawsuits seeking damages on behalf of more than 50 people or which have been “joined, consolidated, or otherwise proceed as a single action,” exempted all sizable class actions from state court jurisdiction, explaining that a “definition does not provide an exception, but instead gives meaning to a term.”  Id. at 1070.  The Court elaborated that Cyan’s interpretation of the definition “fits poorly with the remainder of the statutory scheme” because it would prohibit state courts from hearing any 1933 Act class actions made up of more than 50 class members regardless of whether or not they were “covered class actions” under § 77p.  Id. at 1071.

The Court similarly rejected Cyan’s legislative intent arguments, noting that SLUSA was initially created in order “[t]o prevent plaintiffs from circumventing” the requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”).  Id. at 1067.  The Court thus reasoned that “stripping state courts of jurisdiction over 1933 Act class suits” was simply not something Congress needed or intended to do in order to effect that goal.  Id. at 1072–73.  Cyan also argued that SLUSA’s legislative reports demonstrated Congress’s intent to keep securities class actions solely in federal court.  Id. at 1072.  In response, the Court explained that SLUSA already ensured that most securities class action cases would be brought in federal court by amending the Securities Act of 1934 to provide for exclusive jurisdiction in federal court.  Id. at 1073.  Ultimately, the Court summarized its decision by stating that “we have no sound basis for giving the except clause a broader reading than its language can bear.”  Id. at 1075.

The Court similarly rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that § 77p(c) permits the removal of 1933 Act cases to federal court if they allege the types of misconduct listed in § 77p(b), including “false statements or deceptive devices in connection with a covered security’s purchase or sale.”  Id.  Instead, the Court held that in light of its determination that § 77p(b) only prohibited claims based on state law, the state law claims were removable, and therefore subject to dismissal in federal court.  Id.  However, federal law suits—like Cyan—which alleged 1933 Act violations are not “covered class actions,” and therefore, they “remain subject to the 1933 Act’s removal ban.”  Id.

B. China Agritech and the Limits of American Pipe Tolling

As discussed in our 2017 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, on December 8, 2017, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, No. 17-432.  The principal issue raised by China Agritech was whether a statute of limitations is tolled for absent class members who bring successive class actions outside the applicable limitations period, rather than just individual claims.

By way of background, as readers will know, the Supreme Court held in American Pipe and Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974), that the statute of limitations is tolled by “the commencement of the original class suit” “for all purported members of the class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.”  Id. at 553.  The Court then extended this holding in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), to include “class members . . . choos[ing] to file their own suits,” effectively allowing the statute of limitations to remain tolled for individual suits by any “members of the putative class until class certification is denied.”  Id. at 354.  Crown went on to hold that in the event class certification is denied, “class members may [then] choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action.”  Id.

In Smith v. Bayer, 564 U.S. 299, 314 n.10 (2011), the Court summarized the rule of American Pipe and Crown thusly:  “[A] putative member of an uncertified class may wait until after the court rules on the certification motion to file an individual claim or move to intervene in the suit.”

At oral argument on March 26, 2018, China Agritech argued that American Pipe should not be expanded to toll the claims of “absent class members who have not shown diligence . . . by not filing their own claims when class certification was denied” and that the Court should “require that anyone who wants to file a class action come to court early and in no event later than the running of the statute of limitations.”  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3.  Several of the Justices questioned China Agritech’s push to force additional actions to file while other actions may still be pending.  Justice Sotomayor, for example, observed that “if my financial interest is moderately sized or small sized, there’s no inducement for me to do anything other than what American [Pipe] tells me to do, which is to wait until the class issues are resolved before stepping forward. . . . [Y]our regime is encouraging the very thing that American Pipe was trying to avoid, which is having a multiplicity of suits being filed and encouraging every class member to come forth and file their own suit.”  Id. at 8–9.

On the other hand, Justice Gorsuch commented that extending American Pipe could lead plaintiffs to “stack [cases] forever, so that try, try again, [] the statute of limitations never really has any force in these cases[.]”  Id. at 39.  Chief Justice Roberts echoed this concern, noting that American Pipe’s holding applied only to plaintiffs who sought to bring individual claims past the statute of limitations period and that “if you allow [plaintiffs to bring class actions after the statute of limitations have run every time class certification is denied], you’ve got to allow the third and then the fourth and the fifth.  And there’s no end in sight.”  Id. at 46.

Ultimately, these concerns about a never-ending succession of class actions prevailed, and on June 11, 2018, the Court issued an 8-1 opinion declining to extend American Pipe to successive class actions.  Specifically, the Court held that after the denial of class certification, a putative class member may not commence a new class action beyond the time allowed by the statute of limitations.  China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (2018).

The Court dismissed Resh’s concerns that such a holding would result in a “needless multiplicity” of protective class action filings, pointing to the Second and Fifth Circuits—both of which had long ago declined to extend American Pipe in this context—and neither of which has faced excessive filings as a result.  Id. at 1810.  The Court went on to explain that its decision would not harm prospective plaintiffs or require them to file a protective, duplicative class action simply to protect against possible statute of limitations issues because “[a]ny plaintiff whose individual claim is worth litigating on its own rests secure in the knowledge that she can avail herself of American Pipe tolling if certification is denied to a first putative class.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Furthermore, even if courts faced an influx of multiple pre-emptive class actions, district courts have sufficient tools, “including the ability to stay, consolidate, or transfer proceedings” to deal with such an increase in an efficient way.  Id. at 1811.

Justice Sotomayor concurred in the decision, stating that although she agreed with the majority that plaintiffs in the instant case should not be permitted to bring successive class actions under the American Pipe tolling provision, she believes that this bar should apply only to class actions brought under the PSLRA.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

Gibson Dunn represented the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Retail Litigation Center, and American Tort Reform Association as amici curie supporting China Agritech in this case.

C. Lorenzo: Can Misstatement Claims Be Repackaged as Fraudulent Scheme Claims Post-Janus?

On June 18, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Lorenzo v. Securities and Exchange Commission, No. 17-1077, which raises the question of whether a securities fraud claim premised on a misstatement that does not meet the elements set forth in the Court’s decision in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders for a Rule 10b-5(b) claim can instead be pursued as a “fraudulent scheme” claim under Rule 10b-5(a) and 10b-5(c).  See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i.  The decision could limit the scope of Rule 10b-5 and significantly affect how the SEC chooses to pursue fraud claims against defendants who are alleged to have made false statements to investors.

We expect that, in Lorenzo, the Court will further explicate its holding in Janus that only the “maker” of a fraudulent statement could be held liable for that misstatement under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5(b).  564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011).  In Lorenzo, the SEC accused brokerage firm director Francis Lorenzo of violating Rule 10b-5 by providing false information about a debenture offering to two potential investors.  Lorenzo claimed that he did not intentionally convey any false information and that he had merely copied and pasted information from an email he received from his boss without checking to see if it was accurate.  In the Matter of Francis V. Lorenzo, File No. 3-15211, at 15–16 (Dec. 31, 2013).

Nevertheless, an SEC Administrative Law Judge found that Lorenzo had violated all three parts of Rule 10b-5: (a) employing a “device, scheme or artifice to defraud;” (b) making a false statement or omitting information that misleads investors; and (c) engaging in conduct that “would operate as a fraud or deceit.”  Id. at 8–17.  This decision was affirmed by the Commission.  Id. at 17.  Lorenzo was barred from associating with other advisers, brokers, or dealers in the industry and from participating in penny stock offerings and ordered to pay a $15,000 penalty and to cease and desist from further violations.  Id. at 1.

Lorenzo appealed to the D.C. Circuit, arguing that under Janus, he could not be liable for a violation of Rule 10b-5(b) because he had not intended to convey false information to the investors and had merely transmitted information he received from his firm.  The D.C. Circuit agreed, finding that Lorenzo was not “the ‘maker’ of the false statements” and therefore could not be liable for a 10b-5(b) violation.  Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 872 F.3d 578, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit upheld the SEC’s findings that Lorenzo violated Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) and remanded back to the SEC to redetermine the appropriate sanctions.  Id. at 595.  Judge Kavanaugh dissented, arguing that the majority’s decision “create[d] a circuit split by holding that mere misstatements, standing alone, may constitute the basis for so-called scheme liability under [Rules 10b-5(a) and (c)]—that is, willful participation in a scheme to defraud—even if the defendant did not make the misstatements.”  Id. at 600 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).

Lorenzo filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on January 26, 2018.  The petition contended that the D.C. Circuit’s holding “allows the SEC and private plaintiffs to sidestep Janus’ carefully drawn out elements of a fraudulent statement claim merely by relabeling the claim—with nothing more—as a fraudulent scheme claim.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5.  Lorenzo identified a 3-2 circuit split on the issue, noting that Second, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have all held that a fraudulent scheme claim cannot be premised on misstatements alone, id. at 17–20, while the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits opine that a person can be liable for violations of Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even where they are not the “maker” of an untrue statement, id. at 20–21.  The Petition further argued that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion “erases the important distinction between primary and secondary violators of the securities laws and opens up large numbers of defendants who are secondary actors at best to claims for securities fraud—claims that would otherwise be barred in private litigation.”  Id.  The SEC filed its opposition brief on May 2, 2018, arguing that the Second, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuit’s “inconsistent” rulings on Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) violations are distinguishable because they “have involved different conduct by the defendants, and they arose out of suits brought by private plaintiffs, rather than (as in this case) an administrative enforcement action brought by the SEC.”  Respondent’s Opposition to Writ of Certiorari at 8.  Respondent further contended that “petitioner does not identify any conflict over the scope of liability under Section 17(a)(1),” which uses the same language as Rule 10b-5(a) and makes it unlawful “to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.”  Id.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 18, 2018.  We expect that the parties will submit their briefs to the Supreme Court in the Fall of 2018, with oral argument to follow in the coming months.  We will continue to monitor this matter and provide an update in our 2018 Year-End Securities Litigation Update.

D. Securities Enforcement Updates

In our 2017 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, we noted that the Court granted certiorari in two major SEC enforcement actions:  Lucia v. SEC, No. 17-130 and Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, No. 16-1276.  For further analysis of Lucia and Digital Realty, please see our 2018 Mid-Year Securities Enforcement Update.

III. Delaware Developments

A. Transactions Involving A Potentially Controlling Stockholder

Four recent decisions involved transactions with a potentially controlling stockholder.  In one, the Court of Chancery extended the MFW standard of review-shifting framework to all transactions in which a controlling stockholder receives a “non-ratable” benefit.  In another, the court concluded a company’s visionary founder was a controlling stockholder in part due to longstanding public acknowledgement of his influence.  In a similar case, the Court of Chancery held demand was excused because a majority of a board was not independent of its visionary founder, but stopped short of deciding whether that founder was a controlling stockholder.  Last, the Court of Chancery declined to enjoin a controlling stockholder from interfering with a special committee’s plan to dilute its voting control from around 80% to 17%.

  1. Controlling stockholder transactions satisfying the requirements of MFW will be reviewed under the business judgment rule.

In Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., the Delaware Supreme Court held that the business judgment rule applies to a merger between a controlling stockholder and its subsidiary where the merger is conditioned on “both the approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.”  88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014).  Late last year, the Court of Chancery extended MFW to stock reclassifications.  IRA Tr. FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017).  In Crane, NRG Yield, Inc. was dominated by a controlling stockholder, NRG Energy, Inc. (“NRG”), as part of a “yieldco” ownership structure.  When stock issuances threatened NRG’s control, the NRG-dominated board sought to eliminate or reduce the voting rights of the publicly-traded stock class through reclassification.  The independent Conflicts Committee negotiated an agreement with NRG whereby both NRG and minority stockholders were issued new classes of stock with 1/100 of a voting share each, substantially slowing down NRG’s vote dilution, and conditioned the deal on the approval of a majority of minority stockholders.  The measure passed, and a minority stockholder challenged the transaction.  As a matter of first impression, the Court of Chancery held that the reclassification’s compliance with MFW shifted the standard of review from entire fairness to the business judgment rule because “[t]he animating principle of the MFW framework is that . . . the controlled company replicates an arms-length bargaining process in negotiating and executing a transaction.”  Id. at *11.  Importantly, however, the Court of Chancery expressly extended its holding beyond reclassifications, reasoning that there is “no principled basis on which to conclude that the dual protections in the MFW framework should apply to squeeze-out mergers but not to other forms of controller transactions.”  Id.

  1. Elon Musk is Tesla’s controlling stockholder.

In In re Tesla Motors Inc. Stockholder Litigation, the Court of Chancery denied defendants’ motion to dismiss and found, “in a close call,” that the complaint sufficiently alleged that Tesla’s CEO and Chairman Elon Musk is its controlling stockholder for purposes of its 2016 acquisition of SolarCity, a Musk-related entity.  2018 WL 1560293 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018).  According to the court, Musk’s ownership of 22% of Tesla’s outstanding stock and a combination of “other factors” made him a controlling stockholder for purposes of the SolarCity acquisition.  First, Musk pitched the proposed transaction to the board on three separate occasions, and the board did not consider any other solar power companies or form an independent committee to consider the proposal.  Second, a majority of the five directors who approved the acquisition “were interested in the Acquisition or not independent of Musk.”  Id. at *17.  Third, the court relied on Musk’s and the board’s public statements acknowledging Musk’s influence on Tesla, such as Musk’s role in shaping the company’s vision, hiring executives and engineers, and raising capital.  The court concluded that the combination of Musk’s control over the board, board level conflicts, and the public acknowledgment of Musk’s influence allowed a reasonable inference that Musk enjoyed “the equivalent of majority voting control” in the transaction.  Id. at *15.

  1. A majority of Oracle’s board of directors is not independent of Larry Ellison.

In a similar vein, the Court of Chancery found that plaintiffs sufficiently alleged demand futility against the board of Oracle Corporation because the majority of the board was not independent of Larry Ellison, Oracle’s co-founder and Chairman, for purposes of the acquisition of NetSuite, Inc., another Ellison-founded company.  In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 2018 WL 1381331 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 2018).  Because a breach of loyalty claim belongs to the company, in the normal course a plaintiff must demand that the board take a particular action before bringing a lawsuit.  In lieu making a demand on the board, however, a plaintiff may plead that demand is excused because a majority of the directors were not independent or disinterested.  At the time of the challenged acquisition, Ellison owned roughly 28% of Oracle and about 45% of NetSuite.  After concluding that Ellison and the four manager directors were not independent due to Ellison’s outsized impact on the company’s day-to-day operations, the court went on to find that three other directors, including two of the three directors on the Special Committee that approved the NetSuite acquisition, had sufficient entanglements with Ellison to call into question their independence with respect to the acquisition of the Ellison-controlled NetSuite.  Specifically, those directors had substantial business ties with Ellison, and two of the three directly owed their director positions to Ellison because a majority of non-Ellison stockholders disapproved of their performance on the Compensation Committee.  Without deciding whether Ellison “qualif[ies] as a controller,” the court held that the “constellation of facts” were sufficient, “taken together, [to] create reasonable doubt” about the ability of the directors to “objectively consider a demand.”  Id. at *16, *18.

  1. Equity favors a controller’s right to protect its control preemptively.

In CBS Corp. v. National Amusements, Inc., CBS and a special committee of five independent directors sought to enjoin CBS’s controlling stockholder from interfering with their plan to dilute its voting power from around 80% to 17%.  2018 WL 2263385, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 17, 2018).  Through her control of National Amusements, Inc. (“NAI”), Shari Redstone controls 79.6% of CBS’s voting power, even though NAI owns only 10.3% of CBS’s economic stake.  Id.  According to the plaintiffs, dilution was justified by Ms. Redstone’s efforts to combine CBS with Viacom, which she also controls, and various actions she took over two years that “present[ed] a significant threat of irreparable and irreversible harm to [CBS]” and “the interests of the stockholders who hold approximately 90% of [its] economic stake.”  Id. at *1, *4.  The Court of Chancery agreed that the plaintiffs allegations were “sufficient to state a colorable claim for breach of fiduciary duty against Ms. Redstone and NAI as CBS’s controlling stockholder,” id. at *4.  Nonetheless, the court declined to issue the unprecedented temporary restraining order because case law “expressly endorsed a controller’s right to make the first move preemptively to protect its control interest” and subjected exercise of that right to further judicial review.  Id.

This dispute is ongoing, and an expedited trial is scheduled for the fall.

B. Bad Faith, Waste, And The Business Judgment Rule

Delaware’s default standard of review, the business judgment rule presumes that a company’s directors make business decisions in good faith, on an informed basis, and in the honest belief that the decisions are in the best interest of the company.  In general, unless a plaintiff rebuts this presumption, its claims will not survive a motion to dismiss.  In the first half of 2018, plaintiffs survived a motion to dismiss in three notable cases.

  1. Directors who knowingly cause a corporation to violate the law act in bad faith.

A plaintiff’s breach of loyalty claim survived a motion to dismiss where the complaint adequately alleged that “the directors knowingly permitted [the company] to continue with marketing campaigns containing false representations in violation of law.”  City of Hialeah Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Begley, 2018 WL 1912840, at *4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2018).  The defendants in Begley were directors of a company that operated DeVry University.  Id. at *1.  According to the complaint, the defendants authorized marketing campaigns that misrepresented DeVry graduates’ employment rates and income despite knowing the information was wrong and the campaigns violated federal law, resulting in the company paying over $100 million to settle various government lawsuits and investigations.  Id.  The Court of Chancery denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that specific facts alleged in the complaint supported a reasonable inference that “the defendants chose to maintain DeVry’s marketing campaign and operate DeVry in violation of law because that was the route to maximizing DeVry’s profits.”  Id. at *3.  Operating a company in violation of law to maximize profits “expose[s] [directors] to liability for acting in bad faith, which is a breach of the duty of loyalty.”  Id. at *3.

  1. A board commits waste when it fails to consider terminating an incapacitated employee earning millions of dollars.

In an “extreme factual scenario,” the Court of Chancery found that plaintiffs successfully pleaded demand futility and stated a claim for corporate waste with respect to payments made to CBS’s controlling stockholder, Sumner Redstone, during his twenty-month incapacitation beginning in 2014.  Feuer on behalf of CBS Corp. v. Redstone, 2018 WL 1870074 (Del. Ch. Apr. 19, 2018), judgment entered sub nom. Feuer v. Redstone, 2018 WL 2006677 (Del. Ch. 2018).  Despite having the inherent ability to terminate his employment agreement, CBS continued making payments to Redstone after he fell critically ill.  Id. at *12.  Because the board “made no effort to reckon with the financial consequences of Redstone’s severe incapacity,” id. at *14, however, and Redstone’s contributions during that time “were so negligible and inadequate in value that no person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem them worth the millions of dollars in salary that the Company was paying him,” the court held that the board faced “a substantial threat of liability for non-exculpated claims for waste and/or bad faith,” id. at *13, and denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

  1. A transaction negotiated by an allegedly conflicted CEO is not protected by the business judgment rule.

In In re Xerox Corp. Consolidated Shareholder Litigation, the New York Supreme Court recently enjoined a multi-billion dollar merger of Xerox Corp. and Fujifilm Holdings Corp. (“Fuji”), concluding the plaintiffs adequately rebutted the business judgment rule and showed a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims that the merger was not entirely fair.  2018 WL 2054280, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Apr. 27, 2018).  The merger arose from a decades-long joint venture between Xerox and Fuji whose governing documents made it difficult for Xerox to do a deal with anyone else.  Id. at *2.  The transaction was structured so that Fuji would transfer its 75% stake in the joint venture without additional consideration to Xerox and be issued enough new Xerox shares to become its 50.1% stockholder; simultaneously, Xerox would borrow $2.5 billion to pay its non-Fuji stockholders a special dividend in the same amount.  Id. at *1.  The Supreme Court enjoined the deal, however, because Xerox’s CEO, who negotiated the deal, was “massively conflicted” and a majority of Xerox’s board lacked independence.  Id. at *7.  According to the court, the CEO was conflicted because after Carl Icahn, Xerox’s largest stockholder, stated his preference for an all-cash deal and convinced the board to fire the CEO, the CEO negotiated a non-cash deal in which he would remain as the CEO of the combined entity.  Id.  The court also concluded that Xerox’s board lacked independence from the CEO because he recommended by name a majority of Xerox’s directors to continue as directors after the merger.  Id.

This decision is on appeal to the First Department.

C. Delaware Continues to Restrict Appraisal Awards

In our 2017 Year-End Update, we reported on the significant shift in Delaware appraisal law in Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).  In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “[t]here is no requirement that a company prove that the sale process is the most reliable evidence of its going concern value in order for the resulting deal price to be granted any weight,” id. at 35, and reversed “the trial court’s decision to give no weight to any market-based measure of fair value.”  Id. at 19.

The Court of Chancery began interpreting the high court’s directives in the first half of 2018.  In Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., for example, the Court of Chancery interpreted Dell as (i) endorsing a company’s unaffected market price and deal price as reliable indicators of value when, respectively, the market for the company’s stock is efficient or a third-party merger is negotiated at arm’s length; and (ii) cautioning against relying on discounted cash flow analyses when such reliable market indicators are available.  2018 WL 2315934, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 21, 2018) (awarding $17.13 per share—the unaffected market price and significantly below the $24.67 deal price—as the only reliable indicator of value).  And in In re AOL, Inc., the Court of Chancery found the deal was not “Dell-compliant” based both on provisions in the merger agreement and on the CEO’s public statements that the deal was “done.”  2018 WL 1037450, at *1 (Del. Ch. Feb. 23, 2018) (conducting its own discounted cash flow analysis where the deal price was unreliable, but awarding a price close to it).  These two cases suggest that while there may continue to be some uncertainty as to when and how the Delaware Court of Chancery will choose among market indicators of a company’s value, the Court will continue to enforce the Supreme Court’s directive to use market factors to determine the fair value of a company’s stock, which should continue to keep appraisal awards in check.

IV. Loss Causation Developments

The first half of 2018 saw several notable circuit court opinions addressing loss causation, including continued developments relating to Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014), discussed below in Section VI.

Leading the way, on January 31, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued a per curiam opinion resolving a perceived ambiguity in prior precedent regarding the correct test for loss causation under the Exchange Act.  See Mineworkers’ Pension Scheme v. First Solar Inc., 881 F.3d 750 (9th Cir. 2018).  The First Solar court held that “to prove loss causation, plaintiffs need only show a causal connection between the fraud and the loss . . . by tracing the loss back to the very facts about which the defendant lied.”  Id. at 753 (internal citations and quotation marks removed).  This test does not require loss causation to rest on a revelation of fraud to the marketplace.  Instead, “[a] plaintiff may also prove loss causation by showing that the stock price fell upon the revelation of an earnings miss, even if the market was unaware at the time that fraud had concealed the miss.”  Id. at 754.  In so holding, the Ninth Circuit rejected a more “restrictive view,” in which “[s]ecurities fraud plaintiffs can recover only if the market learns of the defendants’ fraudulent practices” before the claimed loss.  Id. at 752.  As long as the revelation that caused the decline in a company’s stock price is related to the facts allegedly concealed, a plaintiff has adequately plead loss causation for the purposes of stating a claim under the Exchange Act.  At least one district court has relied upon First Solar to deny a defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of loss causation.  See Mauss v. NuVasive, Inc., No. 13CV2005 JM (JLB), 2018 WL 656036, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 1, 2018) (rejecting defendants’ argument that plaintiffs failed to show that the market learned of the actual fraud, because “the Ninth Circuit does not require that fraud be affirmatively revealed to the market to prove loss causation”).

Over in the Fourth Circuit, a split panel issued a decision on February 22, 2018 holding that a plaintiff can plead loss causation based on “an amalgam” of two theories: corrective disclosure and the materialization of a concealed risk.  Singer v. Reali, 883 F.3d 425 (4th Cir. Feb. 22, 2018).  The complaint in Singer alleged that TranS1, Inc., a medical device company, and its officers made misrepresentations and omissions in public filings by failing to disclose that a large portion of TranS1’s revenues were generated by a purportedly fraudulent reimbursement scheme.  In vacating the lower court opinion dismissing the complaint, the majority concluded that two disclosures highlighted in the complaint—a Form 8-K reporting that TranS1 had received a subpoena from the Department of Health and Human Services and an analyst report revealing that the subpoena sought communications relating to certain reimbursements—sufficiently revealed information for investors to recognize that defendants had perpetrated a fraud on the market.  Id. at 447.  Moreover, the allegation that the disclosures resulted in a 40% stock price drop was sufficient to plead that the revelation of the purported fraud was at least “one substantial cause” of the drop.  Id.  The decision in Singer adds to the debate about the extent to which the disclosure of a government investigation, without a later disclosure of wrongdoing, is sufficient to establish loss causation.  See, e.g., Public Employees’ Retirement System of Mississippi v. Amedisys, Inc., 769 F.3d 313, 323-24 (5th Cir. 2014) (“commencement of government investigations . . . do not, standing alone, amount to a corrective disclosure,” but can support a finding of loss causation when coupled with other disclosures); Meyer v. Greene, 710 F.3d 1189, 1201 (11th Cir. 2013) (company disclosure of SEC investigations were not “corrective disclosures” for the purposes of loss causation); SEC investigation was insufficient to plead loss causation).

2018 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update: Falsity of Opinions Under Omnicare

As we have reported in our past several updates, courts continue to grapple with the reach of Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).  The Supreme Court’s Omnicare decision addressed the scope of liability for false opinion statements under Section 11 of the Securities Act.  The Court held that “a sincere statement of pure opinion is not an ‘untrue statement of material fact,’ regardless whether an investor can ultimately prove the belief wrong.”  Id. at 1327.  An opinion statement can give rise to liability only when the speaker does not “actually hold[] the stated belief,” or when the opinion statements contains “embedded statements of fact” that are untrue.  Id. at 1326–27.  In addition, the Court held that a factual omission from a statement of opinion gives rise to liability only when the omitted facts “conflict with what a reasonable investor would take from the statement itself.”  Id. at 1329.

In the first half of 2018, two courts issued notable opinions about how Omnicare applies to disclosure of financial information.  The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied a motion to dismiss when plaintiffs alleged that defendants issued false opinions about the company’s financial health by recognizing revenue in violation of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.  In re Capstone Turbine Corp. Sec. Litig., No. CV 15-8914, 2018 WL 836274, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. 2018).  The parties disputed whether the amount of revenue recognized in a particular period is an opinion or a statement of fact, and the court held that “revenue is an opinion with an embedded fact,” clarifying that “[t]he fact is the actual quantity of the sales and the opinion is that collectability on these sales is reasonably assured.”  Id. at *6.  The court further concluded that the falsity of the opinion portions of the statements regarding revenue recognition were sufficiently pled under Omnicare because the complaint alleged facts showing that defendants knew collectability was not reasonably assured.  Id. at *7.  In the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, plaintiffs brought a suit under Massachusetts security law, which closely mirrors federal securities law, alleging that an auditor’s statement of compliance with PCAOB standards was false.  Miller Inv. Trust v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 11-12126, 2018 WL 1567599 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2018) appeal docketed No. 18-1460 (1st Cir. May 17, 2018).  Acknowledging that courts have reached contradictory conclusions as to whether an auditor’s statements of compliance are statements of fact or statements of opinion, the court ultimately reasoned that “statements by auditors of their own compliance with [standards] are statements of fact” even though “one auditor may apply the standards differently from another.”  Id. at *11–12.

Omnicare continued to act as a pleading barrier to securities fraud claims in the first half of this year, with courts paying close attention to the role of context in determining whether an opinion could be allegedly false.  For example, in Martin v. Quartermain, investors alleged that a mining company’s opinion statements expressing continued optimism in its mining operations were false when the company failed to disclose that one of its experts had expressed doubt.  No. 17-2135, 2018 WL 2024719 (2d Cir. May 1, 2018).  Investors alleged that the opinion was false on two theories:  first, that company did not actually believe its statement of continued optimism given that one of its experts had expressed concern with the mine’s projected viability; and, second, that the company’s failure to disclose this concern was an omission that made the opinion statement misleading to a reasonable investor.  Id. at 2.  As to the first theory, the court held that the plaintiffs failed to show that the company believed the concerned expert instead of the optimistic projection, so plaintiffs failed to show that the company did not hold the stated belief.  As for the second theory, the Second Circuit concluded that omitting the concerned expert’s views did not render the opinion misleading when viewed in context, even if the company knew “but fail[ed] to disclose some fact cutting the other way.”  Id. at *3 (citing Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. at 1329).  The court reasoned that the risk that a mine will not be successful is part of the “broader frame” of the industry that a reasonable investor would understand as part of the “weighing of competing facts.”  Id. (citing Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1329).

Similarly, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York rejected allegations that a company’s guardedly optimistic assessments about the implementation of a new software program were false because they did not include disclosure of implementation challenges the company was facing.  Oklahoma v. Firefighters Pension and Ret. Sys. v. Xerox Corp., 300 F. Supp. 3d 551, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal docketed No. 18-1165 (2d Cir. April 20, 2018).  The court reasoned that these “quintessential statements of opinion” were not false even though the defendant only disclosed in general terms the challenges it was facing because a reasonable investor “does not expect that every fact known to an issuer supports its opinion statement.”  Id. at 577 (citing Omnicare, 135 S. Ct. 1329).  Another court in the Southern District of New York permitted an omission claim to proceed, but this case may simply highlight how difficult it is to overcome Omnicare.  Plaintiffs alleged that Blackberry’s optimistic sales projections were contradicted by omitted data Blackberry had about its sales numbers.  Pearlstein v. Blackberry Ltd., No. 13-CV-7060, 2018 WL 1444401 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2018).  In their second amended complaint, plaintiffs supplemented these allegations with evidence that came to light in a related criminal trial that revealed that Blackberry had adverse sales data when it issued its optimistic projections.  The court concluded that Blackberry’s failure to disclose adverse sales data could plausibly be misleading to a reasonable investor.  Id. at *3–4.  Most plaintiffs, of course, do not have the benefit of evidence unearthed in a related criminal proceedings to demonstrate that an opinion is false.

Further highlighting the barriers imposed by Omnicare, two courts in the first half of this year also rejected claims alleging that pharmaceutical companies made false statements about their clinical trials.  One court held that plaintiff’s allegations that defendants issued a false opinion when they opined on a drug’s efficacy but failed to disclose an allegedly flawed clinical methodology did not support a Section 10(b) claim because plaintiff’s claims amounted to nothing more than an attack on the trial’s methodology.  Hoey v.  Insmed Inc., No. 16-4323, 2018 WL 902266, at *9, 14 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2018).  The court noted that the failure to reveal that the results of a study were inaccurately reported or that a study was manipulated to conceal data may support allegations that an omission made a statement of opinion misleading, but that disagreements over the proper methodology will not support such an allegation.  Likewise, a company’s failure to disclose the recurrence of a known side effect did not render opinions that the clinical trial was “predictable and manageable” and that the company was seeing “favorable clinical data” false or misleading since a reasonable investor would expect the recurrence of a known side effect.  In re Stemline Therapeutics, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 17 CV 832, 2018 WL 1353284, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2018) appeal docketed No. 18-1044 (2d Cir. Apr. 12, 2018).

Courts in the first half of 2018 also provided guidance for companies making opinion statements about legal and compliance risks.  The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas rejected allegations that a company’s opinion that it was in “substantial compliance” with regulations was false on the ground that a regulatory agency had sent informal communications and had issued two infraction notices about recordkeeping practices on a different and small part of the company’s large-scale and pipeline operations.  In re Plains All Am. Pipeline, L.P. Sec. Litig., No. H:15-02404 2018 WL 1586349, at * 38–39 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2018) appeal docketed No. 18-20286 (5th Cir. May 7, 2018).  The court reasoned that the opinion that the company was in “substantial compliance,” when combined with other hedges and qualifications, would inform a reasonable investor that the company was operating in substantial, but not perfect, compliance with relevant laws.  Id. at *39.  On the other hand, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia permitted a claim to proceed where the defendant opined that it had been in material compliance with the laws and that pending lawsuits had no merit because plaintiffs’ complaint sufficiently alleged that defendant had been informed by legal counsel that its model was not in compliance with applicable laws.  In re Flowers Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 7:16-CV-222, 2018 WL 1558558, at *7–8 (M.D. Ga. Mar. 23, 2018).

V. Halliburton II Market Efficiency and “Price Impact” Cases

Courts across the country continue to grapple with implementing the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (“Halliburton II“), and the first half of 2018 did not bring any new decisions from the federal circuit courts of appeal.  In Halliburton II, the Supreme Court preserved the “fraud-on-the-market” presumption—a presumption enabling plaintiffs to maintain the common proof of reliance that is essential to class certification in a Rule 10b-5 case—but made room for defendants to rebut that presumption at the class certification stage with evidence that the alleged misrepresentation had no impact on the price of the issuer’s stock.  Two key questions continue to recur: first, how should courts reconcile the Supreme Court’s explicit ruling in Halliburton II that direct and indirect evidence of price impact must be considered at the class certification stage, Halliburton II, 123 S. Ct. at 2417, with its previous decisions holding that plaintiffs need not prove loss causation or materiality until the merits stage, see Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 563 U.S. 804 (2011) (“Halliburton I“); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 568 U.S. 455 (2013).  And second, what standard of proof must defendants meet to rebut the presumption with evidence of no price impact of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 237 (1988)?

As we reported in our 2017 Year-End Securities Litigation Update, the Second Circuit recently addressed both of these key questions in Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017) (“Barclays“) and Ark. Teachers Ret. Sys. v. Goldman Sachs, 879 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2018) (“Goldman Sachs“).  Those decisions remain the most substantive interpretations of Halliburton IIBarclays addressed the standard of proof necessary to rebut the presumption of reliance and held that after a plaintiff establishes the presumption of reliance applies, defendant bears the burden of persuasion to rebut the presumption by a preponderance of the evidence.  As we have previously noted, this puts the Second Circuit at odds with the Eighth Circuit, which cited Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence when reversing a trial court’s certification order on price impact grounds, see IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., 818 F.3d 775, 782 (8th Cir. 2016), because Rule 301 assigns only the burden of production—i.e., producing some evidence—to the party seeking to rebut a presumption, but “does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.”   In Goldman Sachs, the Second Circuit directed that price impact evidence must be analyzed prior to certifying a class, even if price impact “touches” on the issue of materiality.  Goldman Sachs, 879 F.3d at 486.  In April, the Supreme Court declined to take up the Barclays case, Waggoner v. Barclays PLC, 875 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1702 (2018), and Goldman Sachs remains pending before the Southern District of New York on remand, where an evidentiary hearing and oral argument on class certification was held on July 25, 2018.

The Third Circuit is poised to be the next to substantively address the issue, as the court recently agreed to review Li v. Aeterna Zentaris Inc., 324 F.R.D. 331 (D.N.J. 2018) (“Aeterna“).  See Order, Vizirgianakis v. Aeterna Zentaris, Inc., No. 18-8021 (3d Cir. Mar. 30, 2018).  That ruling is likely to address the nature of the evidence a defendant must put forward to defeat plaintiff’s presumption of reliance.  Before the district court, defendants sought to rebut plaintiffs’ presumption of reliance by challenging plaintiffs’ expert’s event study for failing to demonstrate price impact to the industry’s standard level of confidence.  Aeterna, 324 F.R.D. at 344-45.  The argument failed to convince the court, which noted that (1) plaintiffs’ report had been prepared to show an efficient market, not to demonstrate price impact, (2) the report’s failure to find a movement with 95% confidence did not prove the “lack of price impact with scientific certainty,” and (3) defendants did not present any competent evidence of their own to demonstrate price impact.  Id. at 345 (citation omitted).  Defendants’ 23(f) petitions requesting review of class certification on price impact grounds are pending in several other circuit courts of appeal.

This post comes to us from Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “2018 Mid-Year Securities Litigation Update,” dated July 26, 2018, and available here.

 

Categories
Securities Regulation

Davis Polk Discusses Ninth Circuit Approval of Securities Suit Over Unsponsored ADRs

On July 17, 2018, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion in Automotive Industries Pension Trust Fund v. Toshiba Corp., No. 16-56058 (9th Cir. July 17, 2018), holding that the Supreme Court’s Morrison decision does not preclude purchasers of Toshiba’s unsponsored American Depository Shares or Receipts (“ADRs”) in the over-the-counter (“OTC”) market from maintaining securities claims under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 against Toshiba.  The Ninth Circuit’s decision reverses the district court’s dismissal of the securities claims under Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).  The Ninth Circuit held that Morrison permits such claims, so long as plaintiffs are able to plead and ultimately establish that their purchases occurred within the United States in accordance with the “irrevocable liability test” previously adopted in other circuits to determine whether the sale or purchase of securities not occurring on an exchange takes place in the United States.  For now, at least within the Ninth Circuit, this ruling eliminates for the purposes of Morrison the distinction between sponsored and unsponsored ADR programs and makes clear that issuers with unsponsored ADR programs can be subject to private federal securities claims relating to domestic ADR transactions.  As a result, under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, it is possible that issuers which took no action to cause the unsponsored ADRs to be traded within the United States could nonetheless be subject to Section 10(b) claims.

The Ninth Circuit addressed three questions: (1) whether ADRs are securities; (2) whether the OTC market on which the ADRs were purchased constituted an exchange; and (3) whether Morrison precluded the claims.

The Ninth Circuit’s answers to the first two questions are consistent with numerous previous decisions holding that (1) ADRs are securities, and (2) the OTC market does not constitute an exchange.  The third question—i.e., how to apply Morrison to unsponsored ADR purchases in the OTC market—is a question of first impression at the Circuit Court of Appeal level.  The district court’s opinion insulating issuers from Section 10b claims under Morrison with respect to claims by U.S. OTC purchasers of unsponsored ADRs was, prior to the Ninth Circuit’s opinion, the only published decision to address the application of Morrison to unsponsored ADR programs directly.

In Morrison and cases throughout the country interpreting it, two independent paths to satisfying the domestic transaction requirement of Morrison have emerged.  One, the transactions at issue are within the scope of Section 10(b) if they occur on a domestic exchange.  Two, transactions are within the scope of Section 10(b) if they otherwise occur within the United States, even if off-exchange.  The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the OTC Link is not an exchange meant that plaintiffs’ claims could not satisfy the first of Morrison’s independent prongs for permitting Section 10(b) claims.  However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the purchases of Toshiba’s ADRs in the U.S. OTC market could satisfy Morrison’s second prong, provided plaintiffs can satisfy the “irrevocable liability” test applied by other circuits to determine where a purchase or sale of a security off-exchange occurs.  Under this test, courts consider where purchasers incurred the liability to take and pay for securities, and where sellers incurred the liability to deliver securities.  If irrevocable liability for either is incurred inside the United States, then the transaction is deemed domestic, and potentially subject to the Exchange Act.  Factual allegations related to the contract formation, placement of purchase orders, passing of title, and the exchange of money inform the analysis.  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ complaint failed to sufficiently plead that the relevant transactions occurred in the United States.  But the Court found that plaintiffs could likely amend their complaint to do so, and therefore remanded the case to the district court.

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling rejects the notion that, under Morrison, a domestic transaction is a necessary but not necessarily sufficient condition to the maintenance of a private securities claim.  That “necessary, but not sufficient condition” rationale was employed by the district court in dismissing the claim, but the Ninth Circuit in its decision concludes that a domestic transaction is sufficient under Morrison.  As a result of this decision, foreign corporations with unsponsored ADR programs in the United States may well see an increase in Exchange Act cases.

Circuit Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw wrote the opinion and was joined by Circuit Judge William A. Fletcher and District Court Judge Wiley Y. Daniel of the U.S. District Court for Colorado, sitting by designation.

This post comes to us from Davis, Polk & Wardwell LLP. It is based on the firm’s memorandum, “Ninth Circuit Holds That Section 10(b) Reaches Domestic Purchases of Unsponsored ADRs and That the Supreme Court’s Morrison Decision Does Not Preclude Claims Against Issuers Arising Out of Such Purchases,” available here.